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ABSTRACT 
 
As the European Year of Citizens (2013) dawns, the European Union (EU) finds itself at a crossroads. 
One of the largest international organisations in the world, it has built a reputation as an 
international community model and democratic figure judged in the context of a multi-level system. 
However, the EU has recently departed from both roles, as its economic practices suffer dramatically 
from a lack of political pressure and regulation. One after another, member states admit to major 
economic struggles with some admitting to failing economies, as excessive private and public debt 
and a lack of competitiveness has caused one of the worst financial crises in the history of the EU. 
The EU now faces an uncertain future: should it break apart or move forward with deeper 
integration and a “more Europe” attitude? In contrast to public and scholarly concern, this thesis 
does not treat the crisis as abstract evidence of a structural democracy deficit that signifies the end 
unless cured. This thesis instead attempts to draw attention to the point of departure, the European 
citizen, and a social cleavage that can be easily addressed despite ongoing economic insecurity. In 
this sense, this thesis differs from current academic thought in that it focuses less on understanding 
how democracy can be achieved and more on understanding how democracy, which already exists, 
can be enhanced. Such a line of thinking recognises that one of the great challenges to a national 
democracy is balancing the often conflicting requirements of protecting the rights of individual 
citizens whilst honouring international responsibilities that come with being signatories to 
international treaties. The EU faces the same challenges, adjusted for its multi-level governance 
structure, and its ability to be socially responsible had been severely tested long before the crisis, 
since the initiation of the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights (CFHR). Two discourses relative to 
the implementation of the citizens’ needs and rights set out in the CFHR were identified in the 
literature: civil society, where the third sector is utilised to educate citizens on the EU and its 
policies, and cosmopolitanism, a more recent theory of democracy that prioritises the individual 
rather than the nation-state in global political situations. This paper looks at how the two discourses 
could be combined in a governance framework that would support the EU to become a civilian 
power once again. It will complete this investigation through the use of case studies on two civil 
society organisations based in Spain and primary data collected from within the European 
Parliament (EP), to understand how local civil society can improve the democratic quality of EU 
governance whilst meeting individuals’ needs and rights. This paper will conclude that, in the case of 
Spain 2012, local civil society creates three core conditions for active citizen participation that, 
following minor adjustment to European policy-making and the construction of a pan-European 
space, the EU can benefit from, despite the challenging environment surrounding it.     
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INTRODUCTION 
0.1 Background to the study 
As the EU continues to battle an ongoing financial and economic crisis, the predominant argument 
presented by media commentators is that the organisation faces a grave future. It could instead be 
argued that the EU now has an opportunity to recover the support of its citizens and to act 
collectively – as a Union. The year 2013, the “European Year of Citizens,” brings with it the message 
"the European Citizen Matters" and a platform upon which the relationship between the EU and the 
European citizen can be rebuilt. Of course, the manifestation of a sound economic plan in these 
uncertain times is a long-term priority for the EU. But there is truth in the words of President of the 
European Commission José Barroso, whose recent comments firmly emphasised that European 
spending is just as much about economic growth as it is about social cohesion. Barroso told the EP in 
Strasbourg in November 2012 that ‘compromises have to be constructive’1 and this is especially 
important when budgetary spending amounts to only one percent of the Union’s gross domestic 
product.  
As a form of transnational governance, the EU is represented by a body of law, usually held superior 
to the law of its member states, and has a founding Treaty. Legislative proposals are put forward by 
the European Commission (EC) and adopted by the Council of Ministers (CoM) as well as the EP.2 
Known as the Community Method, the EU decision-making process has a dual mandate, where the 
EP represents the citizens and the CoM represents elected governments of EU member states. At 
times, the Community Method will also draw on consultation with other bodies such as the 
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) or the Committee of the Regions (CoR) in a whole-
of-government approach (local, regional, national, transnational). Thus, the functioning of the EU 
governance system is a representative democracy, where citizens are represented through the array 
of supranational institutions present at the European level.  
Despite existing democratic principles and a proactive policy-making process, the EU continues to 
meet criticism that it ‘has never been democratic.’3 One of the great challenges of a parliamentary 
                                                            
1 David Trifunov, "European Budget Talks Must Be 'Constructive,' EC President Says," GlobalPost November 21, 
2012. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/business/debt-crisis/121121/european-union-budget-talks-
barroso-euro-zone (Last accessed 20 December, 2012).  
2 Commission of the European Communities, "Governance Statement of the European Commission," (Brussels: 
European Union, 30 May 2007). European Union, "European Council," europa.eu, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/institutions-bodies/european-council/index_en.htm. (Last accessed 5 June, 2012); ———, "European 
Parliament," europa.eu, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/portal/en. (Last accessed 5 June, 2012). 
3 Alex Warleigh, Democracy and the European Union: Theory, Practice and Reform  (Sage, 2003). 1. 
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democracy is balancing the often conflicting requirements of protecting the rights of individuals as 
citizens whilst honouring responsibilities that come with being signatories to an international 
organisation. The EU, in this respect, has been severely tested given that there is no European 
Government identifiable as the responsibility bearer and rights provider. As a result, the citizens of 
Europe ‘do not feel the institutions act as an effective channel’4 for their views and it is likely their 
knowledge and understanding of these institutions will be minimal. Additionally, the EU does not 
have a constitution, due to the rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2005 by France and the 
Netherlands and thus has failed to bring the legislative process closer to the lives of the citizens it 
affects.  
Furthermore, it is questionable whether those formal sources of law that exist to protect the rights 
of citizens, such as the CFHR of the EU, provide valid grounds to review EU actions. A European 
Council decision to establish a CFHR was made in order to take the rights of citizens to the EU level 
and ‘make their overriding importance and relevance more visible [author italic]’5 to member states. 
The keywords more visible do very little to support the contention that EU law is held superior to the 
law of its member states. In fact, it almost counteracts the point of having a Charter as a form of law 
at the European level if the individual cannot enjoy the rights of Union citizenship because such 
citizenship cannot surpass the nation-state. Naturally, all European initiatives are essentially 
designed on behalf of the EU citizen and policy-makers wish to avoid adding unnecessary legislation. 
Yet there was recognition that the concept of Union citizenship needed strengthening and thus the 
Union initiated a citizenship development programme.6 Unfortunately, the programme remains 
almost as unheard of today as it was at its initiation in 2000. Policy continues to do little to 
communicate with citizens that the EU values their participation as a useful strategy in the 
immediate future. While a commitment to social cohesion is promised in the form of Barroso’s 
spoken word, there is yet to be any major movement forward, financial or otherwise, by the 
European institutions, which is not a promising start for the year of the citizen. The EU is at a 
standstill as to how to move forward. While desire for change is present, the challenge still exists to 
solidify the relationship between the EU and its citizens. 
                                                            
4 Commission of the European Communities, European Governance: A White Paper. COM(2001) 428 Final. 
Brussels, (July 2001). 7. 
5 Cologne European Council, "Presidency Conclusions," (Cologne: European Union, 3 and 4 June 1999), Annex 
IV. 
6 From the year 2000 to 2006, the programme ‘Citizenship’ was developed to improve citizen participation 
within the Union. Following the year 2006, the programme ‘Europe for Citizens’ was started in 2007 and runs 
until mid-year 2013. The emphasis in Europe for Citizens is less on improving participation and more on giving 
citizens a ‘key role’ in the Union’s governance structure. See Audiovisual & Cultural Executive Agency 
Education, "Europe for Citizens Programme," Europa, http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/citizenship/index_en.php. 
(Last accessed 19 July, 2012).    
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The gap in knowledge is two-fold. First, although acknowledged as a key issue, there remains little 
discussion about what political and even economic rationales might exist at the Union level that 
justify an increased effort to bring the Union closer to its citizens. Second, any effort that has been 
made remains at the European level. The Treaties, the Constitution, the development programmes; 
there is a wealth of documentation and projects initiated at the international level but very little 
emphasis on citizen-led initiatives. Both gaps, when considered in conjunction, reflect the issue of 
democratisation versus the problem of creating a democratic milieu. Currently, there is no 
theoretical body of democracy that well addresses the reality of the present day EU in terms of the 
importance of the relationship between the Union and the ordinary European citizen. The aim of this 
thesis therefore, is to test a mixed theoretical model of democracy that utilises local civil society as 
the tool for strengthening the EU governance system on the assumption it can engage individuals in 
various civic activities and whose active participation can contribute to the improvement of the 
democratic quality of the Union. In doing so, this thesis will address the need to spark an academic 
discussion on the relationship between the Union and the European citizen during the Year of the 
European Citizen. The EU needs to stay true to its message for 2013 and become a Europe for its 
citizens and less of a Europe facing criticism. 
0.2 Primary Research Question and Sub-questions  
Evidently, citizen participation in the EU’s policy and decision-making processes is paramount to its 
success as a democratic organisation. If individuals, as European citizens, are unable to participate or 
are restricted in terms of their participation in the Union’s governance, it reflects poorly on the 
democratic quality of the EU. Given that attempts to date to keep the European citizen involved in 
an ever-integrating EU governance system have been initiated primarily at the international level, 
the primary research question thus asks, how can local civil society (defined here as “organised 
groups of civilians advancing public opinion and political equality”7) further the democratic quality of 
European Union governance (the case of Spain, 2012)? The research question will be approached 
from two angles. First, it is necessary to ensure a democratic governance framework that supports 
both high-level and grassroots approaches and prioritises individual rights exists at least in 
theoretical terms. Second, the specific reference to local civil society demonstrates where the 
empirical scope of the research will be centred: can civil society act as the platform from which 
citizen involvement within the Union governance structure can occur? It is important to note here 
                                                            
7 European Economic and Social Committee, "Le rôle et la contribution de la société civileorganisée dans la 
construction européenne (The role and contribution of civil society within the European construction)," 
(Document CES 851/99, September 1999). 
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that the choice to focus on local civil society follows the lengthy and complicated introduction of the 
civil society discourse to the EU.8 There remains a lot to be learnt about the role civil society can play 
in international governance structures, given that an organisation such as the EU is characterised by 
its complex relationships between multiple actors, public and private. The primary research 
question, while inclusive of both the dependent and independent variables of the research,9 
introduces a number of sub-questions necessary to the research approach. 
In this thesis, strengthening the democratic quality of EU governance starts with strengthening the 
democratic quality of democracy as a notion. Sub-question one thus seeks to find out where existing 
theory is unable to advance the Union democratically. It asks: what will this advancement of 
democracy look like and what will be its major components? Sub-question one directly calls into 
question how current models of democracy can be utilised in this research and, in particular, those 
with a focus on bottom-up strategies that assist in the achievement of direct citizen participation. 
Sub-question one will be the most important question for the research approach as it suggests how 
the research will contribute to the body of knowledge on enhancing the democratic quality of EU 
governance. The second sub-question flows from sub-question one by addressing one of the 
strategies often used in connection with democratisation due to the potential for impact at the 
ground level. It asks: is there a political and economic rationale at the Union level to further the case 
for more grassroots-focused policy and thus the case for deeper engagement of local civil society? 
This sub-question examines the incentives behind the need for increased adoption by the Union of 
social policies with a mix top-down and bottom-up governance strategies working to engage the 
citizen. In other words, before the question of how can civil society help enhance the democratic 
quality of the Union can be answered, it must be acknowledged whether a legislative system that 
supports a dependence on social policy is economically and politically desirable. This is particularly 
important from the political perspective, given that this push in social policy is occurring in a time of 
recession and in an age in which political solutions must work around budget cutting.  
                                                            
8 As recently as the end of 2011, an initiative was launched called Voices and Views, which brought together 80 
stakeholders in Brussels to discuss the form of future dialogue between the European institution, civil society 
organisations and local authorities. It was acknowledged in an article on Voices and Views that one of the 
initiative’s biggest accomplishments was the encouragement of the European Commission to use the wording 
‘civil society organisations’ instead of ‘non-state actors’ in future correspondence. See Coordination Team 
EUROPEAID, "Voices & Views, Continuing Structured Dialogue with Civil Society Organisations and Local 
Authorities,"  Development and Cooperation (31 January 2012), 
http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/article/continuing-structured-dialogue-civil-society-organisations-and-local-
authorities. (Last accessed 19 July, 2012).  
9 The dependent variable is the democratic quality of European Union governance and the independent 
variable is citizen participation within the European Union.  
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Following an examination of the wider political and economic environment, the final sub-question 
surfaces with regard to the concept of civil society and the use of that concept in this thesis: how will 
the abilities of local civil society be measured? Civil society is a very broad and complex concept. A 
clear and unambiguous definition has been adopted to retain a focus on social inclusion and thus 
remain non-discriminatory as to what actors can be involved. In order to reduce the scope for 
research, two Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) with distinctively different backgrounds have been 
chosen as the focal point of two in-depth case studies. Both CSOs are located in Spain, although only 
one can be classified as a local CSO. The other, an international CSO with its base in Spain, can be 
used together with the local CSO to show how they both (from different perspectives) further 
democratic engagement of citizens at the local level of a long-term member state. There are 
multiple reasons for choosing Spain. Firstly, although Spain has been fully integrated into the Union 
for almost 26 years, it was unable to enter between 1951 and 1986 due to its undemocratic status. 
According to Helena Soleto Muñoz, Professor of Procedural Law at the Universidad Carlos III de 
Madrid, forty years of dictatorship has left the Spanish unaware of their rights under a democratic 
Government and, consequently, Spain has a local civil society with record low participation rates.10 
However a culture of social participation is growing, as Spain currently faces a major economic, 
political and social crisis. An almost two year-old Government, local austerity measures, plus little 
help from the Union has sparked a rising public backlash and thus room to strengthen Spain’s civic 
engagement with the Union and its internal associational life.  
0.3 Methodology   
0.3.1 Research design of the study 
To answer the primary question and sub-questions, this thesis will adopt a qualitative research 
approach concerned with developing, exploring and testing an intellectual proposition for increased 
direct citizen involvement in EU governance. Qualitative data are used to detail the primary concern 
of this paper: to explore in greater depth the idea of using local civil society to enhance the 
democratic quality of the EU. Data have been collected from the perspective of the citizens 
themselves and is thus “raw,” of a personal nature and can be used to describe and explain 
individuals’ points of view. Moreover, this process will require the researcher to develop rapport 
with the research participants, communicate with them and understand their actions as a 
meaningful item within the wider context of the theoretical assumptions made in this paper.11 Thus, 
                                                            
10 Interview with Helena Soleto Muñoz, Interview 19 July, 2012. Professor of Processal Law, Length: 20.12 
minutes, (Madrid, Department of Private and Public Law, University of Carlos III de Madrid). 
11 Quentin Skinner, "Hermeneutics and the Role of History " New Literary History 7, no. 1 (1975): 216. 
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a qualitative research approach is adopted not only because it provides detailed data in its human 
context, but also because it can best capture the variables whilst dealing appropriately with sensitive 
issues.  
Quantitative research is also employed in this thesis, albeit in a minor way, for two reasons. The first 
is to test theory. Due to the variety of data collection methods used in this study, the data will 
require summarising to reach generalisations and validate the research hypotheses. The second 
reason is to confirm and validate. This thesis will examine whether there is an economic rationale to 
invest greater sums in social policy, by studying the social component of the budgets of both the EU 
and the United States (US). Quantitative research, however, cannot provide the kind of information 
that provides insight into the human phenomenon as this research intends to. Qualitative research 
seeks that kind of “meaning;” meaning from a social point of view in that the experiences, actions 
and opinions people attribute to a situation are the focus of the research.12 Thus, rather than 
engaging in a scientific realism approach that prioritises the blend of both qualitative and 
quantitative research, the research design employed in this thesis remains in line with a post-
positivist approach that prioritises instead the use of multiple data collection methods (both 
quantitative and qualitative), data sources and the use of theory, all combined in a triangulation 
effect. The topic, the ability of local civil society (viewed as organised groups of civilians) to 
democratise the EU governance system, firmly engrains the research approach in a qualitative field, 
but it is important that a variety of techniques are used to determine the credibility of the study. 
These techniques will be assessed below.   
0.3.2 Data collection methods 
Both auxiliary quantitative data and qualitative data are used within a triangulation approach to 
ensure validity, usefulness and contextual completeness of this research. The research design is thus 
complex in the number of data collection methods it employs and data sources it utilises, ranging 
from theoretical re-design, participant observation and archival methods to semi-structured 
interviews with members of elites, surveys on members of the public and case studies on civil 
society organisations. The two main data collection methods used are case studies and semi-
structured interviews. Data from both case studies have been organised systemically into two 
separate sets of field notes. Each set includes interview transcriptions, observation notes, survey 
data in numerical form and background information on each organisation. Careful organisation of 
the data is essential to identify converging lines of enquiry and emerging patterns, as well as to 
expose new insights on the role of civil society within the EU. 
                                                            
12 Sharlene Hesse-Biber and Patricia Leavy, The Practice of Qualitative Research (Sage Publications, 2010). 4. 
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Case Studies 
This thesis employs the use of case studies as a data collection method to test the primary research 
question and sub-question on the ability of local civil society, and to provide evidence for or against 
the research hypotheses. Firstly, a small comparative study on the annual budgets of both the EU 
and the US is reported in Chapter Three in order to test whether there is an economic need for 
increased funding from the EU into social policy and social initiatives. In addition, Chapter Four 
considers two case studies of CSOs. These macro-focused studies consider whether civil society has 
the potential to link the individual to the Union as a European citizen; and if so, how. With this in 
mind, the organisations examined in both case studies were CSOs with a primary institutional base in 
Madrid, the capital of Spain. The first organisation, known as Consejo de la Juventud de España (CJE), 
is a locally-focused organisation that represents Spanish youth. CJE works with Spanish youth to help 
them realise their rights and have their voice heard on a local, national and international level. The 
second organisation, know as Club de Madrid (CDM), is an international CSO that works out of Spain 
and exists to promote good governance worldwide. CDM works by sharing the expertise of its 
members, who are all former Heads of State or Government, with current leaders in various regions 
in order to encourage democratic leadership. The case study approach employed in this thesis 
enables the researcher to compare unique and typical organisational structures by examining two 
different real-life cases.  
Case studies are used to collect the most up-to-date information within real-life contexts and thus 
produce a more optimal result in an ethnographic study on human individuals. In this case, the aim 
was to determine whether or not civil societies, from the perspective of Spain, are beneficial to the 
democratic quality of EU governance in terms of enhancing local citizen participation. Chapter Four 
will detail cross-case and within-case data evaluation and analysis techniques in the form of a rich 
narrative, in order to find links between the research objects and the outcomes of these two case 
studies with reference to the original research questions. It is important to point out however that 
the case studies are just one data collection tool and the results are used in collaboration with other 
methods to support the overall research approach.       
Semi-Structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants from three important research 
areas. First, the Presidents and Project Coordinators of both CJE and CDM each took part in one-hour 
interviews. The interview allowed them to speak personally of their organisation’s work and also 
provided essential current information regarding the research topic. These interviews were of great 
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assistance to understanding the context of the organisations’ multiple programmes directly in 
collaboration with the Union or funded by the Union, given that particular questions and issues 
could be clarified. Second, academics within the Department of Public Law from the Universidad 
Carlos III de Madrid engaged in twenty-thirty-minute long interviews as a method of clarifying 
recently collected data from the CSO case studies. Professors were selected based on their academic 
focus and its relevance to the Union and European citizens. Once again, as key sources of 
information regarding the research field, these interviews were extremely beneficial in terms of 
clarifying complex legal information regarding the Union’s governance structure. Finally, interviews 
were sought with staff members of the EP to gain a transnational perspective on the idea of greater 
local civil society involvement. EP staff members were interviewed for their personal understanding 
of the political environment they work in and whether it would support a more grass-roots focused 
governance system. 
The questions that were prepared were based on two primary considerations. First, generic 
questions were carefully constructed in the light of the current, past and future experience of each 
participant. Second, specific questions focused on themes that directly related to both the research 
topic and the participant’s own work. Around one quarter of all questions were generic in nature, 
with the remaining three-quarters relating specifically to the research topic (full questionnaires are 
included in the Appendix). The questionnaires had been previously approved by the University of 
Canterbury (UC) Ethics Committee and pilot tests were conducted with a volunteer from the New 
Zealand NCRE. The pilot tests were recorded in order for the interviewer, who is also the researcher, 
to assess her interviewing skills and ability to build rapport, the flow of topics and the timing.  
A semi-structured approach for all interviews allowed the interviewee to direct the discussion and 
the interviewer to clarify certain points with follow-up questions, thereby creating material of a 
greater depth and a more personal nature. This approach has its limitations however, in that 
building a connection and relation with the interviewee was essential to reach the outcome 
described above. For this reason, a face-to-face interview technique was employed in order to 
create a more conversational discussion and a relaxed environment in which the interviewee felt 
more comfortable to engage with the researcher. Interviews were also conducted in English, or 
Spanish (given the interviewer’s proficiency in Spanish) if Spanish was the mother-tongue of the 
participants, to allow for the limitations of translation to be avoided. To prevent misunderstandings 
on the part of the interviewer, all interviews were recorded on a Dictaphone and then transcribed.  
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Archival 
The archival method has also been employed within this thesis in order to examine documentation 
of CSOs, as well as legal documentation produced by the Union regarding the role of the citizen. 
Both CSOs have documentation centres, where inside information in the form of the organisations’ 
legal contracts and guides to intercultural participation are utilised as briefing materials by staff. The 
materials and artefacts of both centres were made available for the purposes of this research and 
could be examined in their natural setting. Key documents identified were the Juventud Ciudadana 
en la Unión Europea (Youth Citizenship in the European Union) from the CJE and The Shared 
Societies Project: Democratic Leadership for Dialogue, Diversity and Social Cohesion from the CDM. 
Both could be used to check what research had been completed on behalf of each organisation into 
the relationship between the Union, its citizens and the idea of building social democracy through 
civil society. In this sense, the archival method has been used for historical research. Furthermore, 
official EU documentation concerning the citizen and civil society was analysed. In particular, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and Draft Treaty for Establishing a Constitution for Europe 
as law, in conjunction with European Governance: A White Paper as a political initiative, were 
studied as initiatives that exist for the protection of citizens’ rights. Third, documentation produced 
in relation to the most recent projects initiated by the Union on behalf of the citizen has been 
evaluated to track contemporary events, to check for major change in parliamentary and legal 
decisions and to provide a deeper understanding of what is available to the citizen. Key 
documentation includes the Europe for Citizens Programme 2007 - 2013, Programme Guide and 
Citizens Initiative, which stems from the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European 
Union, as well as future frameworks; the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 and the 
Europe 2020 Strategy.  
Comparing fundamental documentation from both the EU and CSOs engaged within this study has 
revealed a significant difference between the understanding of citizenship in its legal/political sense 
and citizenship in the social sense. In particular, the breakdown of official definitions into smaller 
units reveals where connections exist and gaps need to be filled that currently separate the social 
from the political. The archival method has thus been used to reveal any unconscious bias or 
unintended consequences produced in these primary sources. Secondary sources, the work of other 
academics and theorists, have also been utilised to back up these findings.  
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Survey 
Although a minor form of data collection in this thesis, the use of surveys as a research tool balances 
out the research approach by shifting data collection to methods that exert a higher level of control. 
Surveying was used as a highly standardised data tool to complement other methods of data 
collection within the case studies. Identical surveys were completed by twenty participants at the 
annual General Assembly meeting of the CJE, which collected data on one third of all participants at 
the Assembly. Participants were selected at random, although roughly an equal number of females 
and males were approached. The surveys collected data from a small sample size but ultimately 
provided information on a wide variety of individuals engaged within civil society. In this respect, 
surveying was used to measure public opinion of those individuals and thus may not be used as a 
representation of the truth. The disadvantage of using surveys is that the respondents, for different 
reasons, may not be completely honest when answering some questions. To avoid the high 
possibility of artificial responses, pre-designed questionnaires were researched when writing the 
survey to ensure a well-written research instrument.  
A simple design was finally adopted. Questions were organised in a user-friendly manner. First, a 
small number of questions gathered basic statistical information, i.e. male or female, age and 
occupation. Over the course of the survey, the questions became more directly related to the topic, 
with the final question asking for an opinion on how the subject would change the governance 
structure of the EU if offered the opportunity. The ratio of structured versus open-ended questions 
was close to 50/50 (full survey included in the Appendix). Furthermore, the survey was handed out 
individually, allowing time to build rapport between the researcher and the subject. Conducting the 
surveys face-to-face also resulted in a higher completion and return rate. The response rate was 
high. 19 out of 20 participants returned their surveys with all questions completed and eight 
participants asked further questions about the research project and asked to contribute more. 
Influencing the response rate is the fact that participants were passionate about advancing the 
relations between their CSO and the Union and thus felt the research conducted for this project 
could help their cause. Results were recorded electronically and summarised quantitatively in terms 
of percentages.  
0.4 Structure of the study 
The thesis has five chapters and a concluding section, in addition to this introduction. The 
introduction contains a brief contextual overview and reveals the overall design of the research 
project: the research questions to be answered, the methodology, data collection methods and case 
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studies undertaken are outlined. The rest of the thesis is structured according to theoretical and 
empirical levels of analysis. Chapter One provides a critical review of the literature that has a bearing 
on the problem of application of democracy in the EU in terms of the role of civil society. The second 
half of Chapter One will then analyse the theory of cosmopolitanism introduced in the work of David 
Held. Held’s theory of cosmopolitan democracy, which focuses on individualisation, is used as the 
foundation of a revised model of democracy that will be advanced in this study. Chapter Two will 
present this revised cosmopolitan model of democracy, labelled here civil cosmopolitanism, which 
hopes to advance the democratic quality of the EU. As Chapter Two unfolds, the model’s three vital 
components will become clear – morality, institutionalism and social cosmopolitanism. Together, the 
three components are the core of a grassroots governance strategy led by the Union that utilises 
local civil society in the execution of the social needs, rights and responsibilities of the ordinary 
European citizen. The final part of Chapter Two will engage the reader in a debate on possible 
criticisms of civil cosmopolitanism. This brings a critical perspective to the model that is required in 
order to test for potential shortcomings and to ascertain whether the theoretical version of the 
model can overcome these.  
In the latter part of the thesis, a comprehensive account of the data collection methods and case 
studies used will be undertaken. First, the data collection methodologies reported in Chapters Three 
and Four will test the necessity for a model such as civil cosmopolitanism and detail the environment 
in which it would have to function. Chapter Three examines whether there is an economic and 
political rationale for the Union to place a greater focus on grassroots social policy. Following on 
from Chapter Three and shifting the focus from the European level, Chapter Four will investigate the 
role of local civil society in the EU and whether it successfully helps individuals exercise their rights 
as European citizens. In a bid to narrow the focal point of this research and strengthen the results 
overall, one democratic member state will be specifically focused on: Spain. Recent growth in CSOs 
and Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs) within Spain has inspired cultural change and increased 
political participation in the recent decade, providing for interesting and timely case studies.13 In 
Chapter Four, two Madrid-based organisations will be the subject of testing in an experiment that 
attempts to collect data on whether civil society can advance the organisations’ goals as well as 
advancing Spanish citizen engagement in EU governance. Chapter Five will resemble a post-audit 
discussion of the data collected to form an analysis of whether, first, a Union-led, grassroots strategy 
is indeed necessary and able to improve the democratic quality of EU governance and second, 
whether civil cosmopolitanism is the best model to support such a strategy. Chapter Five will bring 
                                                            
13 European Foundation Centre, "Exploring Transparency and Accountability Regulation of Public-Benefit 
Foundations in Europe," (Donors and Foundations Networks in Europe 2011). 
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together the theoretical and the empirical and summarise all evidence to form two proposals for the 
EU. The Conclusion remarks upon the findings in the light of the original research question posed. 
This thesis will end with some suggestions for future research projects based on the discoveries 
made while undertaking this research. 
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1. CHAPTER ONE: THE EXISTING LEGISLATION AND LITERATURE ON THE ROLE 
OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN EUROPEAN UNION GOVERNANCE 
 
This chapter locates the current research firmly within the literature on the EU and the use of civil 
society to enhance democracy. Section 1.1 reviews previous and existing legislative initiatives that 
utilise the concept of ‘civil society;’ mostly in attempts to bring the European citizen closer to the EU. 
Although little progress has been made, the initiatives addressed in 1.1 identify two key theoretical 
discourses active in the EU governance model at present; civil society and cosmopolitan democracy. 
Sections 1.2 and 1.3 assess the civil society discourse and cosmopolitanism discourse respectively to 
recognise possible pitfalls in the theoretical base of the work that the EU is proposing to do. Chapter 
Two follows with a possible development plan for a theoretical model that combines certain aspects 
of the cosmopolitan and civil society discourses. The model proposes to build upon the liberal 
democratic system and create a top-down, regionally unified governance system. Use of the wording 
top-down is to say “elite-led,” sending a clear message that those in governmental roles and with 
decision or policy-making responsibilities are important to a well-functioning governance 
framework. At the same time, the framework is one that exists to promote regional unification. In 
other words, the model proposed in Chapter Two aims to represent a well-balanced mix of top-down 
and bottom-up governance strategies to suit the conditions of an international organisation as 
complex as the EU.  
1.1  Citizens’ initiatives in European Union legislation 
European policy has changed at various stages of the EU's growth. The EU originated in the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). It’s growth stages are marked by the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), the Single Market, the EURO (EUR) and finally, the CFHR. In June 1999, the 
Cologne European Council decided that fundamental citizen rights were to be consolidated into one 
document; the CFHR. Shortly after, in 2002, the EC was, for the first time, expected to engage civil 
society within its legislative responsibilities as part of what was labelled an external consultation 
process.14 In its White Paper on European Governance, the Commission of the European 
Communities (CEC) made a commitment towards consultation and dialogue and part of that 
                                                            
14 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission: Towards a Reinforced 
Culture of Consultation and Dialogue - General Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation of 
Interested Parties by the Commission. COM(2002) 704 Final. Brussels, (2002).  
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commitment is the engagement of ‘interested parties,’15 with a specific role for CSOs. For the Union, 
this was a big step forward in terms of its relations with civil society and ultimately its relations with 
its citizens. An ongoing issue for the EU is to what extent citizens should be directly involved within 
the Union, but it took until the twenty-first century before the role of CSOs in modern democracies 
was specifically linked to providing European citizens with a voice. Even then, it was clear that the 
role of CSOs would remain only a voice, the interested parties were not to receive the privilege of a 
vote. External parties are only ever to be addressed as a supplementary opinion to the decision-
making processes of the legislative bodies, rather than a replacement opinion, as is annexed in the 
Amsterdam Treaty.16 Still, the Union aimed to ensure each supplementary opinion would at least be 
heard. Within the European institutional set up, the EESC, which was initiated in 1957 by the Treaty 
of Rome, adopted a set of rules in August 2002 on behalf of organised civil society. To enhance the 
consultation and dialogue process, the EESC was to act as an intermediary actor with the primary 
focus of ensuring the views of civil society reached the EC.17 There was a clear goal, to enable 
interested parties to participate in the Union’s decision-making processes on the understanding it 
would make these processes more transparent to the European citizen; a vital condition for 
democracy. 
 
Until the CFHR, the idea of civil society as a tool for advancing the democratic quality of the EU 
attracted little attention. The adoption of the concept into Union communication was therefore 
clearly intended to promote the role of voluntary organisations and social spaces in Europe. Prior to 
this shift towards the CFHR, the EU’s progression was economic and market-driven. Suddenly the 
extra dimension of EU-society relations existed in the EU’s new focus on communication with civil 
society, bringing with it the message that improving the democratic legitimacy of the EU was 
essential. The assumption here is that the engagement of multiple actors in the EU’s governance 
system in representation of the citizen would create greater accountability, transparency and 
ultimately greater democracy. Assumptions concerning the correct amount of social involvement in 
a political democracy have since taken off in academia. Beate Kohler-Koch, renowned for writing 
specifically on the EU and civil society relations, and Barbara Finke argue that the Union made a 
                                                            
15 ———, 2001. 
16 Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, see European Union, "Treaty 
of Amsterdam: Amending the Treaty on the European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities and Certain Related Acts." Official Journal of the European Union, C 340 (1997).  
17 European Economic and Social Committee, "Rules of Procedure of the European Economic and Social 
Committee," Official Journal of the European Union L 324 (August 2002 (Consolidated Version adopted July 
2010)): 53. 
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serious attempt to write into legislation and policy proposals a new ‘participatory engineering’18 
governance strategy that would guarantee citizen participation. Kohler-Koch later argued the 
European institutions in fact aimed to advance that strategy through the creation of a European Civil 
Society.19 For Stijn Smismans, Jean Monnet Chair in European Law and Governance and involved in 
CIVGOV (Organised Civil Society and European Governance), the involvement of civil society in the 
EU is more about finding a point of common interest between civil society actors and European 
policy-makers and less about advancing social interests within the EU.20 Even with Smismans’ way of 
thinking, civil society within the EU remains an innovative concept because that point of interest 
represents different stages of policy-making and stresses the importance of multi-level governance. 
The more sceptical researchers were convinced the CEC would not receive the results it desired from 
civil society involvement, that these ideas were merely naive and potentially damaging if such a 
position becomes unappealing.21 The EU is not a government, merely a governance system able to 
fail at any time.   
 
The experience of the EU since the White Paper’s initiation was in fact disappointing. In terms of 
enhanced citizen participation, few positive results resulted from the engagement of civil society 
actors. Kohler-Koch argued systemic research into increased exchange of ideas and dialogue 
between the EU and civil society demonstrated the CEC at least widened the scope for participation 
supposedly ‘by lowering the threshold of access.’22 Feedback of this kind was also scrutinised for its 
impact on the EU and was found to have increased the willingness of the Directorate General policy 
units within the EC to subject their communication with civil society to scrutiny.23 This was an 
important step towards greater accountability. All positive reform, however, was institution-based 
only. Despite reform in the EC’s legislative strategy, confidence in the EP did not significantly 
increase and voter turnout at the EP elections continued to remain low, actually decreasing in 2004 
                                                            
18 Barbara Finke and Beate Kohler-Koch, "The Institutional Shaping of EU-Society Relations: A Contribution to 
Democracy via Participation?," Journal of Civil Society 3, no. 3 (2007): 206. 
19 Beate Kohler-Koch and Christine Quittkat, "What is 'civil society' and Who Represents it in the European 
Union?" in The New Politics of European Civil Society, ed. Ulrike Liebart and Hans-Jörg Trenz (Routledge: 
Routledge Studies on Democratising Europe 2010), 20. 
20 Stijn Smismans, Civil Society And Legitimate European Governance (Edward Elgar Pub, 2006). 9. 
21 Christian Joerges; Yves Mény and J.H.H Weiler (eds), "Mountain or Molehill?: A Critical Appraisal of the 
Commission White Paper on Governance," in Jean Monnet Working Paper No.6/01 (Florence: European 
University Institute, 2001), 209. 
22 Beate Kohler-Koch, "Civil Society Contribution to Democratic Governance: A Critical Assessment," ed. Beate 
Kohler-Koch, Dirk de Biévre and William Maloney, Opening EU-Governance to Civil Society: Gains and 
Challenges (Germany: Mannheim Centre for European Social Research, CONNEX, 2008). 13. 
23 Barbara Finke and Christine Quittkat, "The EU Commission Consultation Regime," ed. Beate Kohler-Koch; 
Dirk de Biévre and William Maloney, Opening EU-Governance to Civil Society: Gains and Challenges (Germany: 
Mannheim Centre for European Social Research, 2008). 
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to levels lower than those of 1979.24 The EU faced major issues bringing its decision-making process 
closer to the European citizen. Much of the problem stemmed from a lack of connection between 
the concept of European citizenship and the social rights promised to citizens through the CFHR. The 
Maastricht Treaty institutionalised and thus legalised Citizenship of the Union in 1992, defining it as 
‘every person holding the nationality of a member state.’25 Yet, with only disagreement as to how 
the concept should evolve, citizenship continues to remain an institutionalised and legalised 
definition. In the consolidated version of this Treaty, citizens of the Union enjoy the freedom to cross 
borders, to vote for Members of the EP and the right to address EU institutions or address the EP.26 
In 2004, member states attempted to advance the definition of citizenship to bring it in line with a 
socially progressing EU, by including the ability to participate directly as a social right. The attempt 
failed, despite a signed Draft Treaty and plans for a Constitution. The following statement was 
released by the Council of the European Union in 2007: 
  
 The IGC (intergovernmental conference) constitutional concept, which consisted in 
 repealing all existing Treaties and replacing them by a single text called ‘Constitution,’ is 
 abandoned. The Reform Treaty will introduce into the existing Treaties, which remain in 
 force, the innovations resulting from the 2004 IGC.27 
 
The Draft Constitutional Treaty and subsequently the White Paper failed to achieve the EU’s primary 
goal: to create a more prominent role for the citizen in the governance of the Union through the 
concept of citizenship. While the institutions themselves found some benefits from engaging with 
organised civil society, European citizens continued to face the challenge of exclusion from the 
“participatory engineering” structure. It is questionable who “organised civil society” was thus able 
to represent, given that the distance from grassroots level to the institutions at the top appeared 
too great to be bridged. As of December 2009, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
the CFHR became a legally binding document similar to Union Treaties. The EU moved another step 
                                                            
24 The average turnout in elections has steadily decreased over the last 30 years from 66% in 1979 to 46% in 
2004, with approximately only half the population casting their vote despite the Maastricht and Amsterdam 
Treaties providing additional powers to the European Parliament. See Viviana Vánová, "Charting Voting 
Patterns in European Parliamentary Elections," International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 
http://www.idea.int/elections/charting_voting_patterns.cfm. (Last accessed 23 July, 2012).  
25 European Union, "The Maastricht Treaty - Provisions Amending the Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community with a View to Establishing the European Community." Official Journal of the European 
Union (7 February, 1992). Article 8, (1).  
26 ———. "Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on Functioning of the 
European Union." Official Journal of the European Communities C325 / 33 (2002). Article 20, 2(a, b, c), 56 – 57. 
27 Council of Europe, Brussels European Council: Presidency Conclusions. 11177/1/07 REV 1, (20 July, 2007). 
Annex I: IGC Mandate, Point I (1), 15.  
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towards bridging the distance by cementing citizen rights into law. The Lisbon Treaty itemises a 
number of channels to secure those rights, in particular the right to direct participation, such as the 
need for European institutions to maintain inclusive dialogue with civil society.28 Once again, 
researchers argued the EU was able to use civil society as an ‘output-maximising logic’29 to move 
away from internal reform, which is supposedly connected conceptually and practically with direct 
citizen participation. Unfortunately, several studies indicate the opposite, that contact between 
European Civil Society and grassroots citizens are ‘tenuous at best.’30 There are no real results to 
prove that a decade of relations between the EU and organised European Civil Society has brought 
the EU and its citizens closer together. 
This failure could be attributed to a number of causes. First, the EU may not in fact wish to bridge 
the gap between the institutions and the citizens for fear credibility at the top will be undermined by 
the bottom. According to Giorgio Napolitano,31 any proposal that heightens the power of the citizen 
within high-level EU institutions ‘would raise major questions and difficulties.’32 Napolitano’s 
statement begs the question of what shape such difficulties would take: difficulties with institutional 
performance or, rather, with institutional traditions? Second, the majority of actors involved in the 
EU may not actually desire the greater involvement of civil society. The EU governance system is 
already extremely complex and extensive dialogue with outside parties might only slow all processes 
without actually contributing positively. It could also be argued however, that the problem occurred 
simply because of the lack of any real plan. ‘Civil society’ became the new term for ‘saviour’, the 
innovative tool that would help the EU advance as a social project as well as an economic project 
and therefore enhance the quality of its democracy. There is very little understanding of exactly 
what civil society is, how it should be integrated into the long-term objectives of the EU and how the 
link between the EU and civil society would translate into a link between the EU and the European 
citizen. Beate Kohler-Koch and Christine Quittkat completed a detailed study on how civil society 
was defined. Their in-depth survey concluded that the image of civil society as propagated by the 
CEC fits only with a distinct conception of civil society.33 The fundamental issue appears to be how 
                                                            
28 European Union, "Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community." Official Journal of the European Union, C 306/01 (December 2007) (2009 version). 
Article 11, Point 2.  
29 Francesco Maiani, "Citizen Participation and the Lisbon Treaty: A Legal Perspective," (Aberdeen: Centre for 
the Study of Public Policy, University of Aberdeen, 2011), 6. 
30 Sabine Saurugger, "Interest Groups and Democracy in the European Union," West European Politics 31, no. 6 
(2008): 1275. 
31 President of Italy and Member of the Italian Communist Party. 
32 Giorgio Napolitano in Committee on Constitutional Affairs, "Report on the Role of Regional and Local 
Authorities in European Integration," in A5-0427/2002 (Final) (Brussels: European Parliament, December 
2002). 
33 Kohler-Koch and Quittkat, 2010, 38. 
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interested parties are permitted to label themselves as a CSO in accordance with EU legislation. 
Thus, for the authors, the role of civil society is a very contested issue. 
It is not the objective of this research however to provide a clear definition of civil society. Such a 
definition continues to be a subject of debate among social scientists.34 How the EU is to deal with 
the issues of social rights and regional policy still remains an open question, echoing the current 
inability of the EU to effectively contextualise the citizen in EU policy-making. The lack of any real 
master plan stems from the lack of understanding as to the social prerequisites to citizen 
participation, which stems from the lack of a solid governance framework to support any citizen-
focused initiatives. Although a number of problems are present, they provide a basis for discussion 
and further research. The question still remains; if utilised correctly, can civil society enhance the 
democratic quality of EU governance? Two clear themes evident in the development of the EU as an 
integrated union over the past decade could provide an answer. First is the bottom-up  process, or 
civil society discourse, repeatedly present in EU legislation since the CFHR, remains an innovative 
concept to be studied in relation to citizen participation, given the lack of understanding of what 
European citizenship is or could be. Second is the top-down process, or good governance discourse, 
which focuses on the use of theories of democratisation in terms of their contribution to a strong 
legislative and policy-making system. Different models of democracy will be more or less demanding 
with regard to the importance of a strong social component in the EU governance system.35 Both 
theoretical discourses have received significant attention from researchers focused on international 
governance and are two major theories that underpin the progression of this research. Each 
discourse will now be discussed. 
1.2  Civil society discourse and the European Union  
The EU has attempted numerous times to establish a stable relationship with civil society on the 
understanding that doing so will bring the EU closer to the ordinary citizen. According to Michael 
Edwards, the EU is merely following a trend. Edwards is one of the many researchers to suggest that 
civil society became the golden nugget in academia, the key to the locked door of social order.36 
American scholar Lester Salamon suggests the role of organised civil society in the twenty-first 
                                                            
34 The historical account of civil society and how to define it is detailed by a number of scholars; John Keane, 
Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions  (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); John Ehrenberg, Civil 
Society: The Critical History of an Idea (New York: New York University Press, 1999); M Foley and V Hodgkinson 
(eds), The Civil Society Reader (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2002); John Hall and Frank 
Trentmann (eds), Civil Society: A Reader in History, Theory and Global Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005); Jeffrey Alexander, The Civil Sphere  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
35 Finke and Kohler-Koch, 2007, 207. 
36 Michael Edwards, Civil Society, Second Edition (United Kingdom: Polity Press, 2009). 3. 
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century will be as significant as, if not more significant than, the nation-state in the twentieth.37 
These positive projections of civil society have arisen in a period when it is recognised that there is a 
missing link in the success of social democracy. Civil society is deemed to play an important role with 
regards to the delivery of democracy by incorporating the social into the political. However, the 
measurable impact civil society can have on political democracies is heavily contingent on how the 
concept of civil society is understood. In other words, the role of civil society in the EU governance 
system needs to be clear before the advantage of its existence can be determined. The euphoria 
surrounding civil society led Bebbington and Bebbington to note that minimum distinctions should 
be made between formal and informal versions of civil society. Formal civil society, described by 
Bebbington and Bebbington as organised civil society organisations or NGOs,38 has been the primary 
focus of EU communication regarding civil society. Informal civil society, such as social and 
community movements and grassroots spaces for interaction, is less of a focus, which Edwards 
argued was because the engagement of formal or informal civil society with governments depended 
on state-society relations.39 Edward’s argument suggests that the sole engagement of formal civil 
society with the EU signifies more of a structured state-society relationship between the EU and 
member states. However, both formal and informal civil society should be involved in the 
relationship between international institutions and citizens. In fact, informal civil society has been 
active in the EU since the end of the Cold War, linked with the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
communism in Eastern Europe. Since the end of the Cold War, citizens banded together to fight 
totalitarian regimes, for example channelling the violent tendencies of governments and citizens into 
peaceful relations through a process of European integration.40 But also, according to Howell and 
Pearce, citizens were including themselves into the ever-integrating Union through direct 
participation to secure their own freedom and self-determination.41  
At the heart of the EU’s civil society logic was the formal branch of civil society or the utilisation of 
NGOs and CSOs to advance citizens’ interests and, subsequently, democracy. Following Howell and 
Pearce’s line of thinking, equating civil society with formal organisations would mean the exclusion 
of informal groups of civilians. There is therefore some concern over the concept of civil society 
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40 These ideas flow from the fall of the Berlin Wall and destruction of the memories associated with violent 
times in Europe during World War II. John Keane and Jeffrey Alexander progress the idea of civil society as a 
non-violent third sector within their own versions of European civil society. See Keane, 1998; Alexander, 2006. 
41 Jude Howell and Jenny Pearce, Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration (London: Lynne Rienner, 
2001). 15. 
Kirsten Jane Mander 99543103 Page 27 
 
within the EU and over the uncritical acceptance of the status of NGOs. William Barndt and Thomas 
Carothers argue in their article on civil society that the ‘fascination’42 building around civil society 
has always been a cause for concern. It is good to understand the growing role these organisations 
play, but not at the cost of other players’ participation within civil society or the public sphere. For 
Carothers and Barndt, opening civil society to a wider number of participants is not simply to further 
its nobility, but, similar to Bebbington and Bebbington, to create a deeper understanding of the 
concept of civil society. Not all participants have good intentions.43 Some participants will argue for 
local job security or low energy costs, others for free trade and clean air legislation. The concept of 
civil society is interpreted and defined in multiple ways by researchers studying the same idea; that a 
strong civil society can ensure stronger political democracies. Even critics dispelling such argument 
continue to accept the position that a diverse (informal and formal) civil society can help advance 
democracy.44 This multi-faceted discourse demonstrates how civil society for the most part has been 
a point of reference when discussing the struggles of political democracies today: what makes a just 
society, good governance, social inclusion of all citizens and non-violent relations. However, when 
deeper questions are asked concerning the civil society concept, it is clear that the civil society 
discourse is motivated by ideas entrenched in the past. The discourse is ever changing. 
The way in which civil society is defined in terms of its application in Europe draws on the historical 
account of peaceful movements to promote inclusion and diversity within governments and on the 
utilisation of NGOs in present-day recovery plans to remedy economic and social failure. A recent 
study of civil society and European governance categorised both accounts of civil society into the 
role of intermediary, claiming that civil society in Europe should act as the ‘transmission belt 
between individuals and the political system.’45 Given that the major focus on civil society 
throughout EU legislation is communication with formal civil society, the authors of the study note 
that the role of intermediary in modern times is becoming ‘frequently unrealistic.’46 The civil society 
discourse is discussed in the context of how civil society can engage the European citizen with a 
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participatory regime without actually closely linking civil society to the citizen. Other researchers 
have also noted this mismatch between the EU and civil society. Annette Zimmer and Matthias 
Friese argue the EU is relying too heavily on civil society to overcome major economic and social 
challenges to the EU governance system and state that EU member states receives a lot of criticism 
for being unable to produce satisfactory results.47 Taco Brandsen completed a study into the idea of 
NGO involvement in governance institutions located in geographic Europe and how they affect the 
institutional capacity by making it more innovative. He looked at Dutch social housing NGOs, which 
tried to influence a state-dominated system of governance to be more innovative in the area of 
autonomy. Unfortunately, the Dutch social housing NGOs’ merits ‘remain largely unproven.’48 They 
were studied solely on the basis of their ability to act as an advisor on the direction the institutions 
should take to further their autonomous development. There is a predominant focus not only on the 
use of formally organised civil society bodies, but also civil society analysed against the perspective 
of institutional reform, leading to pessimistic conclusions and critical outcomes. For Cathy 
McIlwaine, as long as the popularity of the civil society concept continues to revolve around 
institutional reform in Western political democracies, such as the EU, and ignores the issue of 
distance between the ordinary citizen and the institutions being reformed, then advancing 
democracy through civil society is ‘ultimately unrealistic.’49   
McIlwaine raises an important point regarding the transnational dimension of EU-civil society-citizen 
relations. While the citizen is not directly involved, the Union can act indirectly for the citizen to 
compensate for any effect transnational decision-making processes have on their lives, as long as 
that process remains accountable and transparent. Civil society is obviously engaged to help 
legitimise that process, yet the point being made here is that the Union itself is a global civic actor, 
which is discussed in detail by academics interested in the normative interpretations of the role and 
functions of civil society.50 Scholars have taken to labelling this interface between internationally-run 
institutions and the citizen as ‘transnationally organized civil society.’51 Patrizia Nanz and Jens Steffek 
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argue that on an international scale, civil society ‘can provide an adequate political realm’52 with 
international linkages that can help democratise global governance practices. The adequate political 
realm the authors speak of could resemble a political space where exchange of opinion, including 
public opinion, takes place. Thus, policy-making processes can be exposed to the public, offering the 
chance to create more informal civil society spaces, for example, a community of political action.53 
To assess the ability of transnational civil society (TCS) to advance democracy in global governance 
structures, Kissling, Nanz and Steffek developed a list of 20 empirical indicators tailored to particular 
settings of interaction between the international organisation and TCS. These indicators are 
intended to provide an account of the democratic quality of public participation i.e. transparency 
and accountability. The study concluded that while TCS consultation holds much promise for 
democratisation, the EU has not realised the full extent of its democratic potential.54  
Smismans writes also that the democratic quality of the EU’s governance system is somewhat 
defined by transnational associational life.55 His own study on the concept of TCS and its relation to 
EU governance found similar results to those of Kissling, Nanz and Steffek in that the EU fails to 
recognise the democratic potential of informal civil society participation. Smismans conducted a 
study for the EESC on the best way to integrate TCS within the Union, which revealed the Union’s 
primary interest was only in those CSOs able to build up the European market. In other words, the 
use of the TCS discourse is economically driven and is intended to further institutional interests 
rather than the interests of citizens.56 The EU, for example, indicated at the dawn of the twenty-first 
century that its intention to launch collaborative relations with CSOs was founded on the need to 
‘improve the legitimacy of European policies.’57 Of course, TCS is argued here as being a tool to help 
legitimise the EU, yet it remains a one-sided relationship. There is complete negation in the EC’s 
Discussion Paper on the ability of the EU to improve citizen participation using transnational social 
spaces. Academics are beginning to realise that continually pushing the transnational side of the civil 
society discourse reveals few real benefits. Institutional reform at the Union level is limiting the 
positive impact civil society can have at the grassroots level. Anna Domaradzka is one academic 
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focused on bringing civil society to the individual level. Domaradzka argues in her work that the 
micro level, or local level, is where change is more visible regarding social activism in the EU.58 
Although Domaradzka focused on producing “typologies” of individuals involved in women’s CSOs in 
Poland, her study still examines civil society in the individual lives of those involved. While 
Domaradzka has furthered the concept of individualism within the civil society discourse, her work 
does not target the issue of assigning more ambitious goals to the discourse in terms of skills, 
knowledge and movement forward of society as a whole. Discussion of how civil society can really 
engage the individual as well as the Union in a process of democratisation will require consideration 
of an ethical and moral dimension that connects civil society to theories of democratisation.      
1.3   Cosmopolitan democracy discourse and the European Union 
The best way forward, given that there are multiple theories of civil society, is to bring clarity and 
rigour to the role of civil society on a case by case basis. In the case of the EU, there is some 
disappointment regarding the evolution of the European citizen in the EU institutional system. 
Whether civil society in all its forms can advance the EU from the bottom-up without further 
complicating the institutional structure at the top is a query that still needs to be addressed. Before 
this is possible, there must be a strong, democratic governance framework in place that is 
supportive of some dependency on the third sector. Democratic governance is defined in multiple 
ways, depending on the different democratic functions assigned to the governing body.59 Following 
an analysis of the civil society discourse in Europe today, it is clear there is an element of informal 
civil society missing from the EU governance structure. Thus, the EU will be studied within the 
context of liberal democratic theory based on the understanding that liberal democratic theorists 
agree, to an extent, with the need for a clear focus on the individual human and their interests, 
rights and freedoms. This is not to say that in developing liberal democracy, civil society is not 
available to neo-liberals, conservatists, right-wing or realist theorists as a tool to further democracy, 
but it does argue that the advancement of civil society and the liberal democratic system together 
best reflects the assignment of new democratic functions, such as individualism, to the EU 
governance system. Cosmopolitan theory, a more recently devised democratic theory in the family 
of liberal democratic theories, is appearing more frequently in the works of academics focused on 
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applying some of the principles and values of democracy to global politics.60 The theory of 
cosmopolitanism assumes one of the main values of democracy is the achievement of social rights 
by all individuals. In the words of scholar Thomas Pogge, cosmopolitanism is the view that ‘every 
human being has a global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern.’61 Furthermore, governing 
institutions are to be shaped to recognise freedom of equality and work to realise that equality, in 
order to fulfil this moral concern.  
Cosmopolitan theory is not a new discourse in Europe. The origins of European cosmopolitanism 
have followed a moral and political path, growing alongside Immanuel Kant’s historic political 
writings (1784, 1785, 1793, 1795, 1797). Kant posits an ideal cosmopolis law, where both states and 
individuals find peace as ‘world citizens.’62 European integration has followed a process of 
institutionalisation to build a framework of governance, including treaties and charters, where the 
priority is achieving citizen equality. Following Kant’s positing of the idea of cosmopolis law, Europe 
quickly became known as the birth place of cosmopolitan theory.63 The European is identified as an 
individual, a citizen of a nation-state, a citizen of a member state and now a citizen of an 
international governance system, where the rule of law facilitates equality.  
A cosmopolitan Europe is clear about two things: integration primarily as an ideology, as an ideal, 
and the multileveled role for the individual. Yet, this is where the clarity ends. Cosmopolitanism has 
also tangled the thought processes of the most advanced social scientists and political scientists 
since it began with Kant’s idea of Europe. Namely, the continual attempt to redefine the governance 
system of the Union as it grows and changes has proven unfruitful. Kant described the concept of a 
United Europe as ‘the object of desire and fantasy’64 in the 1700s and it continues to be described as 
such by theorists such as Julia Kristeva.65 Then there is the idea of the system of Europeanization as 
described by Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, who state that Europe as it is known does not really 
exist.66 In less perplexing terms, EU governance represents an ongoing process of institutionalisation 
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(Europeanization), intertwining the concepts of transnationalism (governance beyond the nation-
state) and intergovernmentalism (governance between the nation-state). Evidently, there remain 
fixed political bodies, such as the nation-state, which will continue to stay fixed as long as they exist. 
Yet, the application of any liberal democracy to EU governance will be unable to capture the realities 
of this ever-integrating body unless treated as a flexible project. For example, in Kant’s theory, the 
existence of a world citizen is justification for the institutionalisation of equal treatment of others 
because it is used as a flexible and conceptual goal to promote universal human rights. If the idea of 
a world citizen becomes rigid, it clings to one dominant governance structure, effectively separating 
itself from all other cultures, ethnicities and religious identities to become its own class. Rigidity in 
cosmopolitan theory can in fact risk creating two groups of individuals, the elite citizen and the 
ordinary citizen. The Union is subject to constant refinement due to ongoing integration and the 
process of outward enlargement. The objective of a cosmopolitan framework of governance will 
need to be the maintenance of individual rights as the unit of moral concern. Appropriate 
institutional design is necessary, for example the inclusion of informal and formal civil society, to 
recognise those rights.  
The flexible nature and adaptability of cosmopolitan theory to different global political situations 
explains why it is also used to understand the role of transnational governance. Cosmopolitan 
theorists believe the increasing importance of transnational spheres is due to the recent 
transformation of international society to a global society.67 The roots of such debate can be found 
in the work of Hedley Bull. Bull made a significant contribution to the understanding of international 
systems and international society through his ideas on pluralism and solidarism, which in their own 
way add to how global governance is understood today.68 His theories, on internationalist politics in 
particular, introduce the role of international bodies such as the EU, to whom the concept of 
collective decision-making is confined. Advancements alongside the EU, i.e. the continuation of the 
United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization means individuals can petition 
internationally and are not confined to the boundaries of the nation-state. Bull considered the 
creation of these organisations to be a shift from an international system to an international society.  
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In an increasingly integrated world, in which threats to international security more frequently than 
before transcend national boundaries,69 the expansion of international society is considered by some 
to be a necessity, not an option. Although not yet fully embraced by the international community, 
the idea of global society is fast becoming an overtly discussed topic in cosmopolitan-focused 
literature.70 Global society places emphasis on the individual and a potential community of mankind 
rather than governments and a community of transitioning states.71 According to Francis Fukuyama, 
the development of global society requires a clear distinction between the social, political and 
economic dimensions of governance in order to understand that their relation to each other makes 
it easy to overstate the degree to which globalisation is responsible for the integration of societies 
worldwide.72 In this statement, Fukuyama reflects upon the fact that the nature of the relationship 
between these dimensions differs significantly in today’s world from what it was historically. For 
example, power politics and hegemonic domination is a historical part of international society, but 
expecting a contemporary developing nation to implement the political order of neoliberal America 
or communist China is no longer viable. As international society transforms to global society and 
integration efforts are stepped up, there is a shift in priority from the interests of national governing 
bodies to the interests of mankind and humanity. At least for Fukuyama, there is a greater 
understanding, or perhaps a greater awareness, of the relationship between sovereignty and 
citizenship, between the political and the social. The nature of social interaction is advancing the 
smaller actors; they are becoming louder. Scholars of cosmopolitan theory have begun to ask what 
this means in terms of the democratic quality of governance being produced. The work of David Held 
is particularly notable in this area and of ever-increasing relevance to the EU. Held’s notion of 
cosmopolitan democracy was introduced as a theoretical framework to explain the transition from 
international society to global society. Held has focused on the theory of cosmopolitan democracy to 
explain the need for global society as a remedy to the increasing dependency among states and 
among peoples on what theorists are calling a ‘global equivalent of a domestic government.’73 
According to Held, global society as such can promote the achievement of global democracy in 
institutions such as the EU.  
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Held developed three models of sovereignty in his most prominent work.74 Cosmopolitan 
sovereignty (the last of the three models) recognises that international law has become the centre 
piece of responses to offences often uncontainable at the national level, such as terrorism. Held’s 
theory poses seven principles as the political framework for global society: ‘equal worth and dignity, 
active agency, personal responsibility and accountability, consent, reflective deliberation and 
collective decision-making, and inclusiveness.’75 An eighth principle, sustainability, was added later.76 
The simplest way to understand cosmopolitan sovereignty is through its encapsulation of 
Fukuyama’s methodology; engaging the political, legal, economical and social as separate yet related 
aggregates using these eight principles. Held has devised a framework for global society based on 
human rights and the rule of law that aims to respect the differing economic and political systems 
existing around the world. As a theory, Held’s cosmopolitan democracy theory has challenged 
international realist theory in two predominant ways. First, the role of the individual in global 
governance has greater priority than the interests of the nation-state. In liberal democratic systems, 
the state is a legal structure of power dedicated to national, and more recently international, 
political systems, whereas cosmopolitan democratic theory associates the state with political 
authority. Second, Held’s theory supports societal transformation in line with the traditions, cultures 
and interests of that society. In Held’s words, a framework was required to take off from where the 
end of international society has left democracy struggling to overcome shifts in global politics.77  
1.4  Moving forward: A brief discussion   
In the last decade, the EU has changed tactic in terms of its governance structure, to engage 
organised civil society in its legislative process. Although a small change, it is highly significant for a 
number of reasons. First, this action comes at a time when the international system is shifting away 
from powerful state interests and a subsequent hegemonic culture to look within the nation-state to 
the development of local societies and communities. Second, it demonstrates the EU is undergoing a 
transformation phase of its own, from a representative to a participatory governance system, by 
attempting to bring the social dimension alongside the predominant economic dimension. 
Unfortunately, the EU has struggled to use civil society effectively as an intermediary between itself 
and the citizen. Consequently, the EU is finding itself without a European community, European 
identity and the confidence of the European citizen. There is room within the EU for democratisation 
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during this social crisis. There is no need for the multiple theories surrounding this topic to become 
too complicated. Despite differences in opinion, the general understanding by academics and 
researchers is that a just and democratic governance system is difficult to achieve today without the 
involvement of strong associational spaces. The desired strategy is therefore to see both the 
international and local levels working together.  
At the local level, the EU focuses on inclusive and constructive dialogue with its civil society partners. 
Over time, a mounting body of evidence is slowly accumulating that suggests civil society is no 
longer a fluffy concept but an empirical tool to help advance the public sphere. However, there 
remains heated but slightly unhelpful debate over which model of civil society is most appropriate to 
state-society relations in the context of the international political system today. Narrowing the 
concept of civil society to a single model could restrict or weaken the movement of other areas of 
civil society. For example, the dominant focus of the CEC on relations with formally organised civil 
society disregards the fact that informal civil society is just as much related, if not more related, to 
the development of the EU. The current use of the civil society discourse within the EU is exclusive of 
civil society spaces at the grassroots level, or local civil society. The motivation to engage formal civil 
society is to democratise the Union at the Union level only: there is no real focus on the individual 
citizen. This is by no means however a reason to turn away from the civil society discourse as a 
suitable democratisation tool for the EU, but is instead a reason to re-engage civil society focusing 
on the grassroots level. Part of the change required here is a mental shift in academia, where the 
rigid perception of civil society as helpful to global democracies only where TCS is involved needs to 
become flexible and inclusive of other perceptions of civil society.78  
Such thinking highlights a lack of a concrete social plan that breaks down the efforts to utilise the 
local public sphere within TCS. The capacity for citizen participation and the enhancement of 
democracy refers less to political equality via public control and more to legitimising policy at the 
European level. Currently, no local level is engaged within the governance structure of the EU. At the 
international level, global democratic theorists are attempting to find ways to democratise 
democracy in order to help institutions such as the EU develop appropriate governance strategies in 
times of change. Heldian cosmopolitan theory aims to bring international society one step closer to 
achieving global society. While his intentions are good, Held’s cosmopolitan democracy remains a 
risky framework. In the process of refurbishing democracy, Heldian cosmopolitanism is also 
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challenging the role of the world’s most prominent actor – the state. There are challenges and 
opportunities involved with this theory. The challenge will be the incorporation of two contrasting 
yet inseparable themes of modern politics: the global and the individual rather than the global and 
the state. The opportunity is that in recognising the importance of these two themes, 
cosmopolitanism increases the chances of universal participation and Kant’s world citizenship. 
Herein lies an additional problem. In removing the role of the state, the global and the individual are 
expected to meet within global society and a global community. To gain “membership” of the global 
society, the eight Heldian principles of global democracy must be adopted, which immediately calls 
into question the relationship-building tactics of cosmopolitan democracy and their representation 
of individual identity. There is a risk of hypocrisy, whereby Heldian cosmopolitanism overrides its 
own promotion of inclusive societies and respect of difference. Currently, there is too much of the 
international level engaged within the discourse.   
Despite these potential issues with the nature and reach of the civil society and cosmopolitan 
democracy discourses, both have ignited sophisticated debate over the ability to achieve citizens’ 
interests and rights on a global scale. Unfortunately, both have lost their focus on the individual. 
There are three core ideas to take forward with regard to the EU – the idea of citizen participation, 
the effect that cosmopolitanism will have on democracy and the ability of the EU institutions to 
legislate accordingly in response to both of the above. This research thus aims to blend adapted 
versions of the two predominant theoretical discourses that deal with these three ideas into a 
cosmopolitan governance framework, which utilises both the legislative structure of the Union (top-
down) with civil society as the local stakeholder (bottom-up). The framework, which will be outlined 
in Chapter Two, aims to bring together debate on two core concepts, civil society and 
cosmopolitanism, that share similar ambitions and failures, but are yet to work together to achieve 
and overcome both of those. Two hypotheses can be devised from the analysis above, which will 
form the basis of empirical investigation carried out in the latter part of this paper. The first of these 
is that in the current international political environment there is both a political and economic 
incentive for the EU to invest in more grassroots-focused legislation that engages the ordinary 
citizen. The second hypothesis states that the role of the ordinary citizen within the EU can be 
encapsulated more effectively by local, rather than transnational, civil society. Empirical assessment 
will thus cover the ability of both the transnational sphere and the local sphere to work together. 
The thesis will conclude that civil society, when utilised correctly in a governance framework, can 
enhance the democratic quality of the EU by creating three core conditions for direct citizen 
participation. Figure 1 below outlines the conceptual framework within which the study described 
above will take place. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Methodological Diagram 
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2. CHAPTER TWO: CIVIL COSMOPOLITANISM AND ITS CRITICS 
 
The purpose of Chapter Two is to clearly define what constitutes a model of civil cosmopolitanism, 
how it builds upon Heldian cosmopolitanism and what its application would mean for the EU. The 
core element of any cosmopolitan model of international democracy is the individual as the unit of 
moral concern. Thus, a cosmopolitan framework of international governance needs to be 
theoretically designed to ensure a governance system within which the individual can wholly 
participate. This chapter introduces a model of civil cosmopolitanism, an advancement, rather than a 
reinvention, of Held’s cosmopolitan democracy, which has the goal of democratising the 
international governance structure of the EU so that it meets the universal right to participate. The 
components of civil cosmopolitanism steer away from Held’s focus on global society and the rigidity 
of world citizenship and bring the cosmopolitan discourse closer to the ground level. Civil 
cosmopolitanism is a socially-orientated model, turning internally towards local society and 
community, as well as encouraging the EU to invest in grassroots strategies that recognise the 
capacity of local institutions to create a form of participatory democracy within the EU. In this sense, 
it reflects a flexible side of cosmopolitan theory by providing a framework that supports the work of 
elites alongside regional cohesion.  
Civil cosmopolitanism is a mixed model of democracy comprised of three components that, when 
combined, set it aside from previous models of liberal democratic thought. The three components 
are individual morality, local institutionalism, and advancements to David Held’s political theory of 
cosmopolitan democracy to include social democracy. Parallel to Held’s work, the model’s primary 
ambition is to create a framework in which the individual can be linked with the global; or in the case 
of this research where the individual can be linked with the Union. Its three components have been 
designed to support this strategy and provide some context as to how the model would contribute 
to improving democracy within the EU. Firstly, the model’s theoretical purpose is to ingrain 
individualism based on the principle of morality within political theory and the EU system. Second, 
the model’s practical purpose is to connect local and just institutions, built to support individualism, 
with the Union’s governance mechanisms. Finally, civil cosmopolitanism aims to enhance global 
political democracy in general by equating the social dimension with its political counterpart, before 
moving forward with the political transformation from international to global society as Held 
advocates. The three components demonstrate in isolation the ways in which model aims to 
improve the democratic quality of the EU. The components, in conjunction, also provide a local 
context for civil society and its relation to the Union. This chapter details the model in theoretical 
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terms as a seminal observation regarding new ways of approaching the issue of democratising the 
governance system of the EU. Civil cosmopolitanism then remains to be explored in terms of its 
development as a feasible governance model in the following chapters of this thesis.     
2.1 The principle of morality 
Firstly, civil cosmopolitanism is built to be applied to the governance structure of the EU because of 
its ability to incorporate expansion, i.e. EU enlargement and the fluctuations that come with the EU 
being an international organisation. In practice, it is not always clear how best to incorporate 
expansion. Cosmopolitans might favour further integration for the universalistic values it promotes, 
but also reject it on the basis it encourages administrative technocracy with the increase of elites 
and political representatives.79 In both cases, the motive behind acceptance or rejection is the desire 
to achieve the most moral path of integration for the individuals involved. Individualism, defined 
here as the importance of the individual, is treated within a model of civil cosmopolitanism as a 
cross-cut ideology that turns the concept inward. That is to say, as well as focusing on the cohesion 
of individuals “outside” states within the Union, the EU would focus on furthering the cohesion of 
individuals in existing member states of the Union. To achieve the most moral path, the ideology of 
individualism is built on the concept of morality. In other words, the choice to further or lessen the 
integration of individuals into the Union’s governance system requires the Union to follow an ethical 
or moral decision-making process.  
To be clear, the principle of morality is not defined in terms of the universality of rules or a set of 
Heldian or Kantian preconditions within a political body,80 but rather morality is defined in terms of 
producing, teaching and encouraging ethical behaviour. The production of ethical behaviour ideally 
follows those basic social, political, cultural and economic rights of any given society in the interest 
of diversity.81 The moral decision-making processes of the EU regarding the integration of the 
individual will thus be preoccupied with creating just and fair societies to stimulate the production of 
ethical behaviour. In a civil cosmopolitan governance system, morality importantly realises the rights 
of individuals (elites and citizens) exist at all times and not just when certain preconditions are met. 
In a real life setting, the principle of morality requires the EU to focus on individualism at both the 
                                                            
79  Adam Brinegar, Seth Jolly and Herbert Kitschelt, "Varieties of Capitalism and Political Divides over European 
Integration," in European Integration and Political Conflict, ed. Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 72. 
80 See the works of R.M. Hare, who built his ideas in part on Kant’s. See R.M  Hare, Language of Morals  
(Oxford 1952). R.M Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford 1963). 
81 C. H. Whiteley, "On Defining Morality," in The Definition of Morality, ed. G. Wallace and A.D.M. Walker 
(Great Britain: Taylor & Francis, 1970), 22. 
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top level and the bottom level, overseeing the elite and the citizen working together, which creates 
space to experiment with the relationship between the political and the social and their ability to 
produce just and fair societies. The principles of justice and fairness are important to a civil 
cosmopolitan governance framework because their application to European societies is with the 
intention of producing an environment in which democracy can flourish. In addition, this type of 
framework advances the democratic quality of the EU’s existing governance framework by 
prioritising the legitimisation of society over the legitimisation of EU institutions. Free and just 
societies provide the base for the second and third components of the model.  
2.2 Institutionalism – State-building and local civil society organisations  
From the perspective of individual morality, that the EU projects the building of strong societies is 
important for three connecting reasons. First, building a strong role for the individual will be 
paramount to the cohesion of individuals as European citizens within the EU. Second, the role of the 
individual will be constructed from the perspective of ethical behaviour, so as to ensure all 
individuals’ rights are included. Third, the necessity of engaging in ethical behaviour will be in 
response to the need for greater participation of all individuals in a contemporary EU. Questions 
remain, however, as to the structure and arrangement of the institutions within local society that 
will supervise and support the creation of transnational arrangements between the Union and the 
individual. How is a transnational process to be carried out locally within the Union? 
Institutionalisation, in the sense of state-building, is the second important component of civil 
cosmopolitanism. Institutions are the regulators of the ethical behaviour expected within the 
principle of morality. They are expected to convey all the qualities of legitimacy, which is not a 
reality at present.82 Given that civil cosmopolitanism aims to further the idea of individualism within 
political theory, there is no theory at present adequately equipped to consider either the 
appropriate arrangement of formal and informal local-body institutions or their impact on the EU’s 
social objectives. Part of the reason for this lack is because EU-level institutions, unlike those of 
traditional international organisations, have been granted the powers to achieve these objectives, as 
defined in the EU’s founding treaties, without local-body institutions.83 Following the recent crisis of 
confidence regarding these high-level institutions (dubbed the Eurozone crisis), a civil cosmopolitan 
                                                            
82 Andrew Follesdal, "Democracy, Legitimacy and Majority Rule in the EU," in Political Theory and the European 
Union: Legitimacy, Constitutional Choice and Citizenship, ed. M. Nentwich and Albert Weale (Routledge, 1998), 
34-48. 
83 Jörg Monar, "The European Union's Institutional Balance of Power After the Treaty of Lisbon" (University of 
Sussex, 2010), 1. Monar is the Director of European Political and Administrative Studies Department at the 
College of Europe, University of Sussex.  
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governance framework necessitates that the EU place greater emphasis on the role of local-body 
institutions in EU governance, which is a timely and necessary decision. 
How the component of institutionalism works is therefore increasing the chance for citizen advocacy 
and mobility by making local institutions central to EU policy making. Institutions would be 
structured formally or informally, but in order to solidify the concept of morality they must be just. 
The idea of just institutions stems from Pogge’s basic concept that all members involved in EU 
governance are citizens, regardless of their social, economic or political status, and citizens have the 
responsibility to other citizens to impose the most fair and just social situations upon them.84 The EU 
as a system of high-level institutions is likely to be predominantly concerned with injustices in the 
form of evident human rights violations, i.e. the consistency of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy with the European Convention on Human Rights. Under civil cosmopolitanism, the type of 
injustices the EU is expected to be concerned with is the production of excessive political or 
economic inequalities at the local level, which can come at the expense of social rights. The elite 
owe it to the ordinary citizen to institutionalise justice. Given that the EU would be expected to find 
a place for local institutions in the policy-making process, it would subsequently be compelled to 
make individuals, regardless of their status, the primary focus of its mandate. 
2.3 Social cosmopolitan theory and democracy 
Connecting both the moral and institutional components of the model is a third and final component 
of social cosmopolitanism. In contrast to the dominant view of cosmopolitan theory, analysed in 
Chapter One, in which the individual can strive to become a world citizen in the wider world, social 
democracy does not presuppose any separation of the individual from their own society or require a 
homogenous world citizenship. Before further analysing this component, it is important to be clear 
about why social democracy matters. Why does it matter that the political systems of the EU are 
further connected with local societies when politicians at the EP, for example, are paid to represent 
these citizens? Why should a system of participatory democracy (defined as democracy in which 
‘decision-making of basic social consequence be carried on by public groupings’85) be considered 
necessary when a system of representative democracy (defined as self-determining democracy, 
                                                            
84 Thomas Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism: A Defence," Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy 5, no. 3 (2002): 87. 
85 Originally it was American student radicals in the 1960s who urged a revival of “participatory democracy.” 
Their definition, used in this thesis, was developed and published in James Miller, Democracy is in the Streets, 
Second Edition (Harvard University Press, 1994). 333. 
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where people have the ‘right to select their own leaders’86) is already functioning and used to 
conduct EU decision-making processes?  The simple answer is the inability of a purely representative 
form of governance to keep up with social democratisation efforts and an ongoing integration 
process. Quite simply, the current governance model of the EU will struggle to incorporate the 
pressures and expectation of its citizens that are becoming louder with each new day of the crisis if it 
is bound by the parameters of high-level decision-making processes. Civil cosmopolitanism has been 
designed specifically to account for a changing social environment, in which public groups are 
banding together and pushing for social change from the elite. The component of social democracy 
calls for the EU to widen its governing structure to include the voices of these public groups. Their 
participation will be vital to a successful EU governance system and improve the quality of 
democracy at the EU.      
Despite the ongoing global upheaval and Eurozone crisis that has rocked the political and economic 
side of the EU, civil cosmopolitanism advocates the events will merely result in the realisation that 
deeper social integration in the EU is necessary. If applied to the EU, a model of civil 
cosmopolitanism would entail more inter-state cohesion to ensure the EU continues developing as a 
global civic actor. From the perspective of representative democracy, democratisation efforts are 
restricted to furthering the power of the EP only, an action of institutional reform already proposed 
in several treaty revisions.87 Furthermore, an increase in legislative powers is purposeless if the EP 
suffers from lack of public interest.88 Civil society has a more socially-orientated set of standards that 
move away from a focus on the EP. The component of social democracy does of course expect the 
EU to make changes at the institutional level because the social dimension needs to catch up to the 
political dimension before the political dimension can and should be advanced. However, the 
legitimisation process is carried out at the ground level. The EU then needs to welcome the prospect 
of change by engaging with the actors within the societies of its member states that are working to 
achieve direct participation and social democracy. Social cosmopolitanism remains a new and 
somewhat elusive concept; its existence in civil cosmopolitanism brings the EU to the forefront of 
the citizens’ perspective of the global crisis and gives rise to further testing in order to assert the 
potential of the social dimension in democratisation efforts.  
                                                            
86 The definition of representative democracy, ‘representative pluralistic government,’ was provided by 
President Ronald Reagan in an Address on democracy in 1987. See United States Department of the State, 
"Promoting Freedom and Democracy in Central America," (Bureau of Public Affairs, 1987). 
87 For example, Altiero Spinelli’s (pro-European integration Member of the European Parliament) resolution on 
the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, see European Union, 1984.  
88 Alex Warleigh, "Substantive Democracy and Institutional Change: The Paradox of Codecision," in Paper to 
the EUROPUB Conference 'European Governance and Democracy: What Prospects, Opportunities and Threats?' 
(Brussels: Institute of Governance, Public Policy and Social Research, Queen's University, Belfast, November 
2002), 11. 
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2.4 Networking, the glue behind the model  
When the three components are combined, civil cosmopolitanism is an advancement of global 
cosmopolitan theory. The aim is to apply that advanced form of cosmopolitan theory, which defines 
more clearly the link between the individual and the global; between the bottom and the top, to the 
EU governance system. In this study, the link that requires further defining is the component of 
social democracy, which calls for the EU to address the rise in public backlash throughout the world 
today. The EU must respond and make itself accessible to its citizens. It is a difficult situation to face 
during a pressing financial crisis and with the struggles of the current EU governance system. Civil 
cosmopolitanism stands to create change by demanding the EU focus on the building of strong local 
communities, i.e. building a local civil society platform that enables social integration to be at the 
heart of democratisation efforts directed at the EU. Practically, in order for this strategy to be tied 
together as an effective unit of stability, it is necessary there be an appropriate communication 
system between all actors, in particular between the local and international. In the model, this 
communication system is termed networking. Manuel Castells’s idea of “the network state” and on 
networking and relation-building in general were investigated due to their relevance to the EU. 
Castells defines the network state as ‘a state characterised by the sharing of authority...along a 
network’89 and proceeds to outline the importance of recognising difference at the state level in 
terms of power and status. The network has no nodes and thus no centre, meaning that all nodes 
are interdependent, so that even the most powerful node cannot ignore the others.90  This is 
relevant to Europe’s social crisis today, where, despite being a hegemonic power, Germany’s fate 
rests on the weakness of Greece and Cyprus. Castells’s networking system separates itself from a 
centred political structure of power and hierarchy, the structure most commonly referred to in 
international relations theory.  
The idea of networking finds a similar point of relevance within civil cosmopolitanism, for example 
the establishment of interdependent nodes of communication between individual and civil society 
as well as civil society and EU institutions. Networking is the glue between the various actors in that 
it will allow for debate, discussion, disputation and mediation in order to progress societal 
transformation.  Civil cosmopolitanism advocates for a more highly structured networking system 
than that envisaged by Castells, given that it has an institutional centre – local civil society. It is 
proposed that the individual citizen connects with the EU most effectively through local civil society.  
                                                            
89 Manuel Castells, "European Unification in the Era of the Network State,"  openDemocracy (12 December 
2001), http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-europefuture/article_347.jsp. (Last accessed 21 May, 
2012). 
90 Ibid. 
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Thus, the networking system within civil cosmopolitanism can be defined as relation building that 
extends opportunities for individual engagement arranged around an institutional centre. It is these 
seemingly unimportant individual voices that often find themselves excluded from governance 
structures, when in reality inclusivity and diversity contribute the most to the preservation of Held’s 
ideal rightful share in the process of governance today.91 When put into practice, the aim of relation-
building in the networking system is to resemble the natural growth process of a tree, where the 
tree trunk resembles a communications matrix from which multiple branches of interaction between 
public and private actors can grow.92  These multiple branches will extend interaction opportunities 
to minorities, which form the institutional centre, or the trunk. The networking system is the part of 
the model that will be of tangible benefit to the EU, given that the EU currently faces a tough 
communication challenge with the ordinary citizen at the local level. The system’s workings are built 
with the specific task of enhancing the democratic quality of international governance structures by 
communicating the needs of all individuals, without stopping at national borders.  
2.5 A critical perspective on cosmopolitan democracy 
As a theoretical model, civil cosmopolitanism aims to support a transnational governance structure 
that needs to cope with societal transformations in order to advance public accountability. Civil 
cosmopolitanism alters existing cosmopolitan theory, thus it is appropriate to consider arguments 
that disagree with the propositions made in this model, if for no other reason than to assess its 
credibility. Disagreement is expected, particularly given that civil cosmopolitanism is expanding a 
theory known on the world stage for originating in Europe, the hub of Western politics. There is no 
doubt that such a positive assumption about the role of the individual citizen will be challenged by 
Eurosceptics in more ways than one. As a theory of methodological individualism, there are four 
areas in general where critical opinion of civil cosmopolitanism has been predicted.  
                                                            
91 David Held, Democracy and the global order: from the modern state to cosmopolitan governance  (Stanford 
University Press, 1995). 273. 
92 The idea of relation-building being similar to the process of cultivation was first mentioned in William 
Connolly’s work on citizen networks. See William E. Connolly, "Speed, Concentric Cultures, and 
Cosmopolitanism," Political Theory 28, no. 5 (October 2000); ———, "Cross-State Citizen Networks: A 
Response to Dallmayr," Journal of International Studies 30 Part 2  (June 2001);  Linda S. Bishai, "Liberal 
Empire," Journal of International Relations and Development 1(2004): 64. 
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2.5.1 An unjustified imposition of the cosmopolitan account, a realist perspective 
Realist critique of cosmopolitan theory has long existed. As an avowed realist, Danilo Zolo believes 
that the state is the only actor in the system that can possess legitimate political power.93 Zolo 
would explicitly deny that a model of civil cosmopolitanism, which draws heavily on networking to 
endorse civil society, has any footing to stand on. He would instead claim that state sovereignty will 
allow the nation-state to uphold its power and leave little room for a civic network. Zolo, who has 
produced a series of articles and books on cosmopolitan theory and its relation to global 
governance, uses examples of the Holy Alliance and the somewhat disastrous UN interventions into 
Somalia (1993) and Rwanda (1994) to demonstrate the lack of desire for liberal democracy on the 
international political scene. Zolo specifically questions the credibility of cosmopolitan theory and 
whether it can be anything but ‘an inherently hegemonic and violent undertaking.’94 There seems 
little point in attempting to further transnational governance from the bottom-up when war, power 
and elitism have existed in the roots of society for all of history and continue to flower today. 
Furthermore, a solution that begins with civil society is inept in a world run by power-politics. For 
theorists such as Zolo, the issue is not one of the nation-state being rendered obsolete, but rather of 
the failure of social cosmopolitanism to see that social transformation from a grassroots perspective 
only intensifies the characteristic of domination.95 Thus civil cosmopolitanism may point to 
individualism on the understanding that protection of difference will protect individual rights, but 
also on the understanding that it risks setting a standard for societal homogenisation.  
One important point to note regarding a realist critique of cosmopolitanism is that, although realist 
scholars argue strongly that existing models are undesirable, the goal of most cosmopolitanists is 
not argued as undesirable. Zolo does not claim the protection of individual rights is of no interest to 
the international system, but argues instead that the current models advocating their importance 
should be revised.96 There is no doubt that theory needs to be adaptable to changing circumstances 
in the international political world. As recognised by civil cosmopolitanism, society is where the 
aspects of ethics, participation and ultimately democracy can best be deepened. In this sense, realist 
theory can be criticised for its own exclusionary tendencies and inability to incorporate social 
democracy.  Zolo’s examples of the American War on Terror in Iraq, the invasion of Haiti and other 
hijackings of the international system used to argue against cosmopolitanism are actually examples 
                                                            
93 Danilo Zolo, "A Cosmopolitan Philosophy of International Law? A Realist Approach," Ratio Juris 12, no. 4 
(1999); ———, "Towards a 'Weak Pacifism'," in Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1997), 131. 
94 Danilo Zolo, Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government  (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997). 15. 
95 Robert Fine, "Taking the 'Ism' Out of Cosmopolitanism: An Essay in Reconstruction," European Journal of 
Social Theory 6, no. 4 (2003): 464. 
96 Zolo, 1997, 44. 
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of the very reason cosmopolitan theory needs to exist: the democracy deficit where the nation-state 
fails on its own. In reopening the case for local civil society, civil cosmopolitanism is offering the 
opportunity for a non-threatening governance model that advances public accountability and 
participation within EU member states at the European level. In contradiction to realist criticism of 
social transformation as abstract domination and universalist, therefore, civil cosmopolitanism has 
constructed grassroots cosmopolitanism; cosmopolitanism from the perspective of the actor being 
liberated, not from the perspective of one actor liberating another. As it was Zolo himself who 
questioned how cosmopolitan theory can overcome human aggression, there can be no issue with a 
theoretical attempt to revisit the themes of human equality and globalism.   
2.5.2 Wishful thinking? Constructing a model of the EU as it ought to be  
Despite projecting itself as a mixed model and thus attempting to produce a cosmopolitan 
democracy that appears desirable at the top and bottom, civil cosmopolitanism is likely to face the 
argument that desirability does not necessarily equate with feasibility. As a model, it may be 
rejected based on the fact that it merely seems desirable, rather than setting the conditions for a 
strong democratic governance framework for the EU. Although the focus of social cosmopolitan 
theory in the model is to engage the ordinary citizen within European-level governance, there has 
been no mention of anything legally binding during this process of societal transformation. Robert 
Fine, a leading European scholar on the history of social and political thought, supposes that a 
process of social or political transformation imagined within any theoretical framework will face 
practical difficulties when it comes to representation, enforcement and of course, implementation.97 
With a flourishing civil society, is the nation-state expected to establish cosmopolitan party systems 
and governmental departments? If not, how does civil society guarantee the component of morality 
and ethical behaviour and avoid irrelevancy in the political world? As a point of comparison, Timothy 
Brennan aligns the situation of the cosmopolitan social community to that of the cosmopolitan 
economic community. The difference between the two is that the economic community is linked to 
the global by way of market flow – capital and trade. The link between local and global is a reality. In 
contrast, Brennan states that the social community is an ‘exported ideological product.’98 It is merely 
a set of unrealistic, overwhelmingly liberal ideals with no connection to the financial model of 
cosmopolitanism, in which institutions are emerging to govern commodities, exchange rates, 
interest rates, prices and sale of goods; the way the world goes around in general. 
                                                            
97 Robert Fine, Cosmopolitanism: Key Ideas  (Oxon: Routledge, 2007). 
98 Timothy Brennan, "Cosmo-Theory," The South Atlantic Quarterly 100, no. 3 (Summer 2001).61. 
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However, the EU is living proof that transnational liberal spheres work successfully. Of course, EU 
governance is directed and managed by a number of treaties, EU statues and other laws, which need 
to set a clear mandate for the engagement of local civil society. Yet, this is not necessarily a call for 
more legislation. No increase in legally binding documentation is going to fix a social issue. Civil 
cosmopolitanism will need to remain very clear on the limits of cosmopolitan theory in this way. It 
does not attempt to create binding international law, agreeing with critics here that the vision of 
enacting global justice remains in the conceptual. Instead, it attempts to recognise the EU as it is 
legally and as it could potentially be socially. This was part of the decision to implement a local 
model that promotes basic rights of individuals, rather than trying to recreate human rights hand-in-
hand with international politics. Following this analysis, there remains little credibility in Brennan’s 
argument that cosmopolitanism, from a social perspective, corresponds to an ideological product 
only. Human rights, preservation of identity, political participation, ethics, cultural beliefs and 
individualisation, all ideological products referred to in social cosmopolitanism, have already been 
legally constituted in EU documentation.99 
2.5.3 A strategy based on exclusion 
The issue of local civil society brings the analysis of civil cosmopolitanism as mere idealism to a final 
point. The expected compatibility of the model to many different local situations is unrealistic. 
Predominantly, if the EU opens up to further enlargement and deeper integration, there can be no 
promise by civil society to empower the grassroots and encourage citizen participation where there 
is conflict in the interests of different members in a society, for example in cases in which some 
citizens are sceptical of the EU while others might want “more Europe.” Heikki Patomäki argues that 
the impartial characteristics of cosmopolitanism ignore these differences and instead split the world 
between heroic morality and differing geographic and historical dimensions. He supposes the 
possibility of de-contextualized individuals,100 or ethereal figures, that attempt to bind these 
geographic differences together through the guiding hand of ethicists. These lines of contention 
spark the argument that cosmopolitan theory ‘cannot capture the political “realities” of the 
international realm.’101 Civil cosmopolitanism would be viewed as holding a sort of unconscious 
                                                            
99 For example, the European Court of Human Rights. See the European External Actions Service; The European 
Convention on Human Rights, Rome. Council of Europe, (November 1950); Charter of Fundamental Rights, see 
European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union." Official Journal of the European 
Communities, Document C 364/01  (December 2000). The Charter became legally binding with the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, see European Union,  2007; European Union, "European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights." Official Journal of the European Union, L 386/1 (20 December 2006a). 
100 David Held and Heikki Patomäki, "Problems of Global Democracy: A Dialogue " Theory, Culture & Society 23, 
no. 5 (2006): 120. 
101 Held and Wallace Brown, 2011, 123. 
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belief of itself as the perfect model. Its foundation is built on a democratic system perceived to 
promote autonomy and inclusion, yet this inclusion is a forced one deemed acceptable because of 
the natural desires of the model. Thus it is actually exclusionary, reflecting a closed system project 
applicable to Europe only. Martin Munro and Robbie Shilliam demonstrate how independence in 
Haiti, arriving two decades after that of the US, accelerated Haiti ahead of America and challenged 
European ideas.102 Yet, examples from the Caribbean are not included in the majority of European-
focused cosmopolitan projects.103 Cosmopolitan projects are therefore based on the exclusion of the 
Other, and focus only on a reference to the European self, thus projecting an unwelcome 
atmosphere to non-natives within European societies.  The authors’ purposeful use of a non-
Western example of peace building aims to highlight that not all projects of emancipation are 
devised from a European perspective of the ‘self.’  
 
The problem with Patomäki, Munro and Shilliam’s arguments is that they fall in line with claims that 
civil cosmopolitanism advocates the construction of a homogenous European society and culture. 
Patomäki, Munro and Shilliam all make valid points, but the vital details of a civil cosmopolitan 
model override this criticism. The model merely breaks down cosmopolitanism to review history and 
extend upon what has and has not worked between the local and international level. This means 
looking at the successes of the European model and considering where there are gaps between high-
level governance and local-level citizen participation. It also means looking at the failures. Civil 
cosmopolitanism has grasped the side of Europe that was constructed through colonialism, slavery 
and imperialism, hence the focus on social rights and recognition of difference. The moral, 
institutional and social components of civil cosmopolitanism are designed to automatically assume 
difference through identity, and historical and cultural preservation. As a more flexible version of 
cosmopolitanism, it is can be moulded when applied to various societal types.  
2.6 Summary 
Civil cosmopolitanism is a governance model designed to address a missing link in the relationship 
between the EU and its citizens, that is, the lack of focus on the social dimension of politics where 
the individual and the elite can better connect. The idea is that by creating a strong social space the 
democratic quality of EU governance will be enhanced by progressing EU values of equality and 
inclusion, promoting culture and establishing a shared identity. The model predicts that, in order to 
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ensure a high quality of democracy, engagement of local civil society – organised groups of citizens – 
will play a role in ensuring institutions exist and strong societies stem from growth on the ground. 
Utilising local civil society as a tool, civil cosmopolitanism’s three components and central 
networking system combine to create an EU that is more accessible to the general European citizen 
by making individualism and societal transformation a core focus of EU policies and initiatives. If the 
EU wishes to continue promoting the message that it is a global civic actor, its governance system 
must work to deliver that message. For example, the policy and decision-making processes in a civil 
cosmopolitan governance system are designed to work with the ground level and reflect the 
processes of an institution that cares greatly at the top about the citizen on the ground.  
To summarise the points of criticism, two strong arguments against the model’s assumptions arise. 
The first of these states the nation-state is the only true community where the individual can thrive. 
The second finds problems in the transcendent individual reasoning apparent in cosmopolitan 
theory. Scholars of the latter argue that the trouble with community development incentives led by 
individuals is that they hold the individual in an elitist light, which creates an unrealistic sense of 
governance and can even remove political equality, for example when the Draft Constitution did not 
go ahead. Both arguments encapsulate modern anti-cosmopolitanism, a movement that argues it is 
simply not rational to expect humanity to be guided by a universal reason simply because, for an 
anti-cosmopolitanist, ‘there is no such reason.’104 The EU, however, is guided in part by a hope for 
perpetual peace, where a single European citizenship and a single European identity is part of a 
Union mindset. This does not mean to say that having international citizenship and international 
rights is to override national status and differing moral spheres of activity i.e. communities. Quite 
the contrary; individuals are primarily citizens of their nation-state and initiatives that strengthen the 
nation-state from the ground up are an important part of global justice in promoting communal 
autonomy and cultural difference.  
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3. CHAPTER THREE: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES BEHIND         
INVESTING IN “GRASSROOTS” AT THE UNION LEVEL 
 
In light of Chapter Two, one can form the assumption that, when put into practice, civil 
cosmopolitanism’s dual aim is to engage strong and just societies through local civil society and 
balance competing nationalist and internationalist claims by focusing on the citizen. In order for that 
to become a reality, there is a more than likely a need at the transnational level to understand two 
things. Firstly, whether there is significant value in policy that mixes traditional top-down 
governance strategies with bottom-up governance strategies, such as the engagement of local civil 
society. Second, whether there is a need to produce more mixed policy of this sort as advocated for 
by civil cosmopolitanism. To assess the accuracy of this assumption, Chapter Three will address 
hypothesis one, whether there currently exists a political or economic incentive at the Union level to 
further the case for more grassroots-focused policy and thus the case for deeper engagement of 
local civil society. In other words, is the time right within the EU system to introduce a governance 
structure such as the one proposed by the civil cosmopolitanism model? Part of the examination 
into the EU governance structure involves looking at what social policies exist, what initiatives are 
being introduced, and whether the end results match up with proposed objectives by EU staff or not. 
In this analysis, the aim is to shed light on the political and economic workings of the Union in its 
current form (a transnational federation of nation-states) to discover if there is a need for increased 
adoption by the Union of social policies with a mix top-down and bottom-up governance strategies 
working to engage the citizen. That is, to understand how social policy currently supports a civil 
cosmopolitan governance structure and where there may be room for development.  
3.1 Creating room for citizen participation and social cohesion at the Union level 
3.1.1 Citizenship initiatives beyond the Eurozone crisis 
The issue of citizenship in the EU is a timely one. The economic crisis, although described as the 
worst in the EU’s history, has been referred to as a ‘wake-up call’105 by President of the European 
Commission José Manuel Durão Barroso in his 2012 State of the Union speech. Correcting the 
financial markets and stabilising the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is of course an essential 
part of the recovery, but what Barroso speaks of is a wake-up call concerning the loss of coherency 
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at the political level and subsequently the gradual loss of community. The EU is a community project 
not a governmental project, but the point of departure during this crisis is the community. In other 
words, the role of the citizen and the flourishing of communities need to be of central concern to the 
EU in its future plans. European leaders share a similar perspective on the issue, evident in the 
significant shift of governance initiatives with regard to their prioritisation of social cohesion and 
regional development. The EU and member states have been cooperating through the Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC) on social inclusion initiatives since the year 2000, but results in relation to 
citizen participation and cooperation within the Union are generally considered insufficient by most 
stakeholders.106 While it is questionable why there was never a move to ensure satisfactory results, 
the underlying problem is likely to be an overall lack of direction in social policy, a mix of good and 
bad policy. Such a conclusion is drawn following the release of the EC’s Europe 2020, a strategy 
proposed to significantly help Europe become a unified body. The clear-cut objectives and ambitious 
goals of Europe 2020 point to the gap in previous Union institution strategies: few long-term targets 
in policy or initiatives and no common goals.  
Europe 2020 is built around three priorities for growth - smart, sustainable and inclusive - where the 
key to all three is innovation.107 One of the three priorities in the seven-year strategy is inclusive 
growth; the innovative investment in economic, social and territorial cohesion. To discourage social 
exclusion and encourage citizens to take an active role in the Union, the EC has set the target of 20 
million fewer people at risk of poverty.108 Given that the population of the EU in its entirety (27 
countries) currently stands at just under 504 million,109 the EC has set the ambitious target of lifting 
4% of the population out of poverty. If the EU adopts Europe 2020, the goals will be clear and the 
targets for social inclusion will be set. There remains an unanswered question however; what 
strategies will be in place to oversee their efforts? There will be those who argue that Europe 2020 
was a necessary proposal simply because the economic crisis ruined what social and economic 
strategies were already in place to oversee the achievement of EU targets. Yet, when proposed pre-
crisis and post-crisis social policies at the Union level are taken into consideration, one could suggest 
that there remain structural weaknesses, regardless of the crisis.  
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In terms of social and cohesion policy, the EU has predominantly focused on Citizenship, a 
programme initiated in the year 2000 to enable citizen participation in the EU. When the programme 
was extended in 2006, the name was changed to Europe for Citizens and the objective extended 
from improving citizens’ participation to ‘giv[ing] the citizen a key role’110 in the EU. Given that the 
programme has continued for twelve years, its success is evident in the fact it has received sustained 
investment, with a financial envelope of 215 million EUR until mid-2013.111 Furthermore, the EC has 
already had its proposal to expand the Europe for Citizens programme adopted. The programme 
now has the capacity to encourage civic participation at the Union level during the 2014-2020 
period, demonstrating clear recognition that the promotion of citizen participation is necessary for 
the Union to function successfully and democratically. Another important factor is that all proposals 
for the programme have focused on two predominant action areas: active citizens and active civil 
society.112 The programme focuses on creating greater opportunity for citizen-led projects and 
initiatives and for CSO involvement, as part of the overall objective of linking the European citizen 
and the EU. One key measure of the success of the EC’s recently launched continuation plan for 
Europe for Citizens will be the extent to which it can increase awareness and change the perception 
of the EU amongst European citizens.  
The importance of direct citizen involvement at the Union level in Europe for Citizens has been 
acknowledged in the continuation of the initiative. However, despite the existence of a long-term 
economic and social crisis, Europe for Citizens remains the only community-led development plan 
that promotes civic participation and active remembrance (remembrance of the fundamental values 
that make up the EU’s foundation, such as freedoms and rights of the European citizen). 
Furthermore, a mid-term review of the programme carried out in 2010 demonstrated shortcomings 
and problems related to ‘unmet demand.’113 Given the ambitious targets set for social inclusion and 
growth in Europe 2020, it should be considered whether the new citizenship proposal for 2014-2020 
will be enough. The proposed financial envelope (budget) alone has increased by a mere 15 million 
EUR.114 The financial envelope not only fails to reach a symbolic “one Euro per citizen” goal, or a 
total of around 500 million Euros, it is also less generous than the current 2007-2013 financial 
envelope when inflation and proposed increases to the overall EU budget for 2014-2020 are taken 
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into account. If anything, the lack of funding further highlights the issue of the lack of strategy to 
oversee the means taken to achieve the long-term goals set out in the EU’s 2020 plan. On 1 October 
2012, the office of Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Hannu Takkula (Committee for 
Education and Culture) submitted a written question to the EC requesting information as to why 
Europe for Citizens would continue to be the only initiative of its nature at the Union level when 
there was a clear link between civic participation and democratic governance. The response, which 
was not received until December 2012, mentioned that several other political initiatives are taking 
place in this domain, but then failed to list anything other than the Year of the European Citizen 
(2013).115 Unfortunately, there have been no new debates, awareness-raising activities on EU 
citizens’ rights or additional projects scheduled to get underway during 2013. The EC’s awaited 
response was addressed by the Chair of the Committee on Education and Culture, who pointed out 
that essentially all initiatives are designed on behalf of the citizen.116 The Chair highlighted the idea is 
to avoid adding unnecessary legislation to the policy mix in order to move forward with simplified 
policy overall. Regardless, it is difficult to see how policy is currently communicating with citizens 
that the EU values their participation as a useful strategy in the long-term. 
In light of the above, there are two clear priorities at the Union level with regard to social policy and 
the development of citizenship. Continued efforts to encourage citizen participation are evident with 
the Europe for Citizens initiative and innovative features of the single methodology for regional 
funding. The Union remains rigid, however, with regard to considering additional initiatives. It may 
be that in effect every programme initiated by the EC stands to benefit the EU citizen, but initiatives 
that explicitly engage the individual as an EU citizen have been acknowledged as having proven 
results for democratic engagement and active remembrance on a European level.117 While the push 
for financial easing within the EU budget might reduce the administrative burden for citizens and EU 
members, as predicted,118 it might also restrict the focus on enhancing citizenship to immediate 
outputs and results. The overall size of the financial envelope is simply not substantial enough to 
sustain the big picture goals that Europe for Citizens was set up to achieve. In this sense and as a 
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flow-on effect, accomplishing the ambitious social targets of the 2020 strategy also becomes a lot 
more challenging and requires a lot more innovation.  
3.1.2 European Parliament, the inside view 
The EP is the only representative body within the Union that directly represents the European 
citizen. There are around 6000 staff members working on behalf of separate European states, as 
MEPs, advisors or assistants for one of eight political groups and for the many sectoral committees 
and delegations for relations with foreign countries. As a unified political body, it puts citizenship 
and citizen-focused governance strategies at its very heart. Analysing citizenship from the point of 
view of parliamentary individuals is likely to reveal any cleavages that exist in the Parliamentary 
body with regard to social and cohesion policy. Their personal and political views are very important 
to understanding if there is an overarching desire for an increase in mixed governance strategies 
that promote grassroots participation and broader participation in the decision-making system. In 
general, it is difficult to study the impact individuals can have in the Union as it is hard to piece 
together data. With regional and social cohesion policy however, the multitude of actors, including 
MEPs, national political representatives, think tanks, local body organisations and citizens, means a 
wide range of opinions can be gathered and the opportunity for comparison exists. The issue of 
Party preferences, nationalism and cleavages within the Union is important for two reasons. First, it 
will help to understand whether individuals from countries with higher social standards are likely to 
push for policies encouraging integration and protection of citizens at the Union level and vice versa. 
Second, there is no pan-European Party at the EU level to work for the European citizen as a whole; 
thus there is no overall stance on community development. Gaining an understanding of how social 
policy is currently perceived within the Union can occur instead from direct contact with the 
parliamentary actors. Overall, understanding the opinions of EP staff may highlight potential gaps 
between what is desired by the EU and what ends up being produced by the EU.  
Using a standardised open-ended interview structure, four parliamentary staff members119 were 
interviewed in the week starting 1 October 2012 and three members of a think tank connected to 
the Parliament were interviewed in the week starting 15 October 2012.120 With the short timeframe 
and small number of interviewees, it was important to select a mix of political parties, nationalities, 
positions, responsibilities, Committee representatives and an even number of men and women 
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(currently only one third of MEPs are women). Participants were asked the same set of questions121 
to gain insight into the real position of the political representatives on what type of Union they 
wanted to see for future generations. The overall feeling is that there is too much contrast within 
the EU, that there is now a two-speed integration process. One Policy Advisor for Regional 
Development for the Group of the Greens, of Austrian nationality, stated he personally believed 
continued integration was the way forward. He argued that the EU was supposed to represent a 
single set of top-down institutions working with communities from the bottom up and that to reach 
a functioning governance of this type requires further integration.122 A Policy Advisor for Regional 
Development from the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) centre Party, of 
Bulgarian nationality, agreed that the EU is supposed to reflect a mixed top-bottom governance 
model, but stated it has lost the bottom-up aspect. She explained how the problem with regional 
development has become ‘an issue of accountability.’123 The EC relates with the CoR and the CoR 
listens to the umbrella organisations, but given that the focus has been predominantly at the Union 
level, blame has fallen on the EC only, when there needs to be responsibility at the local level. Both 
interviewees requested anonymity to protect their jobs. Their views similarly reflect a desire for 
regional development to be a greater focal point in EU policy or, it is argued, the bottom-up aspect 
will be lost.  
Speaking from the perspective of an umbrella institution in Madrid, Professor of Processal Law 
Helena Soleto Muñoz mentioned in an interview in July 2012 that many nations such as Spain have 
turned inward to concentrate on national issues. Ms Muñoz works for the UC3M on mediation and 
conflict projects that are funded by the EU. While organisations such as the UC3M are trying to form 
enhanced relations with the EU, she notes there ‘isn’t really a platform they can congregate on’124 at 
the local level, especially during times when the nation has turned inward. She strongly emphasised 
the fact that Spain has emerged from a forty-year dictatorship and citizen initiatives remain a 
strange concept. The EU needs to encourage programmes such as Europe for Citizens if it wants to 
engage the Spanish and given that programmes such as ERASMUS (education exchange programme) 
have been so successful, it is difficult to understand why additional like-minded initiatives wouldn’t 
be a primary focus. MEP Hannu Takkula from Finland, Member of the Committee for Culture and 
Education, picks up on Ms Muñoz’s point about the success of ERASMUS. Mr Takkula is a leading 
advocate for the role of education in enhancing citizen participation in the EU. According to Mr 
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Takkula, the problem is that citizens are unaware of the EU’s potential because the Union currently 
faces what he calls an ‘unbearable communications deficit.’125 This returns to Ms Muñoz’s point 
about the lack of public space where citizens and the EU can communicate. Educating EU citizens’ on 
their role within the Union should thus begin with establishing political spaces as a base for 
communication and relation-building efforts. The European Policy Centre (EPC), a Brussels-based 
think tank working with the EP on new integration policy, argues that getting people involved in the 
EU remains the number one challenge. In the EPC’s 2011 Annual Report, Director of Studies Josef 
Janning noted the crisis has ‘offered such an opportunity’126 for the EP to involve citizens, to make a 
case for the Europe they wish to see. However, there is by and large a sense of agreement that the 
social dimension is lacking somewhat from the governance structure of the EU in the sense that the 
citizens are not heard. In the United Kingdom for example, the House of Lords has expressed the 
need for a freeze on the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) until the citizen voice 
advocating for greater investment in research, innovation and job creation is heard.127 If, however, it 
makes sense to advance the social aspect and connect citizen participation to the economic and 
political policy-making process of the EU, it begs the question as to why the EU is not jumping to the 
task. The obvious difficulty is that social policy is somewhat more complicated than political and 
economic policy. As Nicos Trimikliniotis from the EPC pointed out in an interview, dealing with real 
social interactions is something policy-makers struggle with because ‘they think in boxes.’128 Policy-
makers are confined by the regulations and financing constrictions placed upon them to the extent 
that even the best legal instruments are unlikely to properly depict a social situation. In this sense, it 
has been described at the EPC as ‘an illusion’129 to think that civic participation could be tailored in 
an abstract manner in Brussels at the EP because it has to be tailored to local situations, hence the 
need for local political spaces.  
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An attempt has recently been made to move more definitively in the direction of a regional 
development model that combines bottom-up with top-down approaches. In 2012, the CoR 
organised a consultation that focused precisely on adapting the governance framework of the EU. 
On this matter, the CoR suggested that the EC pursue coordinated action with local actors.130 The 
overall response from Parliamentary representatives was positive, except for those in the Europe of 
Freedom and Democracy Group (EFDG). While he remained unavailable for comment, Nigel Farage, 
a British MEP from the EFDG, spoke in the EP on 7 September 2012 and criticised any future plan 
that encouraged more coordination and centralisation, calling it ‘fanaticism.’131 Mr Farage’s 
comment is fuelled by a concern that democracy in the nation-state is being undermined, based on 
the idea that too much political power is being accumulated outside of national governments. These 
comments, however, focus specifically on the prospect of shifting EU governance to the authority of 
the Community Method only. Advancing the Community Method does not have to mean allocating 
excessive power to any actor in the EU governance structure. Unfortunately, no action has been 
taken to date following the CoR’s consultation. At this stage, while the fate of the Euro remains in 
doubt and political discussion of a possible Banking Union continues, progress should focus to some 
extent on the part of the crisis that can be attributed to the EU’s social failures. This is not to say an 
overhaul of the Community Method is required, but rather the policy that addresses the Community 
Method could be analysed in terms of effectiveness within the community. Chair of the Committee 
for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and MEP for Spain Juan Fernando López Aguilar spoke 
passionately about his belief in policy that engages citizens through bottom-up strategies. For the EU 
to remain faithful to its values, with democracy first and foremost among those values, it needs to 
be faithful to itself as a social model of governance in order to deliver for the EU citizen.132 When 
asked whether he felt the opportunity now existed for the EU to advance the role of the citizen and 
progress the EU’s value of democracy, his answer was simple; the EU ‘must advance the role of the 
citizen,’133 it must make this shift in governance. 
The personal opinion of experts engaged with and from within the EP points to one predominant 
issue: policy must connect with the citizen and attempts to do so cannot be successful to this effect 
if consultation is not widely sought. Discourse analysis conducted in Chapter Three demonstrates 
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how vital the voice of the local is perceived to be in the current climate. These findings point to the 
possibility of failure in the 2009 Lisbon strategy, which, as noted in Chapter One, strove to further 
civic participation in the EU by altering the structure of EU institutions. With the primary focus being 
a power reshuffle at the top, it is likely there was not enough involvement of all actors. As Luc Van 
den Brande from the CoR mentioned, the EU should prepare itself for a shift from multi-level 
governance to “multi-actorship.”134  It is no longer about new institutions, it is not about opening up 
new discussion after eight years of debate on Lisbon and institutional reform, it is about duty and 
responsibility being met and room being given to the important factors i.e. inclusion, health, 
entrepreneurship and education. The following part of Chapter Three will address the economic 
workings of the EU budget for regional development and social cohesion in the current climate and 
what incentives exist to further invest in strategies committed to these important factors.  
3.2. Funding citizen participation: what does the future hold? 
3.2.1. The structure (social expenditures) in the budgets of the EU and the US 
To gain a more accurate perspective on what constitutes adequate funding for regional 
development and social cohesion initiatives, a brief comparison between the European budget for 
social cohesion and the same budget of another major international player could be helpful. Looking 
at the experience of the US makes economic sense, given that the institutional arrangement of the 
EU has been described as ‘not unlike’135 the monetary policy-making process of the US. The Federal 
Reserve System of the US, designed in 1913, offers regions in the country a direct say in policy 
decisions by diverting power away from a central hub. The executive role of the EC can be compared 
with that of the US President and the citizen-representative role of the EP with that of the US House 
of Representatives. To compare the structure of social cohesion funding of these two actors firstly 
requires a definition of social cohesion. In preparation for the 2012 Draft Budget, the EC defined 
funding for social cohesion as funding covering ‘issues which are of key concern to the citizens of 
Europe, including health, consumer protection and civic protection.’136 For example, projects and 
programmes put forward for the 2012-2020 period include Europe for Citizens (investing in European 
citizenship), Creative Europe (protecting Europe’s cultural sector), Health for Growth (funding actions 
under the Health umbrella) and the Annual Work Programme in the area of Consumer Policy 
(enforcing consumer rights). All of these policy initiatives were devised with the purpose of funding 
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community-initiated projects related to each category. The programmes are specifically linked to 
development in local societies, where civil society can play a role in their fulfilment. Similarly, the US 
Office of Management and Budget created a Social Innovation Fund (SIF) in 2009, where funding 
social cohesion is to fund ‘opportunities for Americans to serve their community and country...to 
develop, evaluate and scale up successful ideas.’137 Both definitions refer largely to investment in 
citizenship initiatives to meet citizens’ needs, as well as community-led development to address 
critical societal challenges.  
The US Federal Budgets and EU Budgets from the last two years (2010, 2011 at the time of writing) 
were analysed based on the amount of funding directed towards social cohesion: citizenship and 
community-led development. Over the last few years, the EU has contributed around 1.14% of its 
Gross National Income (GNI) towards its annual budget.138 In 2010, the EU produced a budget worth 
141.5 billion EUR and increased this to 141.9 billion EUR in payments in 2011, which, although small 
in terms of money actually allocated, amounts to a 2.9% increase.139 Table 1 below shows the 
amount of funding allocated to social cohesion policies from the 2010 and 2011 EU budgets: 
Table 1: Social Expenditure in the European Union Budget 2010-2011*  
Costs Itemised by 
Policy Area 
Expenditure 
Estimate 2010 
(billion EUR)140 
% Change from 
Budget 2009 
Expenditure 
Estimate 2011 
(billion EUR)141 
% Change from 
Budget 2010 
Sustainable Growth 64,3 +3.3 64,5 +0.4 
Cohesion 49,4 +2 51,0 +3.2 
Convergence 40,4 +3.7 42,5 +5.0 
Regional 
competitiveness and 
employment 
7,6 -6.2 7,1 -6.8 
Territorial cooperation 1,2 +6.7 1,3 +5.6 
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Promise," (Washington, DC: U.S Government Printing Office, 2009), 111. 
138 European Commission, "EU Budget 2011 Financial Report," (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union, 2012b). Executive Summary, 8.  
139 ———, "Budget 2011 in Figures," (Brussels, Financial Programming and Budget, 3 October, 2012). 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/2011/2011_en.cfm. (Last accessed 4 October, 2012).  
140 Figures in Table 1 from European Commission, "E.U Budget 2010 in Figures, Building a Social Europe," 
(Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2009). 
141 Figures in Table 1 from European Commission, 2012b, 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/2011/2011_en.cfm. (Last accessed 4 October, 2012). 
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Citizenship, Freedom, 
Security and Justice 
1,7 +10.5 1,8 +8.0 
Freedom, security and 
justice, including 
fundamental rights and 
liberties 
1,0 +16.2 1,1 +13.2 
Citizenship** 0,7 +2.8 0,7 +0.0 
* Figures in Table 1 listed in footnotes 140 and 141 
**including media, culture, consumer protection 
 
Two notable figures stand out from Table 1: the significant decrease in funding of regional 
competitiveness and the increase in funding for citizenship, freedom, security and justice from the 
allocation of 2009. Following the enlargement of the EU in 2004, funding for the states that had 
joined the Union was easily accessible. The near collapse of the financial system in the recent 
financial crisis has resulted in a decrease in regional funding due to reduction in allocations to the 
new member states.142 Yet, despite the crisis, there has been a near 11% increase in the funding 
allocated to the citizenship policy area in 2010 and an 8% increase in 2011. The simultaneous 
occurrence of these two funding changes (an increase in citizenship funding and a decrease in 
regional competitiveness funding) indicates recognition that the EU is not simply a Union of 
financially competitive states; it is also a social project. Economic unison can only really occur if 
social unison is achieved. What can be seen occurring is an important reorientation of European 
finances from economically-focused social cohesion policy to socially-focused social cohesion policy. 
Freedom and respect for fundamental rights are issues of central concern to citizens143 and similarly 
should remain core objectives of the EU given that the Charter of Fundamental Rights has the same 
legal value as the Treaties.144 It would be interesting to know if a turn of events is the reason behind 
such a funding change and whether further enquiry will reveal the reason is an inconsistent and 
incoherent approach to funding citizenship issues to date. An international comparison could be 
useful here. Public policy in the United States has also recently seen an increase in the channelling of 
funds to social policies. The SIF was created specifically to encourage a successful non-profit sector. 
In 2010, the US had a budget total of roughly 3.5 trillion USD, which was increased to 3.6 trillion USD 
                                                            
142 ———, 2009. 
143 Initiatives such as ‘Youth on the Move,’ ‘Europe for Citizens’ and ‘European Platform against Poverty’ have 
sprouted in response to concerns that social policy is too economically-focused. 
144 Armelle Arnould, "The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty, in Particular Article 6 TEU, on Member States’ 
Obligations with Respect to the Protection of Fundamental Rights," in University of Luxembourg Law Working 
Paper 2010-01 (Luxembourg: Faculty of Law, Universite du Luxembourg, 29 July 2010). 
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in 2011 (2.7 trillion EUR and 2.77 trillion EUR respectively145).146 Both budgets were close to one 
quarter of the entire US Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Table 2 below shows the amount of funding 
allocated to social cohesion policies from the 2010 and 2011 US budgets:  
Table 2: Social Expenditure in the United States Budget 2010-2011*  
Costs 
Itemised by 
Policy Area 
Expenditure 
2010 USD 
 (in millions)147 
Expenditure 
2010 EUR  
(in millions) 
% 
Change 
from 
2009 
Expenditure 
2011 USD  
(in 
millions)148 
Expenditure 
2011 EUR 
 (in millions) 
%  
Change 
from 
2010 
Corporation 
for National 
and 
Community 
Services 
 
1,150 
 
0,884 
 
+23.2 
 
1,416 
 
1,090 
 
+30 
Social 
Innovation 
Fund 
 
50 
 
38 
 
+100** 
 
60 
 
46 
 
+20 
* Figures for Table 2 listed in footnotes 147 and 148. 
**The SIF was initiated in 2009, with 2010 being the first year funding was directed at the programme.  
 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Eurozone area remains the world’s largest 
economy despite troubling financial conditions.149 From a purely quantitative perspective, the level 
of financial distribution for social cohesion should be much more limited relative to GNI in the 
United States than in the Eurozone. Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate, however, that while both the EU 
and the US have reformed budgetary procedure to incorporate an increased interest in social 
innovation, this mind-shift is more predominant in the US. Of course, the EU MFF lays down an 
expenditure ceiling for the budget each year, which is the maximum amount that can be spent. 
However, the EU remains divided in its investment at local level, with cultural, innovation and 
cohesion policies relying on different budgets (1.7 billion EUR for Citizenship and 64.3 billion EUR for 
                                                            
145 Converted using XE Currency Converter, 5 October 2012. http://www.xe.com/ucc/   
146 United States Office of Management and Budget, "Updated Summary Tables," in Budget of the U.S. 
Government Fiscal Year 2010 (Washington U.S Government Printing Office, May 2009). Table S-1. Budget 
Totals. 
147 Figures in Table 2 from United States Office of Management and Budget, 2009, 144.  
148 Figures in Table 2 from United States Office of Management and Budget, "Budget of the U.S Government: 
Fiscal Year 2011," (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2010). 
149 International Monetary Fund, "World Economic Outlook: Growth Resuming, Dangers Remain," in Global 
Prospects and Policies (International Monetary Fund, April 2012), 5. 
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Sustainable Growth in 2010). The US, on the other hand, directs all cohesion funding towards a new 
initiative set up, the SIF, as the source of socioeconomic development.  A recent study on American 
and European funding distribution shows that a key element behind decisions affecting levels or 
direction of social cohesion funding is the idea of “social justice.”150 The variance in funding will arise 
from the difference in landscape, for example expenditure ceilings, but also from the different 
conceptions of what will create social entrepreneurship. This difference will matter the most when it 
comes to clarity of structure and transparency of the policy agenda. In the US for example, President 
Obama´s decision to allocate seed capital of 50 million USD to the SIF is to encourage direct 
investment in non-profit programmes and civic participation throughout the country. Thus, to return 
to the original question of whether some turn of events has overseen the shift in focus of social 
cohesion funding from regional competitiveness to citizenship taking place in the EU, the answer is 
most likely no. If the EU shares a similar motive to the US, the increase in socially-focused policies is 
because social justice is believed to occur through the achievement of citizen advancement rather 
than regional advancement. This is a point being realised within the EU and causing reason for 
economic change.    
A general, even if brief, comparison of the EU and US budget allocation for social cohesion is 
worthwhile mainly because it draws attention to areas where the case could be strengthened for 
continued economic reform. First, the figures in Tables 1 and 2 highlight that the distribution of 
social cohesion funding is changing in recognition of the growing value of social entrepreneurship. 
There is one important and obvious factor to point out here: that both the US and the EU have 
reacted to this recognition by allocating more funding to social policies. Empirically, however, the 
figures show the EU is lagging in terms of increased funding, measured as a percentage increase 
from previous years (in particular moving from 2010 to 2011). This is by no means to say that 
spending more will induce better results. It is about effective decision-making with regard to 
distribution. This is because the main difference in both budgets is the different composition or 
breakdown of social expenditure. For example, the EU does not contribute to financing of the state 
because it is a community project, not a government project like the US. In contrast to the US, which 
is focused on financing state social policies, the EU uses its budget to service mainly regional social 
policies and the CAP. Given that funding in the US must cater to a number of areas EU funding does 
not cover, financing social cohesion and the SIF follows a simple layout:  find the most effective 
programmes that promote social justice and provide the funding to recreate their success in other 
parts of the country. In this sense, the EU can learn a valuable lesson from the US. It could be argued 
                                                            
150 Alberto Alesina and George-Maruis Angeletos, "Fairness and Redistribution: US versus Europe," in Institute 
Research Working Paper No. 1983, ed. Institute for Economic Research (United States: Harvard University 
2003), 3. 
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that it is better to ensure funding of the community method is distributed wisely rather than divided 
into solutions more complex than effective.     
Second, given that the EU budget exists to finance mainly regional policies, conceptually the projects 
underway in the EU compared to those in the US should be characterised by a higher degree of 
social entrepreneurship. For example, the Belfast Conflict Resolution (BCR) project, for instance, had 
378 million EUR of funding over two years to ‘forge long-term, sustainable intercommunity 
partnerships’151 at grassroots and transnational level in this European capital. The BCR is a specific, 
community-led local development project, yet there are few of these projects scattered throughout 
the various social policy areas of the EU.152 The US SIF on the other hand, funds projects under the 
Corporation for National and Community Services umbrella, where national services and 
programmes could include education and retirement schemes. On the understanding that perhaps a 
better distribution of social funding will be more effective than an increase in social funding, the 
incentive exists for the EU to fund the third sector as a means of social development, where projects 
like the BCR effectively utilise funds for the purpose of social growth. The third sector is essentially 
marking itself as striving for more democracy in the EMU; a proposition the EU can easily support as 
a community project. Social expenditure will need to target communities as a whole, while 
remaining politically realistic. The refined focus on citizenship and on the concept of social 
entrepreneurship remains fuzzy, but while this may appear to be a problem, in reality it can 
represent an opportunity. There is an incentive for researchers, economists, sociologists and policy-
makers to rethink social concepts and how funding can generate a greater degree of social 
innovation. 
3.2.2 Toward the Europe 2020 Strategy 
Evidently, it could be argued the major actors in global politics are beginning to grasp the substantial 
contribution of community-based initiatives to the development of good governance regimes. The 
fact remains, however, that the EU continues to find itself in a time of extreme economic crisis. In 
June 2012, the European Council concluded a number of substantial cuts in future EU budgets will be 
necessary to restore normal lending to the economy.153 The Council’s movements were later 
criticised and an increase in spending was proposed by some MEPs during debate in the EP, in order 
for the EU to remain a responsible governing body to its citizens. How the EU will move forward is 
                                                            
151 Joe Marley, in Directorate-General for Regional Policy, Investing in Our Regions: 150 Examples of Projects 
Co-Funded by European Regional Policy  (Brussels: European Commission, 2010). 300. 
152 150 examples found from 2006 – 2010. Ibid. 
153 General Secretariat of the Council, "European Council Conclusions," in EUCO 76/12 (Brussels: European 
Council, 28/29 June 2012). 
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still unknown and a central question for all involved, particularly with regard to economic policy. 
Two major agreements are currently being released: the Budget 2013 and the MFF 2014-2020. Prior 
to any final decisions regarding these agreements, the focus has been on Budget 2012, which set a 
concrete budget size and spending ceiling for 2012, being 147.2 billion EUR in commitments (+3.8% 
increase from 2011).154 At first glance, the figures provide comfort that expenditure will continue at 
a reasonable level. With regard to citizenship policies and social cohesion, the EC itself predicted 
these policies ‘will be continued, or even intensified, in the 2009-2019 period.’155 A ten-year period 
has been emphasised based on the understanding that social policy takes time to be implemented, 
given that it is of a voluntary nature and tends to seek long-term results. Programmes such as 
Europe for Citizens, Youth in Action and Creative Europe (the only ones in their respective fields) are 
acknowledged through funding for the link they establish between the Union and citizens, youth and 
culture in the crucial task of reaching out to the citizens. Three years into this period further analysis 
demonstrates the 2012 Budget is still described as an ‘austerity budget,’156 according to 
Commissioner Lewandowski, with far less understanding of long-term investment than initially 
expected. Table 3 below breaks down Budget 2012 in terms of social expenditure: 
Table 3: EU Budget 2012 Commitment and Payment Appropriations for Regional Development  
Heading Billion € % of total budget % change from 2011 
 CA* PA**  CA PA 
1. Sustainable Growth 67.5 55.3 45.9 +4.7 +3.2 
1a. Competitiveness for growth and 
employment 
14.7 11.5 10.0 +9.1 -0.2 
1b. Cohesion for growth and 
employment 
52.7 43.8 35.8 +3.5 +4.1 
2. Preservation and management of 
natural resources 
60.0 57.0 40.8 +2.2 +1.9 
of which Direct aid & market related 
expenditure 
44.0 43.9 29.9 +2.6 +2.5 
of which Rural development, 
environment & fisheries 
15.9 13.1 10.8 -1.3 -0.1 
3. Citizenship, freedom, security and 
justice 
2.1 1.5 1.4 (*) +10.9 (*) -1.3 
3a. Freedom, security and justice 1.4 0.8 0.9 +15.9 -2.5 
3b. Citizenship 0.7 0.6 0.5 (*) +2.1 (*) 0.4 
                                                            
154 European Commission, "Budget 2012 in Figures," European Union 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/2012/2012_en.cfm. (Last accessed 6 October, 2012).  
155 Directorate-General for Internal Policies / Directorate General for External Policies, 2009, 138. 
156 Janusz Lewandowski (Commissioner for Financial Programming and Budget), Statement of Commissioner 
Lewandowski on the Adoption of the 2012 EU Budget (Brussels, 2012).  
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Heading Billion € % of total budget % change from 2011 
 CA* PA**  CA PA 
4. EU as a global player 9.4 6.9 6.4 +7.4 -4.0 
5. Administration 8.3 8.3 5.6 +1.3 +1.3 
of which for the Commission 3.3 3.3 2.3 +0.2 +0.2 
Total 147.2 129.1 100   
 *Commitment Appropriations **Payment Appropriations 
Source: European Commission: Financial Programming and Budget (accessed 30 September 2012) http://ec.europa.eu 
 
Contrary to the recent trends in European policymaking, where social cohesion has been given a 
prominent role in the development of the Union, citizenship funding received a 2.1% increase from 
2011, the lowest increase other than administration (1.3%) and preservation of rural development   
(-1.3%). Citizenship, Freedom and Justice receives the lowest percentage of the total budget, at just 
1.4% of the total. Economic activities on the other hand receive as much as a 9% increase in some 
areas, for example competitive growth and employment. As the fourth year of the financial period 
2009 to 2019 begins, EU-funded projects initiated in 2009 will begin to gather speed as their long-
term objectives begin to take shape. If this has not been taken into account in the 2012 Budget, 
there is already some concern the EC will find itself in a position where it will have to pay higher 
amounts to beneficiaries than at the beginning of the financial period.157 Given the low financial 
commitments towards citizenship for 2012, the risk exists that the EC will run out of funds and it will 
fail to fulfil its role as a community project.   
Analysing the two most recent US and EU budgets has shed light on the fact that both actors 
recognise the need for a clearer focus on distribution of social cohesion policy. In the present 
timeframe however, there is little evidence of intensification in financial support for various actions 
close to citizens. In a statement released by the EC, social cohesion funding was described as 
‘remain[ing] broadly stable’158 for the 2012 period. Given that, as indicated earlier in this research, 
the predominant social initiative remains Europe for Citizens and has thus been delegated the 
“crucial task” of reconnecting the citizen with the Union, it seems somewhat of a contradiction that 
funding levels are “stable” only. Talk of austerity budgets and stable financial provisions indicates 
the issue is likely to be centred on the financial crisis. While there is a somewhat silent agreement 
that development of the Union cannot be successful without investment in closer coordination with 
the citizen, the path of action is restricted by the panic associated with the economic crisis and the 
need for immediate and tangible results. There is instead a need for a clearer focus on long-term 
                                                            
157 Ibid. 
158 European Commission, 2011, 33. 
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economic development and the principle of subsidiarity, one of the main tools for construction of 
the EU, which in turns means there is a need for a clearer focus on social cohesion policy. In an 
interview with Panorama Magazine, Jacques Delors (former President of the European Commission 
1985-1995) argued for a similar focus, stating that social policy ‘should not be sidetracked by the 
need to respond to the crisis.’159 According to Delors, the Union can only respond to the crisis 
through the bottom-up dimension. Thus, there is not only a need for a more effective distribution of 
funding for social policy but also a need for that funding to reach the citizens on the ground. The 
economic rationale behind this reform proposal could only be that devoting a significant share of the 
budget to citizenship as a well-structured policy area would be financially responsible and beneficial 
overall. Beneficial in the sense that it would be democratic and the importance of citizenship and 
inclusion of the local level to the future of Europe lies in the concept of the EU as a democratic 
society. In other words, the incentive exists to fund social policies, such as coherence, justice, 
participation and liberties, with a grassroots influence so as to integrate them at the ground level. 
Delors’s argument also delivers the message that economic reform could be necessary, given that 
economic efficiency is about realising the effective utilisation of funds and the funding potential of 
every place. The flow-on effect will be equity; equal opportunity for citizens no matter where they 
are from. Currently, there is not enough short-term fiscal movement nor long-term fiscal discussion 
to ensure such efficiency is realised.   
3.3. Summary: the political and economic incentive for a more socially-focused EU 
The collection of primary data is particularly important with regard to forming recommendations for 
the future of social and cohesion policy at the EU, especially given the number of actors involved. 
The EU began as an integration project and in this sense the incentive will always exist to further 
development of a European identity, European culture and European citizenship. However, there is 
evidence to suggest that the EU has progressed its economic values to a far greater extent than its 
social values. It is thus important to understand whether there is currently a political and economic 
incentive at the Union level to invest in a governance shift and progress the bottom-up or social 
aspect of the EU. By analysing existing initiatives and future legislative proposals in combination with 
the personal opinions of those working for the EP, the opportunity exists to bring together and 
compare detailed and up-to-date information on what social policy in the EU governance structure 
may look like in the future. 
                                                            
159 Jacques Delors, Reflections on Cohesion Policy in Panorama (Paris, European Commission, 2012).  
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The sense of urgency felt at the EU with regard to its negative image in the public eye following the 
Eurozone crisis has led to a shift in focus from pure economics to social inclusion and regional 
cohesion. Unfortunately, this has occurred to a greater level in the theoretical sense than in reality. 
Focusing on the immediate future, there are two main points to pull from the political initiative in 
place for the 2014-2020 period. Europe for Citizens was designed in recognition of the need to bring 
together local development strategies and local action groups. As the only initiative of its kind 
however, it appears overly optimistic to delegate to the programme the task of re-establishing the 
relationship between the Union and the citizen. Moreover, the large-scale and highly ambitious 
goals of the 2020 strategy set a number of clear targets with regard to social inclusion and regional 
cohesion policy that Europe for Citizens will not be able to achieve on its own. Thus, there is voiced 
recognition of a deep social problem in the EU governance system and a clear concern that if new 
governance strategies are not put in place then the Union will not survive. The benefit of utilising 
governance strategies with more of a bottom-up focus is evident; these strategies push for social 
inclusion and regional development because it is genuinely believed that improvements in these 
areas will improve the Union overall, both economically and politically. Currently, both the political 
and economic action being taken can be faulted for moving too slowly. One of the more necessary 
strategies is the development of a stronger link between the determination of the 2020 strategy, 
Europe for Citizens and the MFF. The opportunity exists here to explore the use of local civil society 
in the process of aligning the 2020 strategy with its task-bearers.   
The perspective from inside the EP provides two additional components to the discovery above: 
personal preferences for reform of governance structure by those working inside the institution 
itself; and more reliable insights into the real position of the political actors within the EU. The 
general opinion supported the initiative for a shift in governance to a directive that places greater 
priority on the citizen and will really support social strategies, such as solidifying the link between 
the 2020 strategy and Europe for Citizens. The most common suggestion was the establishment of 
local level, pan-European political space as a strategy to enhance relations and subsequently 
democracy. Thus, the data drawn from interviews and documentation analysis highlights two 
primary issues in the current governance structure of the EU. Firstly, the priority of the EU is to act 
on the EC Europe 2020 platform through proposed strategies for the 2014-2020 period, but a 
number of these strategies remain undecided.  It also shows that the priority of the individuals 
involved is to try to connect the people at ground-level to the action at the top. There is a major 
disconnect between what is desired by the individuals engaged in EU processes and what social 
policy and initiatives end up being put forward (or not being put forward). This evidence amounts to 
the fact that there is room and even desire for changes to be made to the EU governance structure 
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to make it more socially-focused. The incentive exists to engage in a governance model that builds a 
clear narrative to bridge the divide between the intended objectives and actual results. It is 
important to point out here that, with regards to integration, such a conclusion suggests a push for 
“more Europe” should occur. It is not about more regulation, more institutions and more common 
policy as Farage has suggested, but about a better-quality Europe that sees the qualitative create the 
quantitative. At a time of great crisis, the people are what counts. All of this information suggests 
that a structured top-down / bottom-up governance approach may be a more appropriate form of 
governance for the EU. Furthermore, in this type of approach it should be the case that citizen 
participation is facilitated or encouraged by supporting locally-led initiatives that remain aligned 
with Union law. This introduces the second hypothesis in this research, which assumes the role of 
the ordinary citizen within the EU governance model can be encapsulated most effectively by local, 
rather than transnational, institutions. These local institutions should thus be further integrated into 
the EU system. Chapter Four will test the grounds for the second hypothesis by investigating the 
results of two case studies on the ability of CSOs to promote the role of the citizen and further their 
engagement within the EU. 
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4. CHAPTER FOUR: LOCAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY, THE CASE OF 
SPAIN 2012 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter Three, the EU has the opportunity to adapt its governance structure to 
address the social cleavages that exist. The EU institutions face a political and economic crossroad, 
where one potential path is to increase investment in social strategies with a grassroots focus. The 
three components of the civil cosmopolitanism model and its overall focus on local civil society must 
be developed adequately to provide a strong framework that can incorporate these strategies.  As 
mentioned above in Chapter Three, the opportunity now exists to explore the role of the third sector 
this new framework, which could change significantly if the distribution of social policy funding 
changes. The primary question asks whether local civil society can contribute to and be integrated 
into the multi-levelled framework and if so, how, and in what ways can local civil society further the 
democratic quality of that framework. Chapter Four examines this question in the context of a case 
study of civil society in Spain.  Following an examination of Spain’s civil society, the remainder of the 
chapter will detail how differing CSOs within Spanish civil society can contribute to the development 
of civil cosmopolitanism’s three core components. Local civil society can help build a stronger more 
tangible civil cosmopolitan framework, in order to enhance the democratic quality of EU 
governance.  
4.1 Defining local civil society   
The choice to focus on local civil society as the platform for linking the EU and the EU citizen follows 
the conclusion that EU policy cannot be effective without a social element, but that social aspect 
cannot been achieved through a purely transnational perspective. As was demonstrated in Chapter 
One, the theories promoting civil society as the source of democracy all conclude a healthy public 
sector is an essential ingredient in the recipe for democratic governance. The scale of inquiry has 
become fixed on “the global” aspect of governance, yet as civil society expert Michael Edwards 
points out, even with a grand international vision the question of how a strong transnational civil 
society makes a society strong, civil and engaged internationally remains unanswered.160 The 
purpose of this research is not to answer Edward’s question, which has confronted studies on civil 
society for some time. Case studies that focus on civil society are used to understand how civil 
society under a model of civil cosmopolitanism could shed new light on the benefit of engaging with 
local rather than transnational civil society and a subsequent increase in public accountability. 
                                                            
160 Edwards, 2009,  84. 
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Consultation with local civil society to generate concrete results with regard to the ongoing goal of 
placing the citizen at the heart of EU decision-making processes is beginning to be recognised. This 
case study is a timely one as the EC has recently proposed to make 2013 the year of the EU citizen 
and has specifically acknowledged a need to work closely with the civil society of member states.161 
Ironically, civil society is the most important subject of discussion in the research, yet it is also the 
most complicated subject to define. A vast literature addresses solely the subject of defining local 
civil society. Karl Marx includes the market in his definition of civil society and suggests that civil 
society threatens traditional ways of conducting politics in private within the nation-state by making 
such matters public.162 Georg Hegel, on the other hand, built a view of civil society as the social face 
of the state ‘unsustainable without various kinds of state institutions.’163  This thesis will not attempt 
to reproduce an internationally accepted definition of civil society, but rather draws on existing ideas 
in a way that best suits the purposes of this study. There is one important point about civil society 
that can be drawn from both definitions above: recognition of political institutions and first-
generation rights. Thus, this paper employs a definition of civil society that distinguishes the 
importance of both institutions and citizens. Each component, institutions and citizen, will now be 
defined in turn.  
Civil Society: Civil Society Organisation (CSO) 
The institutions within civil society are known as Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). Given that civil 
society exists to represent a wide variety of public interests, the definition of a CSO must remain 
inclusive of multiple structures. CSOs resemble the location point of political, cultural, social and 
economic activity that remains independent from the state. Their existence provides for local and 
grassroots movements in a wealth of different fields; poverty reduction, human rights and 
environmentalism to name the more well-known.  CSOs are thus defined as organisations that 
include law firms, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), think tanks, indeed any organisation or 
self-employed individual engaged in influencing EU policy-making and policy implementation.164  This 
definition supports the initiative of creating a strong networking platform with which the EU can 
cooperate.   
 
                                                            
161 Francesca Ferraro, "2013 European Year of Citizens," in Library Briefing (Brussels: Library of the European 
Parliament 18 October 2012). 
162 Karl Marx in Justen Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International 
Relations  (London: Verso, 1994). 124. 
163 Thom Brooks, Hegel's Philosophy of Right  (John Wiley & Sons, 2012). 131. 
164 European Union, 2006a.   
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Civil Society: Citizen 
While a wealth of definitions of the term civil society and CSO exist, the same cannot be said for the 
definition of citizen within civil society. The term citizenship is more commonly employed. Articles 17 
to 22 of the Treaty establishing the European Community refer solely to ‘citizenship of the union,’165 
defined by the citizens’ civil rights, duties and legal status as a citizen of a member state.166 Given 
that the idea of citizenship is legal by context and political by definition, the EP is currently the most 
appropriate body to ensure citizenship of the Union is enjoyed by the European citizen. Thus, the 
development potential of a citizen’s civil rights and their ability to carry out civil duties remains a 
responsibility of the transnational institutions. As a result, there is minimal discussion on social rights 
in terms of direct participation within a society and governance system. The education and social 
welfare systems, for example retiree policies and unemployment policies, are social rights that 
remain influenced by economic decisions made at the transnational level. The definition of citizen 
within civil society should separate the ability to be a citizen from the ability to obtain citizenship, 
leaving those legal responsibilities to the state, and should provide social cohesion and the right to 
participate in inclusive societies. Thus, with a greater focus on social rights, the definition of a citizen 
for the purposes of this research is to be an active member of a community that promotes social 
inclusion through opportunity for participation. It is this often neglected social side to citizenship 
that the Union needs to pay attention to. The role of local civil society lies in convincing the citizens 
of the EU that they, rather than their national governments, must enforce their social rights.167 
The definition of civil society provided by the European Economic and Social Committee, that is 
‘organised groups of civilians [institutions] advancing public opinion and political equality [active 
members],’168 accurately brings together these two core concepts, the institution and the citizen, 
and has been utilised in this research. It has been acknowledged by the EC that active public 
participation in civic forums on EU policies is essential to a democratic EU, but as Chapter Three 
demonstrated the EU is not in a position to provide additional resources. The problem is not new but 
is rather ongoing, as is discussed in Chapter One. Civil cosmopolitanism is designed to tackle the 
nature of the problem, that is, the lack of a social element in the governance structure of the EU, by 
bringing governance a step closer to the ground on which social progress is more likely to occur. The 
                                                            
165 European Parliament, "The Citizens of the Unions and Their Rights," European Communities, 
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/opoce/fact_sheets/info/data/citizen/citizens/article_7174_en.htm. (Last accessed 3 
July, 2012).  
166 European Union, "Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community." Official 
Journal of the European Communities, C 325/33 (24 December, 2002). Articles 17 – 22.  
167 Idea from Dimitris N. Chryssochoou, Kostas Ifantis, Stelios Stavridis and Michael J. Tsinisizelis, Theory and 
Reform in the European Union  (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1999). 14. 
168 European Economic and Social Committee, 1999. 
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second hypothesis thus proposes that local civil societies can further the democratic quality of the 
EU by implementing EU social policy at the ground level and subsequently improving citizen 
awareness of and participation in the EU. Chapter Four presents two case studies from one EU 
member state to test the second hypothesis. Spain, a member of the EU since 1986, was chosen as 
the focal point of this study for a number of reasons.  Aside from being the fourth-largest economy 
in the EU and a fully integrated member for over 25 years, Spain is an interesting nation because the 
conditions of its entry to the European Economic Community (EEC), as the EU was known at the 
time, meant an overhaul of Spain’s governance system was necessary to ensure it became the 
democracy that it is today.169 Spain’s membership of the EU was extremely beneficial economically, 
leading to substantial increases to the country’s per capita income due to new trade opportunities 
and the EEC’s structural funds programme.170 Social expenditure in Spain increased because of its 
improved economic position, but remained much lower than that of its partners within the EU. 
Figure 2 below shows how social expenditure advanced between 1980 and 1997 in Spain, the EU and 
Spain’s neighbouring country Portugal:   
Figure 2: Evolution of Social Protection Expenditure, % of GDP 1980 – 1997 
   
 
Spain Portugal EU 
 
Source: Eudor-Stat 1997 and Eurostat 2000. 
 
Helena Soleto Muñoz highlighted the importance of the lag in social expenditure in Spain. Before 
becoming a constitutional monarchy, Spain was under a dictatorship for forty years, during which 
time citizens were encouraged to be completely dependent on the Government. Muñoz explained 
                                                            
169 Jordi Pascual, "Cultural and Structural Funds in Spain," ed. European Expert Network on Culture (Spain: 
European Union, June 2012), 5. 
170 Sebastian Royo, Spain and Portugal in the European Union: The First Fifteen Years  (Taylor & Francis, 2004). 
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that the Government did not promote citizen action, it was paternalist, providing the citizen with 
what they needed while suppressing freedom of association at the same time.171 Spanish society was 
thus very individualistic with little culture of participation in the third sector and therefore little need 
for social expenditure. The Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Centre for Sociological 
Investigations) in Madrid completed a study in 2006 on the number of CSOs in Spain from 1999-2002 
compared with other countries in the EU. The results showed the number of CSOs for every 1000 
habitants was lower in Spain than in other equivalent European countries.172 Civic participation in 
Spain is naturally more limited. In this sense, a number of questions about Spain’s civil society arise; 
for example, has Spanish civil society developed as a response to EU integration and if so, how could 
Spanish civil society now further the EU? Is the application of grassroots governance strategies in the 
EU advocated by civil cosmopolitanism actually detrimental to Spain, which would perhaps not 
utilise civil society as much as some other member states and would receive less EU funding and 
face social exclusion? These questions and others make Spain a fascinating case study. 
4.2 A focus on Spain; the use of case studies in evaluation 
Case studies were used in this thesis to enable observation. The experimental design involved the 
study of two CSOs based in Spanish civil society, one locally-focused and one internationally-focused, 
both working with the goal of democratising governance systems domestically and internationally. 
CSOs Consejo de la Juventud de España (CJE) and Club de Madrid (CDM) were selected for the study. 
CJE is a bottom-up CSO focused on connecting youth with government institutions and society, 
whereas CDM is a top-down CSO with the primary objective of democratising governance by 
strengthening leadership. Two very different CSOs were chosen in order to generate wide discussion 
on the participatory tools available at the local level to engage citizens in the EU. Interview data 
from Chapter Three demonstrated that there is general agreement that tapping into EU citizens’ 
ideas and expectations is the only way to create an EU that protects citizens’ rights.  Part of the case 
study was determining whether the use of local CSOs is the way forward to bringing these ideas and 
expectations to the EU and securing better relations between the EU and the EU citizen. The two 
CSOs in the case study share the same Spanish roots but have diverse ambitions and very different 
structures and have been chosen to assess whether participatory tools of various kinds can bring 
more depth to understanding citizens’ concerns. As discussed in the methodology section of the 
introduction, both case studies involved the use of multiple research techniques to collect data. The 
                                                            
171 Helena Soleto Muñoz, Interview 19 July, 2012. 
172 Laura Morales and Fabiola Mota, "El Asociacionismo en España (Activism in Spain)," in Ciudadanos, 
Asociaciones y Participación en España (Citizens, Associations and Participation in Spain), ed. José Ramón 
Montero Joan Font and Mariano Torcal (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2006), 80-81. 
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goal was to gather data from enough sources so as to present a clear description of Spanish civil 
society from the perspective of CSO participants, members and staff. Methods included analysis of 
documentation, interviews, participant observation and the use of surveys.  
4.2.1. Consejo de la Juventud 
Since its inception in 1983, CJE, or the Spanish Youth Council as it is known in English, has committed 
itself to its role as the umbrella organisation of 76 youth organisations standing for the cooperation 
of youth with the third sector within Spain.173 As the interlocutor for youth with society, institutions 
and government, CJE has the prime objective of reinforcing the role of youth in social, economic and 
political contexts. Following a one-month period of intensive observation of CJE however, it was 
evident the structure of this organisation and the activities it undertakes mean it is much more than 
just a voice for youth. CJE is represented by a Standing Committee as its Governing Board (elected at 
General Assembly meetings every two years), various Commissions, youth organisations and 
members of the public. All were involved in organising the many meetings, seminars, information 
sessions, distributions, media publications, campaigns and training opportunities that took place in 
the month of July 2012. It can be described as a space in which cooperation, sharing of opinion and 
action can occur. The International Relations Commission was very active on the issue of Europe. 
There is strong opinion from academics inside the organisation that the EU ‘ha avanzado mucho más 
en la integración económica’174 (has advanced significantly with economic integration) but economic 
integration only, which was correlated with the sensation de alejamiento (the feeling of separation) 
that many within CJE spoke of when discussing the problem of the EU. CJE hopes to propose to the 
EU that it should construct a new Constitution based on a Law of Fundamental Human Rights.175  
Two key figures involved at the CJE were questioned specifically on the issue of a new Constitution 
and other of CJE’s ambitions for the EU and how they believe CSOs can help. Given that the original 
EU Draft Constitutional Treaty was abandoned, CJE’s proposition for a new Constitution may appear 
fruitless. In an interview at CJE headquarters in Madrid, CJE President Ricardo Ibarra discussed why 
people, such as Giorgio Napolitano, may conclude that attempting again to create a Constitutional 
Treaty after it has been rejected for being overcomplicated is a wasted effort. Ibarra believes it 
                                                            
173 Consejo de la Juventud de España, "Foro Europeo de la Juventud (European Youth Forum),"  Our Work, 
Europe (July 2012), http://www.cje.org/en/our-work/europa/actividades-y-campanas-del-cje/foro-europeo-
de-la-juventud-sobre-europa/. (Last accessed 12 July, 2012).  
174 ———, "¿Cómo está el tema sobre Europa?  (How does Europe as a theme work?),"  Our Work, Consejo de 
La Juventud de España (July 2012), http://www.cje.org/en/our-work/europa/como-esta-el-tema/como-esta-
el-tema-sobre-europa/. (Last accessed 18 July, 2012). 
175 ———, "¿Qué Proponemos sobre Europa? (What do we propose to do about Europe?),"  Our Work (July 
2012), http://www.cje.org/en/our-work/europa/que-proponemos/que-proponemos-sobre-europa/. (Last 
accessed 18 July, 2012).  
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comes down to the type of participation the EU desires from its citizens. Ibarra believes that where 
the decision-making processes have the type of implications they do in the lives of EU citizens, it is 
probably more complicated to organise effective policy without appropriate local and regional 
involvement.176 According to Ibarra, having a Constitution may provide the skills people need to 
participate directly by allocating a greater role to the institutions with substantial impact at the level 
closest to citizens. In Spain for example, the CJE was heavily involved in what it calls the process of 
citizen education, where municipalities have the main role in the governance system because the 
citizen is often unsure how systems and policies work at the top but generally understand how their 
local municipality works. Municipal and community organisations have the greatest potential to 
influence national Government and improve democracy because citizens have the independence to 
make proposals and a local space to present their argument.  Head of the CJE Documentation Centre 
Juan Gonzalez mentioned in an interview that in principle, citizens are guaranteed similar 
opportunities at CJE because the objective is participation.177 In fact it is part of the CJE law, which 
was drafted in unison with the organisation’s initiation, to create such participatory opportunities 
for youth.178 As part of the education process, for instance, the CJE uses a number of methodological 
workshops. One such workshop, The Voice of the European Citizen, brought youth together from a 
variety of organisations to draft ideas and establish a chat group on the mechanisms that allow 
defensive action of citizen rights at the European level, e.g. the Defensor del Pueblo Europeo 
(European Ombudsman). Both Ibarra and Gonzalez emphasised that the workshops are intended to 
act as a space for direct participation, e.g. the immediate or tangible presence of citizens, which link 
grassroots and high-level governance. 
Evidently, with regards to citizen participation in the EU and the role of CSOs, there is a need to 
motivate people to participate in governance systems and this is within the responsibilities of CSOs. 
Second, action should be more than just a question and answer session between the top and the 
bottom. It is the government’s responsibility to engage citizens in an education process on their 
rights to participate. In this process, information is circulated among civil society and then citizens 
have the right to make their own proposals. Therefore, both local CSOs and governing bodies such as 
the EU have a role to play in the creation of citizen participation. It was clear CJE intends to create 
the highest level of citizen participation, with those involved believing direct participation and co-
management of decision-making processes is how democratic governance can develop. It is one of 
                                                            
176 Interview with Ricardo Ibarra, Interview 12 July 2012. President of Consejo de la Juventud de España. 
177 Interview with Juan Gonzalez, Interview 12 July 2012, Head of the Documentation Centre at Consejo de la 
Juventud de España. 
178 Consejo de la Juventud de España, "Law 18/1983, 16 November, on the Creation of the Spanish Youth 
Council, an Independent Organisation," (Madrid: Consejo de la Juventud de España, 16 November 1983). 
Article 2 (d), 1.  
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the more active CSOs in Spain in a weak but developing third sector. Thus, the opinions produced by 
individuals involved in CJE are heavily in favour of creating a role for the citizen in the EU, but also in 
the effort to shift the overall Spanish mentality on the concept of citizenship.  
Effectively, if local civil society was more engaged by the EU, there would be CSOs such as CJE 
contributing to the enhancement of democracy within Spain as well as the EU. Analysing material 
from the CJE documentation centre revealed the organisation’s emphasis on direct forms of 
participation stems from its perspective on the concepts of citizen and citizenship, through which it 
has long recognised the importance of social rights. The link between state and individual, society 
and individual and even community and individual is not new, but CJE understands it differently with 
regard to the freedoms and rights of individuals. For example, freedom of religion, the right to 
justice, the right to work, the right to move across borders and freedom of expression are all civil 
rights institutionalised by the legal bodies, justice tribunals and organisations such as the EU. CJE 
refers to citizens as members of a community in all documentation because it also recognises the 
right to be accepted, to be able to participate politically, to be informed and to belong.179 These core 
social rights are grounded in the literature produced by CJE staff and committed to in the actions of 
CJE members. CJE has proposed and funded activities that favour the development of the 
international dimension of youth associations for example, a move that caused a flow-on proposal 
that CJE coordinate its youth policies with policies from the EU.180 Unfortunately, the CJE is still 
‘looking for the construction of a pan European space at local level’181 in order for the latter to 
become a reality. Once again, it is evident that a lack of engagement from the EU with CSOs, such as 
CJE, due to lack of a pan-European space can cause the efforts and actions led by these CSOs to lose 
their value because they cannot be carried out in full. Within a model of civil cosmopolitanism, the 
overarching networking system has been designed to remedy this lack of relation-building and weak 
communication between the EU and the various actors within society. The CJE strives for the right to 
be accepted and the EU strives for the right to justice and thus both effectively strive for direct 
citizen participation within the Spanish and EU governance systems. Networking could allow for their 
objectives to be intertwined through a pan-European networking centre with a better chance of 
being achieved.      
                                                            
179 David Redoli Morchón, Juventud Ciudadana en la Unión Europea  (Youth Citizen in the European Union), 
Guía Didáctica para una Ciudadanía Europea (Guide Dedicated to the European Citizen) (Madrid, Spain: 
Consejo de la Juventud de España, 2002). 16. 
180 Consejo de la Juventud de España, "Materiales para el Trabajo Internacional (Tools for International Work)," 
(Madrid, Spain: Consejo de la Juventud de España, 1998), 14.  
181 Ricardo Ibarra in Consejo de la Juventud de Aragón, "Entrevista: Ricardo Ibarra, Presidente del CJE: 'Los 
jóvenes vivimos siempre en crisis' (Interview: Ricardo Ibarra, CJE President: 'Youth live in Crisis')," El Periódico 
de Aragón 12 July 2010. (Interview) 
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The CJE General Assembly, held 13-15 July 2012 in Spain, was an additional opportunity to observe 
members putting their commitment to core social rights into action. The point of the meeting was to 
discuss future CJE activities, reflect on existing ideas and offer new suggestions for projects. Around 
80 attendees filled the hall of the UC3M, fulfilling the political responsibility of CSOs to give citizens 
the right to engage in societal issues and advance their own communities.  Presidents of various 
youth CSOs in Spain spoke of the success of CJE in raising important themes, such as sexual 
education. For example, in 2004, in response to the estimated 120,000 – 140,000 people living in 
Spain with HIV and around 3000 new cases annually,182 CJE promised a number of prevention 
programmes and campaigns to raise sexual health awareness. In the last eight years, all 76 youth 
organisations involved with CJE worked on sexual health projects with the goal of creating one 
overall image that would positively represent the prevention of HIV campaign. In 2007, the CJE 
received over 527 proposals for the campaign from citizens and ran with the proposal from Spaniard 
Francesc Vidal Rubí, which was “Condonéate. Placer sin riesgo” (Wear a condom. Pleasure without 
risk).183  The central idea had been achieved; form a positive message that would open up a space 
for young people, who are most vulnerable in the area of sexual health, to encourage debate and 
reflection. Not only was the campaign well received by media, but the Minister of Health at the time 
signed a Convenios de Colaboración (Collaboration Agreement) with the CJE that cemented the 
participation of youth in the Government’s prevention of HIV plan.184 The same space for debate and 
rate of response by citizens could not have been achieved by classical institutions of parliamentary 
democracy within Spain as well as the EU. Youth participation in the area of sexual education is very 
important, yet the Government of Spain realised it would need to sign an agreement with the CJE to 
connect with those young people who were participating within the CJE.  
Outside of national issues, the Presidents at the CJE General Assembly spoke of the current need to 
address the EU financial crisis not only in terms of getting more youth into jobs but in terms of youth 
participation in the construction of a stronger EU citizenship within Europe. Attendees spoke 
passionately about the work they hoped to do to raise awareness of social rights while there is an 
economic lull. It was evidently important to many participants to adopt a methodology that focuses 
on democratising society through providing youth with the right to feel responsible and confident 
                                                            
182 AVERT International HIV and AIDS Charity, "European HIV and AIDS Statistics,” (October 2012). 
http://www.avert.org/hiv-aids-europe.htm (Last accessed 24 February, 2013).  
183 Consejo de la Juventud de España, "Condonéate. Placer sin riesgo." (Wear a condom. Pleasure without risk) 
an article published in Actividades y Campañas del CJE sobre Salud, SIDA y Drogas (Activities and Campaigns of 
the CJE about Health, AIDS and Drugs) (Madrid: 2012). http://www.cje.org/es/en-que-trabajamos/salud-sida-
y-drogas/actividades-y-campanas-del-cje/videos-para-trabajar-en-la-prevencion-de-la-transmision-del-vih-
sida/ (Last accessed 2 December, 2012).  
184 Ibid.  
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about their place in society. CJE, in this respect, needs to continue to act as a space where these 
youth can learn of their rights, their responsibilities, understand democracy and understand politics. 
It was concluded that a Strategic Plan for EU Citizenship and Integration, Plan Estratégico de 
Ciudadanía Europea e Integración, was needed to create more types of local participation spaces like 
the CJE. On day two, pamphlets were handed out suggesting the plan should develop the concept of 
Asociacionismo; to unite voluntarily with a common final objective.185 The plan thus attempts to 
further define participation, despite difficulties with its functional forms in diverse social contexts. 
Asociacionismo refers to three important aspects of participation: inclusion, influence and taking 
responsibility. Discussion showed that what mattered was the purpose for which these forms of 
participation are carried out, i.e. whether it is to generate awareness or to provoke processes of 
change and social development. For instance, a programme known as Juventud en Acción (Youth in 
Action) was specifically referred to as an example of a space for the participation of youth interested 
in initiating projects with a European dimension.186 Youth in Action is sponsored by the EU under the 
EU’s umbrella Youth in Action Programme, set up to create a sense of European citizenship among 
Europe’s youth.187 Here existed the opportunity to establish relations between the EU and the CJE in 
the joint effort to promote young people’s active citizenship. Instead, the project’s attempt to 
connect Europe’s youth with the EU received criticism because a common final objective was not 
recognised by both the EU and member states (in the case of Spain). For the CJE, the goal was to 
create more types of local participation spaces with the EU through Youth in Action projects by 
further defining participation. For the EU, the goal was simply to ‘inspire a sense of active 
citizenship,’188 with no concrete objectives to encourage inclusion of all individuals or all types of 
action. There is no clarity to the manner in which participation in Spain’s Youth in Action programme 
should be carried out. The programme remains the responsibility of EU member states and will only 
continue if enacted by CSOs; there is no real link between the CSOs and the EU with regard to 
programme goals and thus no real direct participation of the citizen in EU processes. This was 
another point of evidence to show CSOs and the EU are not sharing the responsibility of encouraging 
direct citizen participation. 
                                                            
185 ———,"Guía de la Participación Intercultura (Guide to Inter-cultural Participation)," in www.cje.org. 
Consejo de la Juventud de España (Madrid: AFP Gestión del Color, 2012). 
186 Spanish National Agency Youth in Action Programme, "Programa Juventud en Acción (Youth in Action 
Programme)," in www.juventudenaccion.injuve.es, ed. Consejo de la Juventud de España (Madrid: Ministry of 
Health, Social Services and Equality, Spain, 2011). 
187 Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency Education, "Youth in Action 2007-2013" (Brussels: European 
Union, August 2011). http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/youth/programme/about_youth_en.php (Last accessed 24 
February, 2013).   
188 Ibid, 1. 
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When the General Assembly attendees themselves were surveyed as citizens of Spain and the EU, it 
was from the perspective of understanding their wider opinion on the role of local civil societies and 
their ability to provide for direct participation in EU governance. If there is enough evidence to 
suggest that local CSOs provide for direct citizen participation and greater implementation of social 
policy, then the case can be made that they are worth integrating into the EU governance system on 
a greater scale than present. Survey participants were asked to answer six multiple choice questions 
by circling the choice that best suited their opinion. A total of fifteen attendees (around 25% of 
attendees at the CJE General Assembly) were surveyed, ten of whom were Spanish citizens. Only one 
survey was not returned. The rest were returned with all requested statistical information provided 
and all six questions answered. The results are tabled below: 
 
Chart 1: Classification Questions 
 
N (Sample size) = 14 
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Chart 2: Citizens of the European Union understand what the Union is and how it functions 
Totally Disagree - Totally Agree 
 
QUESTION 1 
 
Response 
 
Number of  
respondents 
 
% of respondents 
Totally disagree 0 0 
Disagree 2 15 
Indifferent 10 70 
Agree 2 15 
Totally agree 0 0 
 
 
Chart 3: The European citizen is involved in decision-making processes of the European Union 
Totally Disagree – Totally Agree 
 
QUESTION 2 
 
Response 
 
Number of  
respondents 
 
% of respondents 
Totally disagree 2 15 
Disagree 8 55 
Indifferent 2 15 
Agree 2 15 
Totally agree 0 0 
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Chart 4: I would like to see the European Union focus more on citizen participation 
Totally Disagree – Totally Agree 
 
QUESTION 3 
 
Response 
 
Number of  
respondents 
 
% of respondents 
Totally disagree 1 7 
Disagree 0 0 
Indifferent 0 0 
Agree 4 28 
Totally agree 9 65 
 
Chart 5: How important should local civil society be in a transnational governance system? 
Not at All – Very Important 
 
QUESTION 4 
 
Response 
 
Number of 
respondents 
 
% of respondents 
Not at All 0 0 
Somewhat 2 15 
Moderately Important 0 0 
Important 2 15 
Very Important 10 70 
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Chart 6: Local CSOs promote the social rights of individuals, for example the right to participate in 
international governance matters where relevant  
Not at All – A Lot 
 
QUESTION 5 
 
Response 
 
Number of  
Respondents 
 
% of respondents 
Not at All 0 0 
Not Really 4 28 
Somewhat 0 0 
A Little 2 15 
A Lot 8 57 
 
Chart 7: In order to be democratic, an international system of governance should adopt bottom-up 
governance strategies. That is to say, the system should focus on local institutions (such as the CJE) 
more than focusing on high-level institutions (such as the European Parliament) 
Totally Disagree – Totally Agree 
 
QUESTION 6 
 
Response 
 
Number of  
Respondents 
 
% of respondents 
Totally disagree 2 15 
Disagree 0 0 
Indifferent 0 0 
Agree 8 57 
Totally agree 4 28 
 
Kirsten Jane Mander 99543103 Page 83 
 
A number of participants wished to discuss their opinions on the matter in greater detail. The survey 
provided a section for other comments and the majority of persons expressed a desire to see the EU 
acting rather than just managing. These opinions were expressed in relation to the deep financial 
crisis currently occurring within Spain and the tense relations between Spain and the EU. When 
peered against the rest of the respondents’ answers, these opinions show clearly that the 
respondents believe local civil society does not function as it should. It is not engaged with by the EU 
to the extent necessary to understand the views of these citizens and help them organise those 
views. All of the survey questions were focused in some way on whether the need for more bottom-
up governance strategies exists. Over 50% of respondents agreed that direct citizen participation is 
currently not a priority of the EU and governance strategies that are designed to enforce social rights 
should be a focus of the next seven year period. 70% of respondents agreed that local civil society, in 
particular, should be a primary actor within these strategies and in transnational governance 
structures in general.  The issue for the survey respondents was ultimately how to make any change 
when those making the final decision are at the top-level only and currently remain disengaged. Fear 
was expressed that although civil society might be important to the democratic quality of a 
governance system, it does not offer the immediate and tangible band-aid effect that some EU 
officials might be seeking during these difficult economic times and will thus not receive the 
attention it should. Chapter Three is of paramount importance here. It was demonstrated that there 
is a political desire to implement governance strategies that can bring about greater civil society 
involvement in the EU and economic room to fund those strategies. Evidence from Chapter Three 
shows that although current economic, political and social plans are mismatched, fixing economic, 
political and social issues all at once has been recognised at the Union level as the moral, just and 
economically sound way forward. The potential for greater civil society involvement is high. 
 
Furthermore, there are a few examples within the CJE case study alone that demonstrate where an 
EU governance model that engages more with local civil society will actually enhance the democratic 
quality of the EU. First, there is recognition within the CJE that their CSO has a role to play in 
motivating citizens, youth in particular, to participate in the political decision-making process of 
Spain and the EU. Yet for this role to be successfully fulfilled, the governing body must also meet 
their responsibility to ensure the social right to participate is met. Thus, the two actors (the EU and 
CJE) need to be linked to create assured citizen participation, similar to the Collaboration Agreement 
set up between the Spanish Government and the CJE cementing youth participation in the 
prevention of HIV.  Second, around 50% of survey participants noted that they believe CSOs are able 
to promote social rights for citizens, such as the right to direct participation in governmental 
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processes. Still, this is only half of the participants surveyed with close to a third believing CSOs don’t 
promote these types of rights at all because they can’t if the governments they are promoting them 
to are not interested in engagement. Given that CJE predominantly highlights its role in helping 
create active citizen participation opportunities in youth affairs within Spain and the EU in all 
documentation, it is concerning CJE followers do not feel that active participation outside of the CSO 
is possible. The institutions at the top are failing to incorporate this critical social aspect of a 
governance system and the right to be accepted and to participate directly is instead concentrated 
within these local institutions. This is where the institutionalisation component of civil 
cosmopolitanism will be of use. Under a model of civil cosmopolitanism, the arrangement of CJE as 
defined in its documentation would be utilised to supervise and support the creation of 
transnational arrangements between the Spanish citizen, the CSO and the Union. This introduces the 
third example that demonstrates how civil society can enhance democracy within the EU. The EU 
needs more concrete goals for citizen participation and a more solid attempt to engage with the 
actors where citizen participation is occurring to achieve those goals. The Youth in Action 
Programme failed at setting these clear objectives. A governance model that understands a solely 
representative form of governance will not keep up with the social democratisation efforts of local 
societies is required, such as civil cosmopolitanism, where the social cosmopolitan component 
accounts for ongoing integration.       
4.2.2 Club de Madrid  
Club de Madrid (CDM) is an altogether different type of CSO to CJE. The organisation itself was 
formed after the Conference on Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Madrid in 2001, when 
35 heads of states and governments met with policy experts and academics to discuss the issue of 
democratic governance from both theoretical and practical points of view. CDM was the outcome of 
a decision made at the conference that democratic leadership is one of the most important tools to 
building functional and inclusive governance and should be the focus of an organisation.189 Its 
members are thus the Presidents of the Foundations that organised the conference, former Prime 
Ministers (from 58 countries) and former Heads of State, some of whom participated in the 
conference.190 It is now the world’s largest forum of former democratic Presidents and Prime 
Ministers. In this sense, while it remains an independent non-profit Action Tank similar to CJE, it is 
still correct to categorise CDM as a top-down CSO. It prioritises the role of the leader in creating an 
                                                            
189 The Gorbachev Foundation of North America, "Closing Statement of the Organizers of the Conference on 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation," (Madrid: Club de Madrid, 27 October 2001), 1. 
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effective governance system, not dissimilar to an organisation that would prioritise the role of a 
teacher in creating an effective education system.  
 
As a relatively new organisation, its existence almost acknowledges that in the twenty-first century 
there remain issues with the leadership ability of local, national and transnational leaders around 
the globe. CDM President Wim Kok has explained how, for Europe, the issue, or challenge, above all 
others is defending a social model of Europe that respects the rule of law and diversity.191 Kok details 
how CDM’s structure and membership list means it holds the greatest expertise in democratic 
government and that its mission is to ‘transmit its values’192 to assist with the strengthening 
democracy worldwide, including strengthening the European social model. CDM is therefore an 
important CSO with regards to this study, not only because it is has been founded as a local civil 
society institution but because it is also directly connected to those working at the EU level and in 
positions of high power and is thus also a transnational civil society institution. It is based in Spain 
and calls itself a Spanish CSO, yet its work is focused on democracy worldwide with a connection to 
Spain and the EU.  
 
For the CDM’s Board of Directors (BoD) (the governing body that manages the organisation’s 
interests in accordance with decisions made during the General Assembly), the organisation’s 
primary asset is the leadership experience of its members, of which there are currently more than 
90, and their commitment to building democratic governance elsewhere. Due to the small number 
of CDM’s staff at the home base in Spain (12 – 15 staff and a communication advisor), there is no 
documentation centre, but the BoD’s opinions on current projects are expressed in the briefings put 
together by CDM staff. Given that leadership experience is of primary importance to the 
organisation’s work, there are two main areas on which CDM focuses: democratic leadership in 
governance and educating leaders on promoting democracy within local society.193 The former 
appears more focused on top-down work; supporting different governance scenarios, i.e. situations 
where a government may be transitioning to democracy (Middle Eastern nations), or where there 
are developing democracies (supposedly Russia). The latter approach, within society, suggests a 
more socially-focused democracy that concentrates on cohesion and citizen rights. It is the second 
line of CDM’s work that this research is predominantly interested in; how the education of the 
leaders at the top on the importance of social democracy can promote social cohesion within 
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society. Although the nature of the CDM organisation does not fit the parameters of the civil 
cosmopolitan model perhaps quite as well as the CJE, it is still of equal importance. The whole idea 
of civil cosmopolitanism is to connect just local institutions that support individualism (defined in 
Chapter Two as the importance of the individual) to the EU. The model’s workings will only be 
feasible if it can be applied to a variety of local situations, institutional structures and societies. The 
CDM not only supports individualism by enhancing the democratic quality of EU leadership one 
leader at a time, but it also brings to the attention of political leaders the importance of individual 
rights within society.  
 
One of CDM’s main projects on social cohesion is known as The Shared Societies Project, an EU-
funded initiative that aims to create strong political leaders who will focus on building inclusive 
societies. The background research to the project showed that societies are most likely to be 
peaceful and democratic when the value of diversity is understood, if not celebrated.194 When 
diversity is not understood or ignored, social exclusion and discrimination are a possible result. The 
leadership aspect is very important to the project. CDM focuses on teaching democratic decision-
making processes, as the result is more likely to be policy and practices that respect diversity, where 
citizen rights can be constituted into legislation. In contrast, the work of CJE would focus on the 
citizens at the ground level and encourage their participation in activities directed at affecting 
governmental decision-making processes. Although a top-down initiative, the idea is to provide 
leaders with the best arguments, options and tools in order to set up the conditions for an inclusive 
society, which will mean working with a number of actors.195 For example, Former President of Chile 
and UN Women Executive Director Michelle Bachelet recently argued that The Shared Societies 
Project creates the opportunity for herself as a Member of the CDM to initiate a project that teaches 
leaders about policy that should encourage a shared gender society. Bachelet, who spoke specifically 
about working to construct a post-2015 Development Agenda within Europe, argued to a Global 
Consultation on Addressing Inequalities in Denmark that exclusion of women and discrimination 
based on gender has challenged the international political realm for some time.196 Although women 
fight for their rights within society, Bachelet detailed three necessities that must be met before 
these individuals can secure their rights: first, leaders must take responsibility; second, policy 
initiatives must promote equal opportunity; and third, no gender should be economically 
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disadvantaged.197 Bachelet has effectively set the “conditions” for building restorative gender 
equality within society. The ideal conditions for a gender inclusive society are not just identified by 
the project’s initiator, but are already included within a future Agenda and include democratic 
participation, respect for individual rights, equal opportunity and non-discrimination.198  
 
Following a week’s observation of how the organisation and its members function, it also became 
evident exactly what “arguments, options and tools” the CDM provides to the governments it works 
with. The most important tool is knowledge. CDM has a wealth of experienced members in a variety 
of political fields able to pass down their knowledge to new leaders in the field. Second, much of the 
discussion at the CDM was centred on the need to direct attention to econometric data. Leaders 
should use the tool of research and innovation in order to collect and develop data that 
demonstrates that social inclusion can, overall, enhance a society’s economic wellbeing. The 
incentive for these leaders is to attract funding to their region. Third a clear understanding of what 
will contribute to the creation of shared societies will enhance the argument or opinion of leaders. 
For instance, eighty-one former Presidents and Prime Ministers (members of the CDM) put together 
a proposal called Call to Action and Ten Commitments. The ten commitments are described as a list 
of key policy areas, put together by the members based on the findings of their research, innovative 
ideas and life experience in general, which are essential features of a shared society. For example, 
local government and international community were two policy areas agreed on at the General 
Assembly of CDM in Rotterdam, November 2008, as a necessary focus of democratisation efforts in 
the near future.199 The General Assembly working groups concluded that both strong local 
governments and a strong international community are essential features of a shared society today 
and therefore policy needs to have the specific purpose of aligning the two areas. That is to say, 
there must be some positive result from aligning local institutions with international governmental 
agencies on the wellbeing of citizens and the quality of democracy of the governing system(s). The 
Ten Commitments is similar to a small check-list for leaders, but should instead be viewed as a semi-
structured way of ensuring a good start to developing democratic governance by providing a 
framework skeleton for designing democratic policies.  
 
From the point of view of an outsider able to observe the CDM in action, the CDM aims to integrate 
individualism into governance systems worldwide in two predominant ways: producing democratic 
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leaders and through the education of leaders on citizen rights. The importance of this CSO and its 
contribution to further the democratic quality of EU governance is thus that it is teaching, 
encouraging and effectively producing ethical behaviour at the top, the key aim of the principle of 
morality within the civil cosmopolitan model. It has a multi-level approach, working with leaders, 
local institutions and citizens, to design, advance and disseminate the concept of democracy. 
Despite the more top-down arrangement of the CDM compared with the CJE, as a CSO it may be 
more likely than the CJE to have influence at the European level given the status of its membership 
and structure of its approach. For example, the CDM Legal Charter states that the General Assembly 
holds ‘all the powers granted to the highest governing and representative body’200 of an association 
by Spanish legislation. Yet, its projects’ ambitions remain very much aligned with connecting political 
leaders to local society and to this extent could promote citizen rights more effectively than similar-
minded CSOs at the transnational level.  
 
Rubén Campos, CDM Program Coordinator at the Headquarters in Madrid, was able to expand upon 
this special dual position of the CDM with regards to EU relations, in an interview on 17 July, 2012. 
Complementary to CDM’s international work, Campos explained that one of CDM’s specific goals is 
to work with EU institution leaders and to prompt them to encourage democracy so that policies can 
change, where necessary, from the top down, which will then affect individuals.201 Campos believes 
a mix of top and bottom governance strategies is effective and truly brings about change. For 
example, he indicated that the funding CDM receives from the European Social Fund (ESF) at the top 
is directed into local projects at the bottom. One such project, Freedom of Association in the MENA 
(Middle East and the North of Africa), aims to work with the local actors of the MENA that desired a 
change from the prohibitive laws governing CSOs’ registration processes.202  The project received 
funding from the EU in 2007, with which it engaged more than 500 national stakeholders and CSOs 
in local project activities over a two year period.203 The need to work hand-in-hand with citizens 
grows stronger every day, meaning there is a greater need to engage with and fund CSOs such as 
CDM in order for that funding to reach community members. Essentially, Campos reflected in his 
interview that, similar to CJE, CDM works in the knowledge that a democratic EU governance 
                                                            
200 Article 13, X General Assembly of the Club of Madrid, "Legal Charter," ed. Club de Madrid (Madrid, Spain 8 
November 2011). (Last accessed 20 July, 2012).  
201 Interview with Rubén Campos, Interview 17 July, 2012. Project Coordinator of Club de Madrid. 
202 Club de Madrid, "Program: Freedom of Association in the Middle East and the North of Africa." Madrid, 
2007.  http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/programa/freedom_of_association_in_the_mena (Last accessed 26 
February, 2013).  
203 ———, "Project Achievements and Challenges," in Program: Freedom of Association in the Middle East and 
the North of Africa (Madrid, 2009). 
http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/programa/project_achievements_and_challenges (Last accessed 24 February, 
2013). 
Kirsten Jane Mander 99543103 Page 89 
 
structure extends to individuals the opportunity to engage as an EU citizen, or in other words enjoy 
rights and obligations of living in a society or community that is part of a wider international body. 
The CDM’s role in helping to make that democratic structure a possibility is ensuring the rights of all 
individuals (elites and citizens) exist at all times. For example, Bachelet’s “core conditions” for a 
gender inclusive society aim to enforce the rights of all individuals, male and female, within society. 
A focus on individuals at the top and at the bottom means that CDM is creating a space in which 
citizens and elites are working together. In other words, under a model of civil cosmopolitanism, 
CDM’s work would be used to equate the social dimension with its political counterpart in the effort 
to enhance global democracy. The benefit of CDM and its image as a top-down organisation is that 
the organisation can take its opinions straight to Brussels, to the EP, and have its voice (the voice of 
the leaders and the voice of the citizens) heard so that it can communicate directly with the policy-
makers. This is one example of how Club de Madrid could bring The Shared Societies Project, for 
example, to the EU and bring the EU to the citizen.        
4.3 Local civil society and the European Union 
4.3.1 Developing the core conditions for citizen participation 
Despite their differences, CJE and CDM have one resounding purpose in common: to raise 
awareness of the concept of individualism within the Spanish and EU communities. The opportunity 
to observe the decision-making organ of the CJE in action at the 2012 General Assembly was 
important for two reasons. The Presidents of all the participating youth organisations were very 
effective at engaging citizens in discussion and supporting their active engagement in past and 
upcoming activities or campaigns. CJE acts as a connecting institution between the citizen and local 
or international governance system. The CDM on the other hand, acts as the guiding hand over the 
relationship between governments and the citizen. The CDM recognises the roles and 
responsibilities of both leaders and citizens need to adopt to oversee the creation of just societies. It 
is within these just societies that institutions such as the CJE can sprout.  
Both organisations work to improve democracy by producing democratic leadership and democratic 
communities. Aside from funding a few projects, the EU is yet to recognise the benefits from fully 
engaging with actors such as CJE and CDM. Apart from enhancing its multileveled structure, the EU 
stands to enhance the relationship between its political actors and its social actors and ultimately 
strengthen its decision-making processes. For example, if the EU utilised the leadership work of 
CDM, although relatively new, including projects such as The Shared Societies Project with branching 
projects like the one carried out by Bachelet, it could be effective in producing the first component 
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of the civil cosmopolitan model; ethical behaviour and the principle of morality. Bachelet’s shared 
societies project creates a supportive foundation for individualism by encouraging decision-making 
outcomes that promote equal opportunity for men and women worldwide. It meets the primary 
ambition of a cosmopolitan governance framework by linking the individual with the global in a way 
that prioritises individual rights. The EU needs to do more to engage the European citizen. Given that 
both CSOs have proven successful in engaging citizens in their activities and projects, the EU stands 
to greatly improve its relations with its citizens and thus their understanding of its system of 
governance through deeper engagement with the institutions where the presence of those citizens 
is felt.  
Thus the overall point to take from the case studies is the importance of the relationship between 
the EU and local CSOs within the EU governance system. CSOs create opportunities for citizen 
participation, but this crucial contribution to transnational governance systems is not utilised 
because the benefits are not fully understood. Analysing the case studies in further detail 
demonstrates three basic conditions of citizen participation that these CSOs fulfil, which could 
greatly improve the democratic quality of EU governance if the EU can establish strong relations 
with these CSOs. At the very least, the EU can learn from these CSOs about reaching out and 
engaging the ordinary citizen. The first condition is formation of strong institutions. CJE and CDM are 
both clear about what they want to achieve by pursuing citizen participation, how, in what way and 
in what forms. Their institutional structure and the activities, events, documentation and projects for 
which they are responsible were designed accordingly. The institutions are designed to act as 
appropriate channels for citizen participation. Second, and of equal importance, is the organisation 
of spaces for participation. These spaces are organised around what constitutes moral, free and just 
societies and are thus based on the idea of inclusion and the achievement of social rights. Spaces can 
be organised as a direct or indirect participation space, where direct participation is the capacity to 
physically act from within different social contexts (CJE) and indirect participation is the ability to be 
represented within different social contexts (CDM). Both direct and indirect spaces are organised to 
transform or maintain social rights, but to initiate change both types are necessary. Finally, the idea 
of motivation is incredibly important to participation. Motivating citizens has, contained within it, a 
necessary personal meaning. The topic of democracy, participation in the EU, the right to belong to 
an active community, the identity of citizen; these were the evident drivers behind those who 
actively participated in CJE and CDM and in civil society in general. Motivating the individual is a key 
social factor in creating participation. All three conditions fit the components of civil 
cosmopolitanism.  
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Figure 3: The Three Core Conditions for Creating Citizen Participation 
 
 
As a physical amenity of citizen participation, CSOs can help contribute to the creation of active 
citizenship, a more socially based form of citizenship, within the EU, where citizen engagement 
remains a great challenge today.  
 
Figure 4: How CSOs Can Contribute to the Creation of Active EU Citizenship 
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Figure 4 highlights the work local CSOs could play in the creation of three fundamental prerequisites 
for any political institution to encourage active citizen participation. The conditions for creating 
citizen participation are wholly supported within a civil cosmopolitan model. Moreover, the case 
studies are indicative of how the components of civil cosmopolitanism can be expanded in order to 
accommodate the conditions of participation supported by CSOs. This analysis will further clarify the 
way civil cosmopolitanism could function in practical terms.   
4.3.2 Civil cosmopolitanism and the conditions for enhancing democracy 
Local civil society, in the case of Spain, has been demonstrated as capable of furthering the 
democratic quality of EU governance through the advancement of engagement with local-level 
actors to bring the concept of individualism to the forefront as well as fulfil necessary conditions in 
terms of citizen participation. Local civil society can provide an organised space for active citizen 
engagement with and active achievement of citizen rights within the EU. It has created such a space 
by fulfilling a set of theoretical pre-conditions of social democracy: formation, organisation and 
motivation, which were a successful combination for the CJE and CDM in terms of attaining elite and 
citizen participation. To recap, civil cosmopolitanism expands upon David Held’s cosmopolitanism by 
connecting democracy to the theory of social legitimacy. Social legitimacy understands that any 
move forward for EU governance, e.g. further political and economic integration, should be 
grounded on a choice by citizens, not on an unavoidable consequence of transnational governance 
that citizens must live with. In this sense, the three components, institutionalisation, morality and 
social democracy, were developed as part of the civil cosmopolitanism framework using the 
theoretical preconditions of social democracy. The local civil society case studies demonstrate where 
each of these components can be strengthened and provide a clearer understanding of the workings 
of a potential EU governance system.  
Formation 
First, formation is central to the institutional component of civil cosmopolitanism because of its 
focus on relation-building from the perspective of forming stronger societies. It is understood that 
the institutionalisation of justice is part of the domestic state-building process, yet civil society also 
shows justice can be achieved in CSOs where overlapping decision-making procedures are utilised. 
According to Pogge, this is because CSOs are inclusive of multiple actors and follow a ‘cross-cultural 
discourse’204 of institutionalisation. Pogge’s idea of a cross-cultural discourse follows from the idea 
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that locally there are political, social, cultural, ethnical and economic aspects not able to be 
institutionalised at the international and sometimes even national level. For the Union to be 
described as the ‘fully global perspective’205 that Held claims that it is, the global structures must 
support and respect the local structures that support the institutionalisation of those aspects. Given 
that local institutions have not featured as a primary focus within literature on EU governance, the 
conditions of their existence and a brief description of their make-up is required.   
 
Following the examination of CJE and CDM, there are certain prerequisites any political institution is 
expected to meet that are necessary to safeguard the citizen. The institution must be formed in a 
way that provides for individuals to influence agendas, avoid pressure from government elites, 
remain safe from psychological stress and be free and able to inform themselves, for example freely 
accessible information. That is to say, local CSOs provide opportunities to physically take part in the 
institution, for example leading community activities and assembling individuals together for 
discussions. This is known as direct participation and redirects the focus from achieving just 
international justice to also achieving societal justice. The aim is to form institutions that will provide 
for meaningful engagement of the citizen with the EU rather than merely having a percentage 
number of citizens represented at the EU. In other words, to form institutions that can oversee the 
achievement of social rights of the citizen. CSOs such as CJE and CDM are formed because they share 
the same objective of contributing to just and democratic governance. For local civil societies in the 
EU’s member states in general, the EU has the opportunity to encourage the formation of strong 
institutions; and thus to encourage the distribution of political authority, which creates social justice 
at the local level.  
 
Thus, there are two prominent characteristics of civil cosmopolitanism’s institutionalisation 
component. First, local institutions should be built on a foundation that promotes equal opportunity 
and freedom for individuals to engage as citizens in society. Their position as bottom-up actors 
provides ample opportunity for the achievement of social justice through participation. Second, the 
EU is to remain at the core of the governance system. CSOs must be formed with the flexibility to 
network. They must be structured appropriately to liaise with key political figures as well as build 
relations with citizens, which is a challenging part of politics, given that many institutions tend to 
lean towards the top or towards the bottom. Civil cosmopolitanism advocates that the formation of 
strong local institutions is essential to enhance the democratic quality of EU governance, because, as 
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was demonstrated by the CJE, they can act as the connecting point for all actors. A strong 
connection between the European citizen and the EU is the first step to ensuring governance and 
policy meet democracy and justice.      
Organisation 
The success of the condition of formation relies on the social integration of member states within 
the EU; not necessarily to create more Europe but to provide for a balance of political authority 
between the local institutions and the Union institutions. The CJE and CDM are examples of the 
ability to organise social spaces which act as an essential starting point for social integration and civic 
participation. Civil cosmopolitanism proposes that the achievement of social integration will start 
with the utilisation of CSOs in the construction of a pan-European space, which avoids a sole focus 
on national or international political spaces. A well-organised pan-European space begins with local 
civil society for one predominant reason:  CSOs allow for an elite-driven process to occur politically, 
whilst providing a greater emphasis on the role of the citizen in that process. They embody the 
balance of top-down and bottom-up strategies that civil cosmopolitanism promotes as a necessity in 
a democratic transnational governance structure. CSOs provide a non-threatening, easily accessible 
and inclusive space for individuals to participate either first-hand or through direct representation in 
the process of social integration.  Alex Warleigh and Richard Bellamy call it ‘ethics participation,’206 a 
focus on direct participation routes for the citizen as well as indirect representation. CJE, through the 
use of direct participation routes, and CDM, through the use of indirect participation routes, 
contributed to the strengthening of the Spanish third sector by engaging multiple voices in activities 
with clear motivations and the ultimate goal of more democratic societies. The projects initiated by 
both CSOs will aim to hold the EU accountable where necessary. The case studies in Chapter Four 
demonstrate that a clear relationship between elite and citizen, a clear link between top and bottom 
and a clear use of both direct and indirect participation methods is essential for a government’s 
democratising potential. A civil cosmopolitan pan-European space adds a clear space where these 
relationships, links and methods can be established. 
The organisation of a pan-European social space is also very important to the establishment of 
peaceful relations between the EU and local European societies, so that EU decision-making 
processes better fit the ideals and interests of those societies. This is where the merging of the civil 
society discourse with cosmopolitan theory aims to offer a much clearer and focused understanding 
how the role of morality and individualism can fit into the democratisation efforts regarding the EU. 
                                                            
206 Richard Bellamy and Alex Warleigh, "From an Ethics of Integration to an Ethics of Participation- Citizenship 
and the Future of the European Union," Millennium: A Journal of International Studies 27(1998): 447. 
Kirsten Jane Mander 99543103 Page 95 
 
Given that the EU was produced following major conflict and war between states that were to 
become its members, the issue of ethical human behaviour is important to the relationships 
between its actors.207 The Spanish CSOs, derived in a weaker third sector environment than is the 
case in many EU member states, recognised the link between Warleigh and Bellamy’s ethical 
participation and a change in the social culture of Spain and the EU. The idea of morality and 
behaving ethically is very important to the organising of an appropriate social space. Morality as an 
ideal governance trait comes from a post-World War Two concept of peace and the attainment of 
individual social rights. Civil cosmopolitanism combines the morality aspect of civil cosmopolitanism 
with the civil society discourse to further clarify the position of CSOs in the creation of an ethical 
space for integration. A pan-European space needs to be organised so as to ensure the EU can begin 
to produce policy in accordance with the attainment of individual social rights, but civil society will 
play a role in overseeing a fair and just distribution of those rights.  Figure 5 below outlines the 
workings of a pan-European space, with the roles of both the EU and local civil societies in 
guaranteeing social rights. 
Figure 5: Local Civil Society and a Pan-European Space
 
Motivation 
Civil cosmopolitanism takes into account the fact that citizens play a vital yet underutilised role in 
the development of the EU’s governance structure. The formation of strong institutions and the 
organisation of a space for political participation are two conditions that must be met to oversee 
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citizen participation. However, if citizens are not informed or communicated with during the policy-
making processes of the EU, then it is almost certain citizen participation will continue to remain 
low. A major part of the discussion on the Eurocrisis today focuses on the very point that a citizen 
must be motivated in order to participate and this will certainly not be the case if they feel their 
choices are made for them.208 Following an observation period of the CJE and CDM, it became 
apparent that motivation will never be achieved by information campaigns on the EU, no matter 
how compelling or how publicised they are. This is a very important observation in terms of the 
effect it has on the design of civil cosmopolitanism. The real difference to citizen motivation 
occurred when citizens were spoken to through the ambitious objectives of the CSOs. The CSOs took 
it on as their own responsibility and duty to motivate citizens to participate. It is proposed here that 
the effect will be the same for the EU, either through its policies or through engaging with local 
CSOs. Civil cosmopolitanism thus promotes the need for social democracy to be inherent in the 
characteristics of EU activities, initiatives and policy. The fact that citizen participation in the EU 
could result in the citizens’ ability to make a difference to future EU policies should be reflected in 
policies and communicated to the citizens.  
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5. CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND PROPOSALS  
 
The focus of this research is on analysing the democratic challenges currently facing the EU on the 
understanding that those challenges present an opportunity for the EU to reconnect with its citizens 
and move forward – as a Union. Despite an ongoing economic crisis, the need to ensure long-term 
stability in the banking and financial sector is not an excuse to sideline social rights in an anxious 
rush to produce immediate and tangible economic solutions. This research has therefore focused on 
the situation from a social perspective, arguing that the EU could make more of an effort with its 
duty as a social project to further connect with the 500 million citizens it governs. It thus proposes 
the use of a governance model that aims to bring together local civil societies and EU social policy to 
create a strong framework in which the EU can connect with the European citizen through direct and 
indirect citizen participation. Civil cosmopolitanism is one such framework in which EU-Citizen 
relations could develop because by balancing the civil society and cosmopolitan theoretical 
discourses, it effectively mixes top-down and bottom-up governance strategies. If such a framework 
is employed correctly, it will enhance the democratic quality of the EU and strengthen its 
governance structure in general. The framework places local civil society at the heart of 
democratisation efforts, claiming a major part of the EU democratic deficit is the absence of a pan-
European space where such strategies can be put into practice and political authority can be 
distributed.  
Over the course of the essay, two hypotheses are addressed to understand the scope and level of 
social problems in the EU and the scope and level of room for movement towards a more social 
model of governance. The first hypothesis questions whether there is a political and economic 
rationale at the EU to increase investment in top-down EU incentives that strengthen local civil 
societies and enhance citizen participation. A direct part of the study into hypothesis one was an in-
depth look at the policy produced by the EU. Evidence from Chapter Three reveals that while 
European representatives speak encouragingly of deeper interdependence between nation-states to 
engage the European citizen at the transnational level, this is not translated into European policy. 
There is no real effort to address the social in European policy to help the citizen internalise 
European integration. That lack of effort could be either because it is an underfunded area or 
because it is not a priority area. The EU must be proactive however, and deliver in action what it has 
promised in the spoken word, as this is how the EU will truly communicate with its citizens and 
correct a core political tension: a lack of citizen trust in the EU. Furthermore, evidence suggests that 
existing social policy, Europe for Citizens, has, over time, enhanced democracy by increasing civic 
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participation. There is both a political and economic incentive to build upon Europe for Citizens and 
increase investment in policy targeting the grassroots level.  
The second hypothesis focused on the role of the individual as key to achieving social equality within 
the EU. Given that Chapter Three found evidence of room in the EU system for new governance 
strategies and even a more socially-focused governance framework, the conundrum now faced by 
the EU is how best to engage the European citizen to correct a malfunctioning EU-citizen 
relationship. Furthermore, would there be any solution that could avoid overcomplicating the 
system of governance? The problem is well-recognised within the EU. The Directorate-General for 
Internal Policies at the EC noted in a recent report that the EU faces a choice between either ‘too 
much politics or no politics at all.’209 How can the citizen participate directly without challenging the 
institutional make-up of the EU? Chapter Four outlined two case studies involving CSOs in Spain. The 
purpose was to understand the abilities of local civil societies; what role can they play in advancing 
the ordinary European citizen from the bottom-up without generating “too much politics.” Whether 
educating leaders on the importance of citizen participation or representing the citizens themselves, 
local civil society is arguably a central actor in the bid to enhance the democratic quality of EU 
governance. The predominant reason in the case of Spain is because the CSOs met three core 
conditions necessary to create citizen participation in national and international governance 
contexts. Due to these primary characteristics of CSOs, they stand a greater chance of being able to 
create participation without impinging upon the political authority of the Union. The CSOs could 
instead reorganise European political spaces in a non-threatening manner to oversee the emergence 
of a pan-European space for interaction. The space could provide a starting point for the creation of 
just institutions and eventually the social integration of individuals who are motivated to participate.  
In the following Chapter, hypotheses one and two will be discussed in greater detail in terms of their 
implications for the EU and their contribution to the field of study on democracy and the EU. In 
particular, the results of the study in relation to hypothesis one demonstrate where EU funding of 
social policy needs to be distributed and where that policy needs to be clearer or redesigned in 
places, especially with regard to the issue of innovation, which is becoming a lacklustre fallback 
solution to achieving long-term goals. The findings from the study in relation to hypothesis two are 
used to further clarify how a model of civil cosmopolitanism could work and how it would oversee 
redirected social funding and new social policy. In Chapter Five, all three of the model’s components 
are fitted together and developed using the three core conditions to creating citizen participation. 
The remainder of the chapter will present two concluding proposals based on the findings of this 
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research, which are supported by a civil cosmopolitan governance structure. The proposals will not 
address how the EU should move forward financially in terms of the budget, resources and revenue 
sources, as this is beyond the scope of the research. It will only propose two new political and social 
avenues that could be explored on the understanding that they have the capacity to enhance the 
democratic quality of the EU.   
 5.1   A Union of citizen-orientated policy initiatives  
Antigoni Papadopoulou, MEP, Rapporteur for the 2013 European Year of Citizens, recalled at a 
conference on the EU citizen in November 2012 that the concept of European citizenship was 
introduced into Union law some twenty years ago.210 With respect to the progress made within this 
area, it is an ideal time to discuss and consider further improvements to the role of the citizen as the 
EU attempts to emerge from economic and social crisis. The data in Chapter Three drawn from 
interviews and documentation analysis is timely to the debate on democracy within the EU, with the 
release of the next seven-year budget and policy proposals currently occurring. The majority of 
interviewees engaged within the EP expressed the belief that the time was right to reopen the case 
for greater citizen involvement. Popular opinion however, has not translated into the primary 
concern of the policies proposed. The benefit to those on the ground is currently defined in terms of 
meeting the objectives set out in the EC Europe 2020 platform, reflected in the proposed strategies 
for the 2014-2020 period. The core objective of the EC strategy is sustainable and inclusive growth; 
and there is what could be described as a headlong rush to produce policy that finds immediate 
growth in economic factors such as GDP, employment levels and government savings. The sense of 
urgency, although necessary in the latest recession, is less reflective of the long-term goal to 
produce sustainable and innovative growth than it is reflective of the deeper desire to return to pre-
crisis business as usual. The role of the citizen is barely mentioned. This is of concern for policy 
incentives such as Europe for Citizens or Creative Europe in terms of the burden they must carry as 
the leading initiatives in the area of social justice. Europe for Citizens, for example, continues to 
remain the only initiative of its kind that specifically aims to bring Europe closer to its citizens. In 
defence of the Union, it can be argued that all programmes initiated by the Union are to be utilised 
by the citizen. This is an important aspect to keep in mind, yet even so the ambitious targets set for 
social and regional cohesion in Europe 2020 face an unlikely future in terms of sustainability and 
inclusiveness if the EU does not depart in some way from the previous integration project.  
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Europe for Citizens is successful, politically and economically, hence there is an incentive to push for 
more programmes of its kind. Policy with the greater social goal of establishing a connection 
between the Union and European citizens, such as Europe for Citizens, is vital so that the 
implementation of EU objectives is not seen as foreign to the community structure it may be 
overstepping and is most certainly affecting. Thus, in order to meet the 2020 goals, there is a 
political incentive to invest in community ownership, because increasing local citizen participation is 
ultimately recognised for increasing overall participation in the Union by assisting multi-level 
governance.211 It will also stimulate the need for innovative features that include networking tools 
and cooperation incentives to put those policies into effect. With only 1% of GDP being directed to 
the EU budget, there needs to be an efficient use of funds that is connected to the citizen and 
integrated into the community. Either the efficient use of current funds is necessary, given that 
funding for the only citizen-led development programme (Europe for Citizens) increased by no more 
than 14 million Euro for the 2007-2013 period, or new revenue sources need to be sought to finance 
socially meaningful and innovative policies.   
The opportunity therefore exists to tackle the financial challenges facing the EU and meet the need 
for a clearer focus on distribution of social cohesion policy funding. Measurable targets for the EU 
have been set by Europe 2020, with one of the core targets being the removal of social exclusion,212 
which means closing the gap between available finances and the declared ambitions for social 
cohesion. The implementation of sustainable and inclusive strategies called for in Europe 2020 will 
require strengthening of governance so as not to repeat the difficulties encountered with the Lisbon 
strategy for growth and cooperation. The most important factor will be the governance framework 
in place to support the implementation process. A governance model that will enable the EU to 
support regional development to the extent required is really an essential rather than optional, 
including with regard to financial matters. Thus, it is proposed here that in order to achieve 
economic effectiveness and efficiency discussed in Chapter Three, financial instruments that require 
the skill of local and commercial actors should be used to achieve 2020 objectives. For example, 
microfinancing, loans and venture capital; instruments that can be depicted by their ‘revolving 
character,’213 meaning their use occurs cyclically and ultimately invests back into the system. Recent 
data indicates that investing one or two Euros in loans finds a one to three euro return in equity 
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investments.214 The current funds are not enough to extend to actions funded by these financial 
instruments, as evidenced in the case of Spain. As the founding coordinator of the Agenda 21 for 
Culture and Member of the European Laboratory for Cultural Cooperation, Spain has been praised 
for the improvements to social inclusion and social cohesion within the EU. Despite this fact, 
statistics on the use of financial instruments to promote social and cultural community-led 
development initiatives are not reported by the ESF, other than decreases to the amount of funding 
available.215  
From both the political and economic perspective, the EU is not seriously investing in the promotion 
of social and cultural development in regions to encourage citizen participation in Union governance. 
This conclusion is arrived at despite there being enough empirical evidence to support the case for 
investment in social cohesion, regardless of the need for budget cuts at the present time. In fact, it is 
one of the more sensible investments to make, given that political, social and cultural participation 
in the EU is acknowledged in Union law as a right. Essentially, the EU should invest in citizenship 
initiatives and social cohesion policy initiated at the Union level because citizens face exclusion, 
especially during times of market fragmentation and global technological shifts. Developing 
exclusionary policy could result in the absence of social values in the EU, a lack of local democratic 
societies and sluggish formation of a common European identity. The use of additional financial 
instruments should therefore be further investigated. In recent meetings of the Committee on 
Budget in the EP, political support for the use of financial instruments in the MFF is described as 
‘consistently high.’216 The incentive to seek alternative governance strategies is beginning to be 
circulated through the Union’s institutions. The objective here is to try to make clear to all involved 
that the MFF 2014-2020 will need to generate new priorities for Europe: partnership, local 
community involvement and cooperation.  
5.2 Fitting together the components of civil cosmopolitanism: how could the model work?  
The existence of both a political and economic incentive to invest at the Union level in policy that 
promotes the grassroots level is a pre-condition to the successful engagement of local civil society. It 
is very encouraging to see direct citizen involvement is considered a crucial part of democratic 
governance, even if there remains room for expansion of EU social policy. There is at least some 
understanding that the role of the individual is able to be better executed from the ground up, for 
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example through the role of civil society in instigating citizen-led initiatives, if those execution efforts 
are supported at the top. Thus it makes sense to propose a governance model that balances both 
top-down and bottom-up governance strategies to achieve the best result in terms of democratising 
the EU governance system. Civil cosmopolitanism can only work if both governance dimensions are 
present. At the ground level, the substantial involvement of local civil society is argued here as one 
of the better opportunities the EU has to enhance the democratic quality of its governance system 
because of the ability of CSOs to achieve higher levels of citizen participation than classical 
governmental institutions. Local CSOs, in the case of Spain, are argued to embody the conditions for 
direct citizen participation: that is, formation of strong institutions, organisation of inclusive spaces 
within society and motivation of individuals. In other words, the CJE and CDM stand for the 
achievement of individual rights by contributing to the manifestation of moral and just local 
societies. Thus, while local civil society engagement may not be the best democratisation strategy in 
other transnational governance situations, in the case of the EU it can offer the creation of direct 
citizen participation without demanding institutional reform at the top.   
Moving forward with the analysis to the question of how local civil society can help enhance 
democracy at the EU, the case study in Chapter Four also demonstrates how the employment of 
local civil society can advance the components of a model of civil cosmopolitanism. The theoretical 
ideas of what constitutes morality, a just institution and social democracy can be envisioned in a 
practical sense. Civil cosmopolitanism remains flexible as a theoretical project in the sense that there 
is room for growth or change on a territorial basis, given that the EU brings together 27 different 
member states. It is unwavering, however, in its promotion of a well-structured local civil society as 
a body with major potential to help integrate the European citizen within the EU through 
achievement of his or her social right to participation. Thus, as a framework for democratic 
transnational governance, it stands by traditional cosmopolitan theory in preserving the rights of 
individuals in global governance. In addition, it incorporates one essential aspect of European 
development through the civil society discourse; the recognition of the local and social aspect as 
crucial characteristic of a democratic international governance system. The previous chapter 
detailed how the model’s three components could be significantly developed in order to best utilise 
local civil society to achieve practically what the model promotes theoretically. To gain a deeper 
understanding of the potential workings of civil cosmopolitanism, it is important to discuss briefly 
how the components fit together and integrate the European citizen.  
First, civil cosmopolitanism moves away from David Held’s global society to focus instead on local 
society. This follows the understanding that linking the EU with the European citizen will begin with a 
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social integration process, which will be reliant on local institutions where territorial minorities and 
cultural differences are taken into account. Thus, institutionalism is a primary component of the 
model. It is concerned predominantly with local CSOs and their ability to further the role of the 
individual in the EU governance structure. In order to be effective, the institutions will focus on 
structure. With the number of individuals and the variety of backgrounds in any local CSO, good 
quality formation is essentially a key characteristic of local institutions with an international purpose. 
The CSOs studied in Chapter Four both exhibit a focus on formation. They are structured formally, 
similarly to EU institutions, according to the organisations’ legal statute, with a clear set of 
objectives. At the same time their local status allows them the informality of an open and inclusive 
structure for any individual who wishes to be involved. The possibility for direct or physical 
participation exists.  
Second, the formulation of local bodies such as CSOs is also contingent on the presence of a space 
for their activities. Neither CDM nor CJE are officially connected with the national Government of 
Spain, meaning they must be able to create separate social spaces where active participation and 
social integration can occur. CSOs effectively represent local societies in a number of policy areas. In 
this sense, the institutions’ ability to organise such spaces is essential to ensure just and free 
societies. Furthermore, without excessive reliance on national policy and rules, CSOs have a better 
chance at internalising the consequences of European integration. In essence, the organisation of 
sound social spaces will exist to bring together the local social component and European political 
component into what would be known as a pan-European space. The concept of a pan-European 
space will become increasingly important where the issue of integration and the formation of 
deeper relations between the Union and its citizens are concerned. Utilising the ability of local CSOs 
to organise social spaces will hopefully result in a strong pan-European space from which these 
relations can grow, which will help to create well-defined and beneficial democratic arrangements 
between the citizen and the elite. The flow-on effect is of course stronger EU-CSO relations and EU-
citizen relations, which represent the foundation of a top-down, regionally unified governance 
structure; a mix of Union level and ground level authority to create more effective governance. 
Taken together, the formation of strong local institutions and the organisation of strong social 
spaces brings attention to the fact that the activities of the EU would be divided between local units 
and international government. Each governance level, whether local level or international level, will 
have a role to play in the decision-making process in at least some of the fields of activity.217 In 
Held’s cosmopolitan democracy, there is a lack of adjustment between global institutions and local 
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institutions. The components of institutionalism and just society of civil cosmopolitanism bring a new 
perspective to ideas surrounding multi-level governance: that is, a peaceful citizens’ pillar. One of 
the great issues of the day deeply rooted in the past is the puzzle of how to live together peacefully 
and in realisation of individual autonomy.218 The components of institutionalism and just society add 
value, that is to say these two components inculcate a culture of peace that motivates the 
participation of all actors within the EU.  This brings the discussion to the final component of social 
democracy and the ability of civil society to induce motivation amongst citizens. A focus on social 
democracy as an essential component to democratic governance aims to solidify the connection 
between the social and the political in international relations. Motivating the European citizen to act 
upon his or her rights will require local civil societies to bring the political to the citizen, e.g. to 
reflect European policy in their objectives as an educational tool on the theory and practice of 
transnational participatory democracy. The social participation of the citizen will then be transferred 
to the political through the ability of local civil society to preserve local culture, territorial interests 
and citizen identity at the EU level. For example, the high level of citizen participation in the CJE 
campaign against HIV impacted the decision-making process of the Spanish Government, which 
resulted in the inclusion of Spanish youth in the Government’s HIV prevention plan. The CJE was able 
to transfer the social to the political whilst preserving the identity of Spanish youth at the national 
level. The Union has a greater chance of following its own legislation and respecting member state 
history, culture and tradition, as is outlined in the Treaty establishing the European Community. 219  
When the components of civil cosmopolitanism come together, the EU governance system is more 
than formulated treaties and legislation; more than the trade agreements, a central banking system 
and a political hierarchy. The governance system requires individuals to open their societies to new 
cultures, ethnicities and political systems. It requires them to take on the citizenship of the Union as 
well as the citizenship of their own nation-state. Thus, where state-society relations, political 
representatives, structures and cultural identities exist, local civil society is proposed as the 
appropriate sphere where just institutions and social spaces can function adequately in respect of 
these imaginaries. It is clear here that “Europeanisation” demands a model of thought separate from 
that of globalisation, as originally suggested by Delanty.220 Focusing specifically on the political rights 
of the European citizen in a globalising world, while important, fails to capture the social world of 
European integration. According to Delanty, the transformative capability of the EU is restricted to a 
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“concept:” ‘a European people, a European society, a European supra-state or a European 
heritage.’221 In contrast, the transformative capability of the EU within civil cosmopolitanism, while 
still responsive to regulation and policy wording, advances to a more organic stage. Democracy is a 
concept of advancing aspirations, where civil society provides the connection between the political 
and the social; the ability for individuals to connect as citizens. In other words, civil society allows for 
the encounter of the local with the global to occur from within a social context.    
As a top-down, regionally unified model, civil cosmopolitanism aims, through the use of local civil 
society as a tool for grassroots development, to enhance the democratic quality of the EU. It focuses 
in particular on the social aspect of EU governance and the concept of individualism, following a lack 
of substantial analysis on the local dimension in international governance structures. The three 
components create a framework that steers away from any one concrete argument, such as the 
existence of an information deficit, as well as any one cure, such as the need for further EU 
legislation. Of course, challenging the opacity of the EU remains important, but the civil 
cosmopolitanism framework recognises the overarching need to reach local society. Reaching out to 
local civil societies may be enough given that local CSOs can represent local society through just 
institutional-building and organisation of social spaces. The EU’s relationship with local societies and 
citizens will also have a flow-on effect on the relationship with local Governments. In essence, the 
model works as a networking system. It acts as a multi-level networking system to ensure that the 
inclusion of minority voices materialises in practice through the use of constructive dialogue. It 
ensures the Union respects the existing traditional layers of the societies with which it is interacting 
by working with the bodies set up to protect those layers. Figure 6 below provides a visual summary 
of a model of civil cosmopolitanism as an EU-citizen networking system. 
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Figure 6: Civil Cosmopolitanism: EU-Citizen Networking System
 
 
Currently, there is no proper public European space and there exists a continued lack of citizen 
engagement with the EU. During the year of the European citizen and in the run-up to the European 
elections in 2014, there is now the opportunity to build an EU-citizen networking system with the 
involvement of all stakeholders concerned; not only civil society but also European institutions, 
national Governments, academic communities and media. Finally, the medium-to-long-term 
objectives of the policy and legislation produced on citizen initiatives should be reviewed at the 
Union level. The European institutions, through existing policy, are correct to promote the fact that 
European citizenship should not just be about citizens’ rights but also about participation and civic 
engagement.222 Civil cosmopolitanism takes it one step further however and promotes the view that 
participation and civic engagement are citizen rights, but it appears the institutions have failed to 
make that connection. These two proposals, a pan-European space for the networking system and 
more effective European policy, will now be developed in the final part of Chapter Five. 
5.3 Proposals for a top-down, regionally unified European Union 
This chapter has so far detailed the way in which local civil society, from an individualist perspective, 
can set the conditions for active citizen participation within the EU if the EU chooses to engage itself 
through policy and legislative initiatives that will support that participation. Furthermore, a 
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framework of governance, civil cosmopolitanism, has been developed, which aims to reflect these 
top-down and bottom-up strategies. There are two proposals for the EU that arise from the findings 
above, which, if fulfilled, suggest how the ability of local CSOs to engage citizens can be maximised 
and how the civil cosmopolitan framework may be politically feasible. The two proposals are reform 
of EU policy and a pan-European space for local civil society. The financial and economic side is not 
dealt with due to the unknown direction of the Euro, the Union’s budget and the imposition of a 
European Central Bank. While the United Kingdom hopes for a freeze on the next budget, others are 
proposing the budget should increase from 1% to at least 3% of EU GDP.223 At the risk of accusations 
of impracticality, the two proposals are discussed here with regard to their potential development in 
future research. With the dual task of retaining the European institutional balance of power as well 
as engaging the European citizen through direct participation, proposals that are less courageous will 
not fully grasp the seriousness of the democratic challenges facing the EU.  
5.3.1 Policy that communicates with the European citizen 
Europe for Citizens remains the only programme that encourages direct citizen participation and 
active remembrance on a European level. Even then, it is not financially stable and, despite requests 
for a considerable increase of the financial envelope,224 it is questionable whether its success will be 
financially recognised in the near future. There is no genuine effort to devise real human relation-
building techniques. Policymakers view financial challenges and the risk of over-legislating from 
within their own prism and experiences. This mindset needs to change and policy must be adapted 
to focus more on issues at home rather than debates at the EU, in order to reflect changing realities. 
The opportunity exists to do things differently and the Union must communicate through its policy 
that the needs and concerns of future generations can be met and responded to through EU 
governance. The EU can enhance its democratic quality, therefore, by producing policy better 
aligned to the growing awareness of the importance of the local and social dimension in governance. 
What justifies the existence of the EU, for example, if the policy and legislative instruments do not 
correspond with its role as a model for social and economic development? In particular, social and 
cohesion policies that target regional development, such as Europe for Citizens, must provide for the 
citizens what they expect from the Union by incorporating a mix of dialogue-inducing initiatives, the 
possibility for new enterprises and businesses, an emphasis on merging public civil society with the 
EU, the direct participation of citizens in the management and monitoring of policy-making 
processes and investment in research and data collection. Whether this means redesigning current 
policy or creating new policy is a decision for the policymakers.  
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There are two priorities for new policy; first, active citizen participation. Active citizen participation 
was present in a number of CJE projects and even the General Assembly meeting, a meeting 
generally thought of as closed to a board of presidents or directors. Active citizen participation in a 
number of EU policy arenas should aim to address the desire for the Union to foster social 
democracy and transparency. An active civil society program is the second priority. Within its Shared 
Societies Project, the CDM promoted communication and engagement with civil society to the 
leaders it educates, claiming within the MENA, for example, leaders were finding working closer with 
CSOs meant working closer with citizens. Engraining an active civil society program in EU social and 
cohesion policy could focus on eradicating structural social exclusion of individuals. Europe for 
Citizens, although unable to meet current citizen demand, has added value to the EU in terms of 
raising awareness of the EU and contributing to a European public sphere. These two priorities 
however are more than just valuable; they contribute to an overall objective of linking grassroots 
policy initiatives to the EU’s major strategic goals leading up to 2020 and beyond. Europe 2020 is 
leaning towards ambitious but necessary goals for social inclusion, economic growth and 
sustainability that, unless policy is strengthened, are unlikely to be met. A policy initiative that 
transforms how the EU interacts with local civil society e.g. more closely links the EU with local 
institutions, is thus an ever-increasing necessity because the way in which the EU interacts with local 
society is likely to be the way in which the EU will interact with national Governments. Given that 
the implementation of EU policy and funding is effectively made by member states’ national 
administrations, the dependence on local civil society increases. However, if utilised correctly, this 
trio of relations can have a positive effect on EU-member state relations and certainly on moving 
forward with the goals and strategies of Europe 2020.  
One final point concerns the achievement of citizen participation and rendering more concrete the 
idea of deeper relations between the EU, CSOs and national Governments. The connection between 
new policy, new financial instruments and the need for innovation to advance the two could conceal 
better uses of creativity in social policy. Europe 2020, the MFF 2014-2020, the updated Europe for 
Citizens; all of these proposals studied in Chapter Three rely excessively on the use of innovation and 
the idea of the European Union as the “Innovation Union” as the solution.225 The idea behind 
innovation is the investment in multiple different projects with the goal of only a few finding success 
and, finally, for those few to be reinvested back into. This seems to be a key point about innovation 
that has clearly been forgotten in the excitement over the immediate results from applied 
innovative research, which are likely to be technological development and material economic 
growth. There is a risk of an excessively narrow focus on policy initiatives that produce immediate 
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and upfront results that appear to be driven by innovation. For example, policy focusing on citizen 
participation as a legitimisation tool can easily be calculated in terms of upfront costs, i.e. financial 
envelopes, but it is extremely difficult to know the results in advance.226 Thus, it will not be a policy 
priority. In reality, scientists believe it is close to impossible to predict which policies and research 
areas will lead to innovative solutions and results.227 What is true, however, is the need to invest 
either less in the idea of innovation, to avoid skewed perceptions about effective policy, or invest in 
all areas of innovation with a long-term focus, including social innovation.  Furthermore, with regard 
to the achievement of citizen participation in such policy, the use of wording such as innovative 
growth and innovative technological development, to give examples, is complex, confusing, 
uninformative, unclear and worst of all, not motivating for citizen involvement.   
5.3.2 A pan-European space for citizen rights, access and belonging  
Following from the previous proposal for new initiatives and a clearer focus on the long term in EU 
policy is a need for open resources, open education, open access and open societies to discuss these 
new ideas. The Spanish civil society model is a good case study because it reveals what is missing in 
the multi-level structure of the EU and how social investment can address that issue. There is 
currently no open pan-European space for local civil society to formulate strong CSOs and organise 
social spaces for citizen participation. The presence of an anti-EU feeling in Spain in combination 
with a now-booming civil society meant CJE was working on how to reintegrate Spanish citizens 
within the Spanish Government and, less successfully, the EU. A lot of those individuals affected by 
the crisis are now turning to the third sector for education on their rights and to form stronger 
communities. The youth involved with CJE are pushing for active participation in Spain and the EU to 
secure rights for their future. Thus, proposing policy focused on active citizen participation and an 
active civil society program is of critical importance because it indicates some understanding of the 
need to fix a stagnant European community.  Few future proposals talk about the stagnation of 
community within the EU, meaning few proposals recognise that social recovery plays a large part in 
the creation of economic recovery.  
While an ambitious proposal, the creation of pan-European space in combination with new policy 
proposals is necessary to give citizens a practical vision of an open environment where their 
participation in the EU is encouraged and facilitated. The fine points of such a space remain to be 
detailed. In combining the civil society and cosmopolitan theory discourses, this research has sought 
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to reintegrate the social dimension, or the individual, into the EU while incorporating state and top-
down governance strategies. Thus, this research proposes a pan-European space committed to the 
effective and multileveled distribution of political and social authority. The pan-European space 
would therefore serve various purposes, including being an education platform for individuals on 
European citizens’ rights, a help centre for those involved in local civil society or enforcement of 
citizens’ rights, a resource centre for those working at the transnational level and a place for 
communication, debate and discussion between all actors. Even if the nature of European policy 
does not shift to be more socially inclined, the existence of a legitimate European space allows the 
EU, as a minimum, to communicate clearly the policy it wishes to impose upon its citizens.  
The pan-European space itself remains an elusive concept and should be a pivotal point of future 
research. Despite these uncertainties, the workings of a pan-European space are envisioned as 
bringing effectiveness to the Union. Civil society at the local level works to enhance the role of the 
citizen and elite by ensuring the conditions for participation are met. Given that the Union, due to 
institutional structures and legislative requirements, cannot create such conditions itself, there must 
be a point where the Union can engage with the institutions that can, and thus with the citizen. It 
should exist not only to ensure a clear distributive effect of EU policy but also to assure the citizen 
their voice is not simply represented by the voice of their state or political representative at the EP. 
It should exist both virtually and physically as a space for networking, where relations are built 
among the various stakeholders of EU governance to empower citizens at the bottom and advance 
the policy agenda for public benefit at the top. Thus, it has an overall function of connecting local, 
national and international politics together through the shared understanding that European issues 
are important to all levels.  
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CONCLUSION 
Thesis Summary 
In studying the enhancement of the democratic quality of EU governance at a time when the EU 
faces an uncertain future, this thesis tackles a challenging topic with bold proposals. At the start of 
this thesis, it was mentioned that some will consider the conclusions of this work to be overly-
ambitious for the EU. But it should also be stressed that with the number of competing overly-
ambitious proposals being released, as concern for the EU rises, it will come down to a question of 
which of those overly-ambitious proposals should be chosen. In positioning the idea of democratic 
enhancement at the local level (through the use of case studies on the Spanish third sector), this 
thesis has explored the possibility of utilising local civil society to maintain a direct role for the citizen 
within the EU. At the same time, it has questioned the likelihood that the EU could in fact support, 
both politically and economically, increases in the active involvement of local institutions and the 
ordinary citizen within EU policy and decision-making processes. The research looked at both 
existing EU policy and legislation as well as literature on the civil society discourse and cosmopolitan 
theory discourse in relation to international political structures. It was discovered that in the last 
decade the EU has in fact changed tack in terms of its governance structure to incorporate organised 
civil society in the legislative process, but that the utilisation of civil society as a democratisation tool 
has been ineffective due to a predominant focus on civil society in a global context, which 
sensationalises the transnational role of the EU and weakens its local role. In extending 
cosmopolitan theory, this thesis aims to make an original contribution to the field by devising a 
possible governance model called civil cosmopolitanism that would successfully rely on local civil 
societies of EU member states as an instrument for enhancing democracy, without disturbing the 
transnational powers of the EU.  
To test the feasibility and desirability of the model, primary research was conducted in two areas: 
the potential for movement at the Union level in terms of changes to policy and legislation, as well 
as the ability of CSOs to incorporate local communities and individuals into European politics. First, 
research was carried out from within the EP, where face-to-face interviews were conducted with 
staff from various parts of the EP. The personal views and academic opinions of those working for 
the EU were then matched against the trend in current and new proposals for social policy being 
released by the EC. The outcome was a real mismatch between what those within the EP desired, 
and claimed to be working towards, and the actual policies, or lack of policies, currently being 
published. During a time when the EU needs to regain all the trust it can from its citizens, this 
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miscommunication is confusing to citizens and damaging to the reputation of the EU.  Second, two 
case studies on CSOs based in the region of Madrid were carried out, which involved the use of 
surveys, interviews, archival research and participant observation. Conducting these case studies 
involved working at ground level for one to two months in order to gain a well-rounded 
understanding on the building of democratic societies and leaders.  This empirical research 
demonstrated the root of the EU’s ineffective use of civil society. It revealed that CSOs were in fact 
able to help the EU’s governance system by providing training to citizens and elites on the benefits 
of active citizen participation. Both CSOS embodied three core conditions for active citizen 
participation: formulate, organise and motivate. These conditions had been successfully met in 
Spain, as well as other project locations such as the MENA, but not in the barely existent relationship 
between the CSOs and the EU. By not wholly engaging with civil society on all levels, the EU suffers 
from a lack of grounding in local societies where citizens are active in national and international 
politics. Subsequently, it also suffers a lack of common history, European culture, European identity 
and European discourse, where most individuals come to define the social meaning of their EU 
citizenship.  
 The results indicate current EU institutions fall short of being able to guarantee direct citizen 
participation or even protection of citizens’ needs, rights and responsibilities. This evidence alone is 
not enough to suggest the EU suffers a ‘democracy deficit;’ in fact the tight constraints of 
constitutional checks and balances imposed upon its institutions ensure its legitimacy. However, in 
the opinion of this researcher, the democratic quality of EU governance could be improved by more 
closely aligning the EU with its citizens and redesigning the social dimension of EU governance. It 
makes sense to bring the EU back to its original point of departure; the European community.  Given 
that, in terms of enhancing the democratic quality of the EU, academic opinion has largely 
concentrated on reform within the transnational institutions themselves, the purpose of this 
research has been to demonstrate that the social cleavage can be improved by establishing a link 
between the Union and the citizen from the ground up. It was argued that there is in fact room for 
the progression of a modified governance framework, such as civil cosmopolitanism, which, in 
theory, recognises that a shift in the culture of the EU governance structure is necessary to 
incorporate a greater grassroots influence. Over the course of the thesis, civil cosmopolitanism was 
developed into a top-down, regionally unified governance framework with three core components 
that support both the EU and the European citizen in their endeavours. In furthering the 
cosmopolitan theories of David Held, civil cosmopolitanism combined both Held’s cosmopolitan 
discourse with the civil society discourse to produce an elite-led but individually-focused model. It is 
argued that the EU is more likely to succeed as a democracy by working as a governance system that 
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is both bottom-up and top-down orientated, given that the EU must co-exist within a multi-level 
environment. The key to the model is the role local civil society plays as an intermediary point, 
relation-building network and strong institutional base.  
The model itself is acknowledged within this thesis as elaborate in nature and in need of further 
testing. However, the EU is more obliged than any national polity to maintain an image of a 
functioning democracy due to its own plural structures. It is therefore perceived to be realistic to 
expect the EU to wish to engage in more ambitious governance strategies in the immediate future 
that aim to address the social aspect of the crisis over the long term. This thesis suggests two 
strategies that would support the implementation of a governance model such as civil 
cosmopolitanism. First, the EU would have to openly acknowledge there is a need to work with 
policy that is wholly encouraging of active citizen participation and supports the role of local civil 
societies in creating that participation. Second, for the networking created by civil cosmopolitanism 
to have a greater chance of working, a pan-European space should be designed and created. Both 
strategies recognise two simultaneous needs: the need for attention and expertise in the area of 
policy-making at the international level and the need for the distribution of political authority at the 
local level to dispense justice, equality and individual rights.   
Limitations 
It is acknowledged that there are limitations to the results published in this thesis. Predominantly, 
there are limitations that arise from data collection methods and the use of theory to tackle such an 
ambitious topic, given that what is proposed as a result will be considered challenging by many and 
impossible by some. First, these results have been reached focusing solely on the examination of 
Spanish civil society. It is strongly argued that Spain is one of the better choices for a case study, 
given its fragile state yet long-term commitment to the Union as a member state. Spanish civil 
society is also a relatively fledging concept with room for academic thought. The sole examination of 
Spain, however, is not to say that the benefits discovered from studying a local and a transnational 
Spanish civil society are limited in their applicability to the civil society of other member states, 
whether the economy or civil society base of those member states is strong or not. Second, the 
research design employed in this thesis draws heavily on the work of cosmopolitan theorists and is 
thus predominantly theory-based in nature. Cosmopolitan theory is used as the analytical 
framework with which to view the issue of EU governance and questions concerning its democratic 
quality. The size and scope of the issue is limitless when considered in isolation, meaning the use of 
theory in this thesis to strengthen the validity of the research must have a clear focal point. The 
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aspect of cosmopolitan theory that focuses on individualisation has been combined with the civil 
society discourse to create a governance framework that provides clarity to the way cosmopolitan 
theory is perceived to help advance the democratic quality of the EU. There are two limitations with 
this research approach. First, it appears to be the intention of this thesis to reinvent existing theory. 
Consequently, the framework appears overly-ambitious and unrealistic. The advancement of 
cosmopolitan theory however was only ever intended to revitalise and refresh existing democratic 
theory, in order to contextualise it with regards to the EU. The second limitation applies to methods 
of testing the framework that are employed in this thesis. Data relies heavily on the opinion of 
survey participants and EP interviewees of which there are not a huge number. It is argued, 
however, that when compared to existing EU policy and initiative proposals, those who were 
interviewed or surveyed offered valid insight into the potential benefits of a cosmopolitan 
governance framework i.e. more citizen-orientated policy or a greater focus on local civil society 
involvement. Great care was taken to ensure a variety of EU personnel were chosen. Furthermore, 
testing the framework outside of the EP largely takes a sub-level approach, adopting a differing 
perspective to the summit approach more commonly considered in research on the EU. In this 
sense, this research does not offer much of a focus on the transnational institutions within the EU 
but, rather, concentrates on the institutions in the field. The primary research question asked how 
local civil society could advance the democratic quality of the EU and therefore it is expected that 
local-body institutions will be the core focus of the research. With regard to the EU’s social cleavage 
however, the examination of local civil society only gives a limited view of other potential avenues to 
help create a more socially-orientated EU. This is why it was so important that a top-down focus be 
present throughout the research to ensure the study of local civil society is understood in the 
context of EU governance, for example, the study on EU social policy and any existing political or 
economic incentives to further the engagement of local civil society. The use of multiple data 
collection tools to compare and analyse primary material as well as the mix of a top-down and 
bottom-up research design ensure the research adequately tests the theoretical framework and 
offer options to further the democratic quality of the EU.    
Future Research 
During these challenging economic times, there is likely to be some unwillingness to make any major 
decisions regarding the state of democracy within the EU. It has also been stressed, however, that 
the EU faces such an uncertain future that the choice is likely to be between proposals that are 
drastic in nature or that let the Union collapse. The latter will have significant economic and social 
costs for Europe as a whole. Thus, future research on topics similar to those presented in this thesis 
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should be continued. Primarily, this thesis offers a theoretical framework that, it is argued, 
represents a necessary extension of the existing EU governance structure if the EU wishes to 
advance democratically. Civil cosmopolitanism is not an attempt at forecasting the future of EU 
governance, but rather an attempt at strengthening EU governance as it currently stands. As the 
section on limitations clearly indicates, civil cosmopolitanism is yet to be understood as a desirable, 
feasible and, ultimately, secure governance framework with which to move forward. Therefore, 
while the political dynamics of the current crisis have been explored in this thesis and subsequent 
proposals have been offered, civil cosmopolitanism has not been fully placed in the context of 
urgency that currently surrounds the EU. The model itself requires full development at European 
level, which will involve further validity testing of its characteristics against the backdrop of a severe 
crisis.  
It is also the case that the proposals put forward follow heavily from the results of the case study 
data on Spain. However, the proposals suggested in this thesis follow the theme that their 
implementation allows the ordinary citizen to make sense of the EU and vice versa. As such, any 
proposal that continues the theme will have a bolstering effect on itself in that, once committed to 
by multiple actors, it will be able to generate stronger relations between the EU and the citizen as 
well as a better functioning EU. This prediction flows from the assumption that the use of 
democratisation tools that engage the citizen, e.g. local civil society, is to provide for individuals’ 
rights and links democracy to the theory of justice. If the proposals offered in this research are not 
pursued, future research investigating EU-citizen relations could look into effective socialisation 
strategies that empower the citizen at the global level, where the nation-state cannot ensure justice; 
that citizens’ rights, needs and responsibilities are met. The issue is a timely one in global political 
literature and should be supplemented by various opinions as the European Year of the Citizen 
begins. For example, 2013 offers the chance to hear ideas on more attractive reform and 
governance strategies directly from citizens from multiple member states, which could be a 
promising idea for a broader study on enhancing the democratic quality of EU governance.           
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Appendix B: Interview questions (English Version) for Interview with Ricardo Ibarra, President of 
Consejo de la Juventud de España (CJE) 
12 July, 2012 
General Research Questions  
Please tell me a bit about yourself before you entered into the CJE. 
Congratulations on becoming President of the CJE in 2010; what is your main goal for the 
organisation?  
In what ways do you believe the CJE as a civil society organisation (CSO) can democratise society and 
the region of Spain? 
How does the CJE go about achieving its objectives? 
Can you tell me a bit about the successes experienced by the CJE to date? What have these meant 
for the youth of Spain? 
How do you see the CJE progressing / developing as a CSO over the next decade? 
Specific Research Questions  
One of the main themes of interest at the CJE is the European Union. There is concern that 
integration has only produced economic results and has not formed the deep sense of political and 
social community as it was supposed to.  
How does the CJE plan to contribute to the construction of a more social Europe? 
In the document published by CJE called ‘El Tema Sobre Europa’ there is reference to “una identidad 
europa” as the base of a social Europe. How does the formulation of a European identity influence 
the goals of the CJE? 
As a regional CSO, the CJE can act as a link between the European Union and the youth of Spain. 
What is the role for youth in creating a social Europe?  
I mentioned in my introduction that I have designed a theoretical model to help support the 
implementation of a more social Europe. The model is based on cosmopolitan democracy - 
prioritisation of individual rights – where the creation of strong local institutions and the ability to 
network assumes a more democratic system of European Union governance.  
What are your thoughts on the ability of local institutions to strengthen individual citizen rights – 
“individualisation” - within the European Union? 
On behalf of the CJE, would you encourage the implementation of such a model with regard to the 
best interests of Spanish youth?   
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Appendix C: Interview questions (English Version) for Interview with Juan Gonzalez, Director of 
the Documentation Centre of Consejo de la Juventud de España (CJE)  
12 July, 2012  
General Research Questions  
When did you start working for the CJE?  
 
How does the documentation centre work inside the institution?  
 
How do you personally feel about the work that CJE does for young people? 
What can you tell me about the topic of the role of youth in the European Union?  
Specific Research Questions  
What would you say to the argument that local civil society, such as Spain, can help advance the 
quality of democracy of European Union governance?  
What can you tell me about the amount of material you get in the documentation centre to do with 
helping youth achieve their rights as citizens of the European Union? Follow up question: Does or 
should it appear a topic of importance do you think? 
Can you please clarify for me why there is not a greater focus on the role of youth in the Union 
within the documentation centre of the CJE?  
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Appendix D: Interview questions (English Version) for interview with Rubén Campos, Programme 
Coordinator of Club de Madrid (CDM) 
17 July, 2012 
General Questions 
Please tell me a bit about your involvement in Club de Madrid (CDM). What does CDM mean to you 
personally? 
How has the organisation achieved its goal of furthering and strengthening democracy worldwide 
since its initiation almost 11 years ago? 
Where do you see the organisation following the next decade? 
As the only civil society organisation (CSO) that is made up of 90 former heads of state and 
democratic governance, how does CDM intend to use the asset of its membership to further 
democracy in the region of Spain? 
The CDM is supported institutionally by the Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el 
Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE); as a team is there much of a commitment to practical programmes focused 
on the European Union? 
As a non-profit organisation similar to most CSOs, what are your thoughts on the economic rationale 
behind the EU to invest more in social policy and local institutions? 
Does the European Social Fund provide funding and how is that funding used so it best represents 
the individual citizen? 
Specific Questions  
How would you define a citizen and does CDM represent these individuals? How? 
Can you tell me what is in the pipeline at CDM in terms of creating more of a social Europe? 
The organisation works specifically with leaders all over the world to help implement or strengthen 
democracy. What does the organisation do by way of working with local individuals and helping 
them participate as citizens?  
How can the Spanish citizen utilise CDM to establish a deeper connection with the European Union?  
The Shared Societies Project is a great initiative to bring about more inclusive societies, but there 
lacks any mention of the European Union where other major international institutions are 
mentioned such as the United Nations and African Union, why? 
How will Club of Madrid bring the Shared Societies Project to the European Union?  
What does CDM hope to achieve from being a Member of the EU Civil Society Platform for 
Multilingualism?  
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Appendix E: Interview questions (English Version) for interviews with Alicia Cebada Romero, 
Professor in International Public Law and International Relations, and Helena Soleto Muñoz, 
Professor of Procesal Law, at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (UC3M). 
19 July, 2012 
General Research Questions  
You have written extensively on the external action of the European Union. What are your thoughts 
on the democratic quality of the Union’s governance system? 
Can you tell me what feedback you have had to your suggestions for the Union to act more as a civil 
power model on the international stage?  
Before the Union can be more civilian-orientated externally, do you believe there needs to be a 
similar shift internally?  
Specific Research Questions  
What do you know about the Europe for Citizens initiative? 
What are your beliefs as to why the Union has not been able to create the social community and 
idea of a European Identity as it set out to do? 
What do you think it means to be a citizen? 
As a citizen of the European Union, where do you think the Union could create more opportunity for 
its citizens to participate in its governance structure? 
What are your thoughts on the argument that local and regional civil societies should be utilised to 
strengthen relations between the citizen and the European Union? 
Do you think civil society organisations should play a role in the governance structure of the Union? 
Where do you stand theoretically in your own work with regard to international organisations such 
as the European Union?  
Would there be any reasons why you would not wish for further research on the implementation of 
a grassroots-based model of governance within the Union to be carried out?  
What, if any, do you think are the political reasons behind the need to adopt or reject a theoretical 
approach that prioritises civilian rights (economic, political, intercultural, social, civil)? 
  
Kirsten Jane Mander 99543103 Page 132 
 
Appendix F: Interview questions for interviews with staff members from the European Parliament 
1 – 20 October, 2012 
General Questions 
What is your primary goal for your nation-state as a staff member the European Parliament (EP)? 
What is your primary goal for Europe? 
Specific Questions  
The European Union Governance Structure 
What kind of Europe do you want for yourself and future generations? 
While the Union is changing and adapting its governance structure, what political incentives for a 
more grassroots-structured top-down / bottom-up governance system do you think might exist?  
In your opinion, is the Union governance system structured appropriately to deal most efficiently 
with regional development?  
Do you think an increase in citizen-led initiatives or an increase in citizen participation in general will 
further the democratic quality of the Union? 
Do you think there is a need for the EU to focus on increasing citizen participation? If not, why? If so, 
how do you think we can increase citizen participation in EU decision-making processes / the 
governance system? 
Regional Development and cohesion policy 
What do you believe are the main challenges and opportunities for regional development within the 
Union over the next decade? 
When we discuss social policy, it most commonly refers to social in the economic sense, i.e. 
employment and market policy. In the new legislative package for 2014-2020, there is a greater push 
for the social dimension i.e. civil liberties and the people. What do you see this doing for citizen 
participation and regional development in the EU? 
Changes to EU policy and the structuring of funds seem to be about simplifying administrative 
processes to maximise outcome for beneficiaries. How do you think regions and local communities 
can complement this effort? 
Could the push for outcome / results-based incentives be detrimental in anyway?  
The future of the EU seems to be focused on internal orientation, towards more economic, social 
and territorial cohesion and inclusion. What do you think about this assumption? Do you think this is 
contrary to perhaps some of the previous policy directions pushing for EU competitiveness in a 
global context?  
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Appendix G: Survey for Spanish civil society organisations (Original Version: Spanish) (participants 
were involved in the 2012 General Assembly Meeting for Youth Organisations)  
13 – 15 July, 2012 
El papel del ciudadano y las organizaciones de la sociedad civil 
Prólogo: El siguiente cuestionario se enmarca dentro de una 
investigación realizada por una estudiante de Postgrado de Nueva 
Zelanda, Kirsten Mander, quien plantea la siguiente pregunta en su 
estudio: ¿puede democratizar un sistema de gobierno la sociedad civil? 
El foco del estudio es la sociedad civil española y su habilidad de 
democratizar la Unión Europea a través de proveer al “ciudadano” más 
acceso a la participación.   
Kirsten quisiera invitarle a participar en una encuesta corta con el 
propósito de recopilar datos. Todas las respuestas son confidenciales y 
serán empleadas exclusivamente con fines de investigación. Por favor, 
rellene el siguiente documento con bolígrafo azul o negro seleccionando 
la mejor respuesta y devuélvalo a Kirsten.   
Clasificación 
Usted es: Hombre  Edad: 15-18        18-24          25-50          50-70         70+ 
    Mujer    
  
¿Cuál es su ocupación? _____________________  
 
¿Cuál es su razón para participar en la Asamblea General del CJE*? _________________________ 
 
¿Es ciudadano/a español/a? Sí          No 
 
Cuestiones sobre la Unión Europea 
1). Los ciudadanos de la Unión Europea entienden lo qué es la Unión y cómo funciona.** 
 
1  2   3  4  5 
Totalmente En desacuerdo  Neutral  De acuerdo Totalmente    
en desacuerdo        de acuerdo   
             
 
    
*Consejo de la Juventud de España 
**No hay definición de ‘Ciudadano de la Unión Europea’ en la documentación de la Unión,  pero 
“Ciudadanía Europea” aparece definido en al Tratado de Maastricht como   “es ciudadano de la 
Unión toda persona que posea la nacionalidad de un Estado miembro” 
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2). El ciudadano Europeo está involucrado en los procesos de toma de decisiones de la Unión 
Europea.  
 
1  2   3  4  5 
Totalmente En desacuerdo  Neutral  De acuerdo Totalmente    
en desacuerdo        de acuerdo  
 
3). Me gustaría que la Unión Europea enfocara más sus acciones en la participación, en vez de 
representación, de sus ciudadanos.  
 
1  2   3  4  5 
Totalmente En desacuerdo  Neutral  De acuerdo Totalmente    
en desacuerdo        de acuerdo  
 
Cuestiones sobre la sociedad civil (grupos de ciudadanos organizados) 
 
 
4) ¿Cuánta importancia cree que tiene la sociedad civil dentro de un sistema de gobierno 
democrático?  
 
 
 
 
 
5). Las organizaciones de la sociedad civil (instituciones locales) promueven los derechos sociales de 
los individuos, por ejemplo, el derecho participar en los asuntos políticos nacionales e 
internacionales.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Muchisíma En 
general 
Una 
poca 
No 
mucha 
Nada 
 
Muchisíma En 
general 
Una 
poca 
No 
mucha 
Nada 
 
Kirsten Jane Mander 99543103 Page 135 
 
 
6). Para ser democrático un sistema de gobierno internacional, debería adoptar una estrategia 
“bottom-up,” es decir, debería representar (podríamos utilizar mejor “representación” u  
“organismo de representación”) en las instituciones locales (p.e. Consejo de la Juventud de España) 
más que un foco en instituciones de alto nivel (p.e. El Parlamento Europeo).   
1  2   3  4  5 
Totalmente En desacuerdo  Neutral  De acuerdo Totalmente    
en desacuerdo        de acuerdo  
 
Cuestión sobre la participación de la sociedad civil en la Unión Europea.  
Por favor, clasifica cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones de 1 a 4 según la importancia que tenga 
para usted. 
1 = Nada importante  
4 = Muy importante 
  
Abreviaturas: 
UE = Unión Europea 
 
Mecanismos más accesibles para que el ciudadano participe en el sistema de gobierno de la UE a 
título individual: ______ 
Democratizar el sistema de gobierno de la UE a través de su representación en instituciones locales / 
regionales / nacionales: ______ 
Democratizar la UE otorgando más poder al Parlamento Europeo: ______ 
Mantener la UE tal y como está de tal forma que pueda centrar sus esfuerzos en superar la crisis 
financiera: ______ 
 
Cualquier otro comentario: 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Muchísimas gracias por participar  
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Appendix H: Survey for Spanish civil society organisations (English Version) (participants were 
involved in the 2012 General Assembly Meeting for Youth Organisations)  
13 – 15 July, 2012 
 
The role of the citizen and Civil Society Organisations 
Prologue: This is a study undertaken by a postgraduate student (Kirsten 
Mander) from New Zealand, which asks can civil society democratise a 
system of governance? Kirsten is focused on Spanish civil society and its 
ability to democratise the European Union by providing the “citizen” 
greater access to participation. Kirsten would like to invite you to 
participate in a short multi-choice survey for the purposes of data 
collection. All answers will remain strictly confidential and will be used 
solely for the purposes of this thesis. Please circle the desired choice in 
blue or black ink and return to Kirsten. 
Classification 
 
Are you: Male   Age: 15-18        18-24          25-50          50-70         70+ 
   Female    
  
What is your occupation? _____________________  
 
What is your reason for attending the CJE* General Assembly Meeting? _______________________ 
 
Are you a Spanish national citizen? Yes          No 
 
Questions regarding the European Union 
 
1). Citizens of the European Union understand what it is and how it functions.** 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly              Disagree  Neutral              Agree                Strongly  
Disagree                     Agree 
 
 
*Consejo de la Juventud de España 
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**There is no definition of European citizen in European Union documentation, but Citizenship of 
the Union is defined in the Maastricht Treaty as ‘any national of a Member State is a citizen of the 
Union.’  
 
2). The European citizen is involved in decision-making processes of the European Union.  
 
1   2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly  
Disagree       Agree 
 
 
 
3). I would like to see the European Union focus more on citizen participation. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly  
Disagree       Agree 
 
 
Questions regarding local civil society (organised groups of civilians) 
 
 
4). How important should local civil society be in a transnational governance system? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5). Local civil society organisations promote the social rights of individuals, for example the right to 
participate in international governance matters where relevant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Very 
Much 
Generally Some-
What 
Not 
Very 
Not at 
all 
 
Very 
Much 
Generally Some-
What 
Not 
Really 
Not at 
all 
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6). In order to be democratic, an international system of governance should adopt bottom-up 
governance strategies. That is to say, the system should focus on local institutions (such as the CJE) 
more than focusing on high-level institutions (such as the European Parliament) 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly  
Disagree       Agree 
 
Question on involvement of local civil society in the European Union 
Please give the following statements a rank from 1-4 in terms of their importance to you as a citizen.   
1 = Least Important  
4 = Most Important 
  
Key 
EU = European Union 
 
Accessible ways to participate in the EU governance system: ______ 
Democratise the EU governance system by focusing on local/regional/national institutions: ______ 
Democratise the EU by giving more powers to the European Parliament: ______ 
Leave the EU to focus on the financial crisis: ______ 
 
Any other comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
  
Thank you very much for your participation   
 
  
